Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1979
• Citation: 401 A.2d 148
• Parties: Peter VICNIRE v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 148

401 A.2d 148

Peter VICNIRE v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 1, 1979.

Berman, Berman & Simmons, P. A. by Paul F. Macri (orally), Gary Goldberg, Lewiston, for plaintiff.

Preti, Flaherty & Beliveau by David M. Cohen, Portland (orally), for Ford Motor Credit Corp.

Jonathan S. Piper, Portland (orally), for Ford Life Ins. Co.

Herbert A. Crommett, Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ.

McKUSICK, Chief Justice.

Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company (hereafter "Ford Credit") and Ford Life Insurance Company (hereafter "Ford Life") appeal from a Superior Court Judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding plaintiff Peter Vicnire damages on claims arising out of Ford Credit's financing of his purchase of a new pickup truck and Ford Life's insuring of Vicnire's ability to make the requisite installment payments in the event of his death or disability. Plaintiff cross-appeals, challenging parts of the jury's verdict and certain actions by the presiding justice. We deny plaintiff's cross-appeal; we deny in part and sustain in part Ford Credit's appeal; and we deny Ford Life's appeal.

On June 8, 1974, plaintiff Vicnire purchased a new pickup truck from Auburn Motor Sales, Inc., on an installment plan. Auburn Motors assigned the contract to defendant Ford Credit. In addition, Vicnire purchased credit life and disability insurance from Ford Life. James Murray, a salesman employed by Auburn Motor Sales Inc., handled all negotiations with plaintiff covering the purchase and financing of the truck and the purchase of the insurance.

On July 18, 1974, Vicnire became totally disabled and had to leave his job. The disability stemmed from an automobile accident in 1969 in which Vicnire had sustained cranial injuries. Shortly after his layoff, plaintiff wrote Ford Life requesting that the company make subsequent payments on his truck pursuant to the disability policy. Ford Life refused, claiming that Vicnire's disability was not covered by the policy since it resulted from an injury sustained prior to the execution of the contract.

Plaintiff made the installment payments for July and August 1974 but defaulted in September. On October 8, 1974, an employee of Ford Credit left a letter requesting payment at Vicnire's house while he was absent. On October 23, 1974, employees of Ford Credit repossessed plaintiff's truck by taking it from his driveway at 1:00 a. m. without notifying him of the repossession.

On April 28, 1975, plaintiff brought an action against Ford Credit and Ford Life. Against Ford Credit plaintiff sought damages for (1) alleged violations of the former Truth-in-Lending Act, P.L.1969, ch. 423, § 35, 9 M.R.S.A. §§ 3901 Et seq. (repealed by P.L.1975, ch. 446, § 1, effective June 12, 1975); (2) alleged conversions of $650 cash from plaintiff's home by an employee of Ford Credit on October 8, 1974, and certain items of personal property in the truck at the time of repossession; and (3) mental suffering resulting from intentional acts of employees of Ford Credit. Against Ford Life plaintiff sought to enforce Ford Life's obligation on the contract for credit disability insurance.

After a full trial the presiding justice propounded special interrogatories to the jury on critical aspects of the case. The jury found for plaintiff on all claims against defendants. Defendants then filed motions for judgments n. o. v. and new trials. The presiding justice granted defendant Ford Credit judgment n. o. v. in regard to the jury's finding for plaintiff that (1) Ford Credit had converted $650 from plaintiff's home and (2) Ford Credit had engaged in a course of conduct which inflicted actionable mental suffering on plaintiff. The presiding justice denied all other motions and granted plaintiff interest on the damages award computed in accordance with the interest statute in effect on the date of entry of judgment, 14 M.R.S.A. § 1602 (Supp.1978-79).

I. Vicnire v. Ford Credit

A. Truth-in-Lending Act

Both parties on appeal challenge specific portions of the presiding justice's instructions regarding plaintiff's claim under the former "Truth-in-Lending Act," P.L.1969, ch. 423, § 35, 9 M.R.S.A. §§ 3901 Et seq. (repealed eff. June 12, 1975). Defendant Ford Credit contends that the presiding justice erred in stating as a matter of law that the parties had engaged in a "consumer credit transaction" within the coverage of the act, while plaintiff Vicnire argues that the presiding justice erred in limiting his damages to $1,000 regardless of the number of specific violations of the act found by the jury.

We find merit in neither contention. First, defendant Ford Credit waived its right to challenge the presiding justice's instruction on appeal by failing to raise an objection below. Perry v. Butler, 142 Me. 154, 48 A.2d 631 (1946). But even if the point had been properly preserved, the record fully justifies the presiding justice's decision to rule as a matter of law that the parties engaged in a "consumer credit transaction" to which the provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Act applied. Former 9 M.R.S.A. § 3903 defined a consumer transaction as one in which "the money, property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes," while section 3904 excluded from the act "(c)redit transactions involving extensions of credit for business or commercial purposes . . . ." Vicnire's unrebutted testimony that the truck was the only family vehicle and his sole means of transportation to his regular job conclusively established that his use of the truck was primarily personal. Evidence presented by Ford Credit to show that Vicnire also used the truck to transport cattle that he sold as a sideline was clearly insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find in favor of Ford Credit. Nor could a reasonable juror have placed much weight on the fact that a clause of the purchase contract stated that the purchase was for "Business or Commercial Use," in light of the admission of Ford Credit's former office manager that the clause was included in all contracts for the sale of trucks regardless of the intended use of the vehicle.

Similarly, there is no error in the presiding justice's conclusion that former section 3922 of the Maine Truth-in-Lending Act limited plaintiff's damages to $1,000 regardless of the number of violations of the act by a defendant in a single transaction. Section 3922 provided:

"(A)ny creditor who fails In connection with any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person any information required under this chapter to be disclosed to that person is liable to that person in an amount equal to the sum of:

"A. Twice the amount of the finance charge In connection with the transaction, except that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; . . . ." (Emphasis added)

The emphasized portions of this section evidence a clear legislative intent to place a $1,000 ceiling on damages for all violations of the statute that arose in any single credit transaction. Plaintiff urges us to depart from the plain meaning of section 3922 on the basis of a federal case. Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973), which interpreted a similar provision of the federal version of the truth-in-lending act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(1) (1969), to allow multiple recoveries, and a subsequent congressional amendment of the federal act to state expressly that multiple recoveries would not be allowed, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(g) (1974). We reject both arguments. The Thomas Case is distinguishable from the instant case on its facts, ¹ and the subsequent congressional amendment may well have reflected a clarification of Congress' original intent rather than an acknowledgment that the former section allowed multiple recoveries.

B. Conversion

The jury found that employees of Ford Credit converted (1) certain items of personal property which were in Vicnire's truck at the time of its repossession and (2) a bag containing $650 in cash which Vicnire had left unattended inside his house. On motion of defendant, the presiding justice set aside the jury's verdict finding that Ford Credit's employees had converted $650 in cash, but upheld the jury's finding that they converted the property left in plaintiff's truck. Both parties appeal from adverse rulings of the presiding justice.

In challenging the presiding justice's grant to defendant of judgment n. o. v. regarding the alleged conversion of $650, plaintiff argues that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. We disagree. The sole evidence linking an employee of Ford Credit to the crime was Vicnire's own testimony that he left $650 in a paper bag inside his house on October 8, 1974, and that when he returned he found that the money was missing and that a letter from Ford Credit had been left on a table inside his home. A Ford Credit employee admitted visiting plaintiff's house on October 8, 1974, but insisted that he had left the letter in a screen door and never entered the house. We concur with the presiding justice's conclusion that this evidence was "entirely lacking in sufficiency" to support the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

Nor do we find merit in defendant's contention that the presiding justice should have granted it judgment n. o. v. in regard to plaintiff's second conversion claim for $350 of personal property on grounds that the evidence failed to establish (1) that plaintiff had complied with a contractual provision requiring plaintiff to make written demand for the items in question within a specific time period and (2) that the employees of Ford Credit who allegedly converted the property were acting within the scope of their employment or that Ford Credit had ratified their actions. By failing to raise the issue below, ...