Victor v. State, 4D10–2276.
Decision Date | 15 August 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 4D10–2276.,4D10–2276. |
Citation | 126 So.3d 1171 |
Parties | Gregory VICTOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Antony P. Ryan, Regional Counsel, and Louis G. Carres, Special Assistant Conflict Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Gregory Victor appeals the final judgment of the trial court, adjudicating him guilty of carjacking after a jury trial. He argues that the trial court erred by not conducting a “genuineness analysis” pursuant to Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996), after he objected to the use of numerous peremptory challenges used by the State to strike black prospective jurors. We agree, reverse, and remand for a new trial.
After a party raises a timely objection that a peremptory challenge is being used in a racially discriminatory manner (step 1),
the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2). If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained (step 3). The court's focus in step 3 is not on the reasonableness of the explanation but rather its genuineness. Throughout this process, the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial discrimination.
Id. at 764 (footnotes omitted).
[S]tep 2 of the Melbourne test requires only that the proffered reasons be facially ethnic-neutral. If the reasons are not ethnic-based, the trial judge must then assess the genuineness of the reasons in order to determine whether they are pretextual. A conclusion that the proffered reasons are not ethnic-neutral is not synonymous with a finding of pretext. The former requires only a superficial analysis to determine facial, ethnic neutrality, whereas the latter requires a judicial assessment of credibility of both the proffered reasons and the attorney or party proffering them.
Greene v. State, 718 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (emphasis added). See also Bellamy v. Crosby, 31 So.3d 895, 899 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) () .
Although Melbourne “does not require the trial court to recite a perfect script or incant specific words in order to properly comply with its analysis under step three,” the trial court must still “weigh[ ] the genuineness of a reason just as it would any other disputed fact.” Wimberly v. State, 118 So.3d 816, 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Hayes v. State, 94 So.3d 452, 463 (Fla.2012)). “Therefore, where the record is completely devoid of any indication that the trial court considered circumstances relevant to whether a strike was exercised for a discriminatory purpose, the reviewing court, which is confined to the cold record before it, cannot assume that a genuineness inquiry was actually conducted in order to defer to the trial court.” Id. at 821 (quoting Hayes, 94 So.3d at 463). In fact, “Florida's appellate courts have fairly consistently reversed for a new trial where the record provides no indication that the trial court engaged in the required genuineness inquiry.” Id. (quoting Hayes, 94 So.3d at 463–64).
In Wimberly, we approved of the trial court's genuineness analysis pursuant to Melbourne because the record in that case reflected that the court assessed “the credibility of the proffered reasons and determine[d] whether these reasons were genuine in light of the circumstances of the case and the total course of the voir dire in question.” Id. at 822.
The record indicates that, when the defense raised Melbourne objections to jurors 3 and 7, the court referred to relevant circumstances—including the racial make-up of the venire, prior strikes exercised against the same racial group, and a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror—in determining that the state's proffered reasons for striking those jurors were genuine. The fact that the trial court did not incant magic words to indicate that it considered the same circumstances when striking juror 23 does not suggest to us that the court did not undertake a genuineness inquiry at that time.
Id. at 826 (emphasis added).
However, in Bellamy, the First District reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial because the record was devoid of any findings that the purportedly neutral reasons for striking the jurors was not pre-textual. Bellamy, 31 So.3d at 896, 901. Although the trial court found the State's reasons for striking the jurors to be race-neutral, “it did not engage in the genuineness determination part of the analysis at all.” Id. at 899.
[T]he trial court did not make a finding as to whether the reason offered for the strike was a pretext. Instead, it simply stated, “I have heard all of the Neil1 challenges that have been made, and there have been race-neutral reasons given for the challenges.” It did not make the next step of going on to the third part of the analysis, determining the genuineness of the state's reasons.
Id. at 900.See also Tetreault v. State, 24 So.3d 1242, 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) () .
Here, after the State moved to strike a prospective juror, Ms. G., a black female, defense counsel asked for a race-neutral reason. The State responded: “She was arrested and she mentioned her son was arrested.” Defense counsel noted that the State had not moved to strike other members on the panel who were also arrested, to which the State argued: The trial court responded:
The State then moved to strike Ms. C. Defense counsel asked for a race-neutral reason for the strike, and the State noted that she was arrested for a code violation. Defense counsel argued that when she was questioned, she said she would be impartial.The trial court responded: “But it's still a race-neutral reason....”
After the State moved to strike the only black male prospective juror, Mr. H., defense counsel again asked for a race-neutral reason. The State supported its strike by arguing that Mr. H.'s family member was arrested for attempted murder, and
more so than that, when he responded to me about when I was asking, again, negative feelings towards law enforcement, your Honor may recall how he jumped and talked about the shoot to kill order that was involving his nephew, for no reason, that he wanted to go into. That's my reason.
The following transpired:
The State then moved to strike Ms. N., a black female:
State: When she was talking about the police to [defense counsel], as to what they will and won't do, she made a point of jumping up and saying, I have personal experience with a police officer lying, and I quote, to make a point.
Defense: Judge, she didn't jump up at all. She just said a police officer lied, and that was to the point of saying whether or not police officers will lie. This is getting to be a pattern. We're striking all of the black prospective panel.
State: For the record, your Honor, Ms. D. is on the panel. She is an African American female.
Defense: The State has made strikes against or cause challenges against one, two, three, four, five, six—no. I'm sorry. Six. Seven, and this will be eighth black member of the prospective panel.
Court: The Court finds a race-neutral reason.
The State then moved to strike Ms. J., another black female, based on the fact that she was on community service. Defense counsel objected and argued that the State was engaging in a pattern of discrimination. The State noted that a black female remained on the panel, and the trial court allowed the strike, merely stating, “okay.”
As was the case in Bellamy,Tetreault, and Simmons, the trial court found the State's reasons to be race neutral but never considered the genuineness of the State's purported race-neutral reasons, even after appellant alleged purposeful discrimination. Instead, the...
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