Victory Distributors, Inc. v. Ayer Division of the District Court Department
| Decision Date | 10 May 2001 |
| Citation | 435 Mass. 136,755 NE 2d 273 |
| Parties | VICTORY DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. AYER DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT. VICTORY DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. MARLBOROUGH DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.
F. Joseph Gentili for the plaintiff.
Elizabeth Klein Frumkin, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.
Victory Distributors, Inc. (Victory), appeals from the decisions of a single justice of this court denying its two petitions under G. L. c. 211, § 3. Victory sought orders from the single justice compelling the Ayer Division of the District Court Department (Ayer court) and the Marlborough Division of the District Court Department (Marlborough court) to "[a]ccept, process, hold show cause hearings and decide on the merits" its applications for criminal complaints.1 Although Victory alleges that the Ayer court and the Marlborough court refused to accept its applications, a clerk-magistrate in each court received the applications for filing purposes and thus "accepted" them. See discussion, infra. Essentially, then, Victory sought orders compelling the Ayer court and the Marlborough court to hold show cause hearings and issue criminal complaints, should probable cause support such complaints. The single justice denied Victory's requests, concluding that Victory was not entitled to relief as the actions of the Ayer court and the Marlborough court did not violate a substantive right.
Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is available only in extraordinary circumstances. See Montanino v. Boston, 425 Mass. 1025, 1026 (1997). A party seeking review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, must demonstrate that his or her substantive rights have been violated and that there is no other adequate or effective avenue of relief. See Bradford v. Knights, 427 Mass. 748, 749 (1998), quoting McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 495, 497 (1995). We will not disturb an order of a single justice denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, unless there is an abuse of discretion or other error of law. See Adoption of Iris, 427 Mass. 582, 586 (1998), citing Department of Mental Retardation v. Kendrew, 418 Mass. 50, 53 (1994).
Victory was entitled to file applications for the issuance of criminal complaints, which it did, and to have the divisions of the District Court act on those applications, which they did. Victory was not entitled to show cause hearings or to favorable court action on such applications. Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the single justice.
We summarize the facts from the undisputed documentary materials contained in the record. Victory, which owns and operates a chain of grocery stores, filed applications with the Ayer court and the Marlborough court at various times for criminal complaints against customers who had paid for their groceries with "bad" checks. It alleged that these customers had committed larceny by check under G. L. c. 266, § 37.
The Ayer court. Between April and August, 1999, Victory filed fifty applications for criminal complaints in the Ayer court. An assistant clerk-magistrate received the applications, and a hearing on each application was scheduled for September 23, 1999. On that date, a Victory representative appeared before a District Court judge in the Ayer court.2 The judge said that he would not issue complaints on Victory's applications because the police, the district attorney's office, and the court lacked the resources necessary to pursue these matters. He stated that Victory was using the criminal justice system as a collection agency and that its recourse was the small claims session. On that same date, the assistant clerk-magistrate, authorized by the judge, noted on each of the fifty applications that no complaints would issue for the reasons given by the judge, and he referred Victory to the small claims department.3
The Marlborough court. On September 10, 1999, Victory filed two applications for criminal complaints in the Marlborough court. A clerk-magistrate notified Victory in writing that she could not "accept" these two applications because the banks on which the checks were drawn were located outside the court's district.4 The clerk-magistrate indicated that venue was proper only in the district in which the drawee bank is located. This interpretation was wrong as a matter of law. See infra. Although the clerk-magistrate termed her action a refusal to "accept" Victory's applications, she did receive, and thus "accept," them for filing purposes. Her action effectively was a decision to deny the issuance of a complaint.
On September 22, 1999, Victory wrote a letter to a District Court judge in the Marlborough court informing the judge of the basis on which the clerk-magistrate had disposed of its applications and requesting that the judge "review" the applications. Victory did not request a hearing, and none was held. Cf. District Court Standards of Judicial Practice: The Complaint Procedures standard 3:21 (1975) ("If the clerk denies an application and if the complainant manifests serious dissatisfaction, he should be told that he may request a new hearing before a judge of the court"). But see commentary to standard 3:21 ( ). According to Victory, the District Court judge did not respond to its letter. We consider the judge's silence as a denial of Victory's request for review and an implicit affirmation of the clerk-magistrate's decision denying Victory's applications.
One month later, Victory sent a letter to the Chief Justice for Administration and Management complaining about the applications it had filed in both the Ayer and Marlborough courts. An administrative attorney in that office responded that Victory was not a private person under Mass. R. Crim. P. 4 (b), 378 Mass. 849 (1979), and therefore was not authorized to file applications for the issuance of criminal complaints. See, in this regard, note 6, infra.
Victory then filed its petitions under G. L. c. 211, § 3, requesting the single justice to order the Ayer court and the Marlborough court to "[a]ccept, process, hold show cause hearings and decide on the merits" its applications for criminal complaints. The single justice denied the petitions. He held in each case that Victory was not entitled to relief The single justice also stated that the Marlborough court clerk-magistrate's interpretation of the proper venue for the applications was "unduly restrictive" and that a "complaint under G. L. c. 266, § 37, may be brought in the judicial district where the goods were received in exchange for the bad check."5
Victory first contends that a private citizen6 has a substantive right to file an application for a criminal complaint and that the Ayer and Marlborough courts violated this right by refusing to accept its applications. A private citizen does have a right to file an application for a criminal complaint with respect to misdemeanors, but neither the Ayer court nor the Marlborough court violated this right.
By enacting G. L. c. 218, § 35A, the Legislature acknowledged that a private citizen can file an application for the issuance of a criminal complaint for a misdemeanor.7 See, e.g., Bradford v. Knights, 427 Mass. 748, 751 (1998), citing G. L. c. 218, § 35A (). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 4 (b) (). The statute provides that "[i]f a complaint for a misdemeanor is received," inter alia, by the District Court, the court shall notify the person against whom the complaint was made, give such person an opportunity to be heard, and "may upon consideration of the evidence cause [a complaint] to be issued." The provision "[i]f a complaint for a misdemeanor is received" assumes that a private citizen has the right to file an application for a criminal complaint for a misdemeanor. G. L. c. 218, § 35A. We interpret statutes so as to avoid rendering any part of the legislation meaningless. See, e.g., Volin v. Board of Pub. Accountancy, 422 Mass. 175, 179 (1996), quoting Adamowicz v. Ipswich, 395 Mass. 757, 760 (1985). It follows that if a private citizen files an application for a criminal complaint, a clerk-magistrate cannot refuse to act on it. Cf. Commonwealth v. Clerk of the Boston Div. of the Juvenile Court Dep't, 432 Mass. 693, 695 (2000) ().
In the present cases, neither the Ayer nor the Marlborough court refused to act on Victory's applications. Clerk-magistrates in both courts received Victory's applications for filing purposes, notwithstanding the Marlborough court clerk-magistrate's statement to the contrary. The District Court judge in the Ayer court declined to issue criminal complaints due to lack of resources, and the clerk-magistrate in the Marlborough court disposed of the applications believing venue was improper. In sum, Victory had a right to file applications for the issuance of criminal complaints, which it did. It also had a right to court action on those applications, which it received. Victory therefore obtained all to which it was entitled.
Victory concedes, as it must, that a private citizen has no right to the issuance of a criminal complaint. Our prior decisions have held consistently that, if a judge or clerk-magistrate denies an application for a criminal complaint, a private party has no constitutional or statutory right to...
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