Vidaurri v. State
Decision Date | 10 November 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 07-98-0235-CR,07-98-0235-CR |
Parties | Gary Jefferson VIDAURRI, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Law Offices of Elyse D. Blount (Elyse D. Blount), Amarillo, for appellant.
Potter County District Attorney (Rebecca King) (John L. Owen), Amarillo, for appellee.
Before QUINN and REAVIS JJ., and CHARLES L. REYNOLDS, Senior Judge *
Gary Vidaurri appeals from a judgment under which he was convicted of indecency with a child. Pursuant to a plea bargain and guilty plea, the trial court initially placed appellant on deferred adjudication. Subsequently, he was adjudicated guilty and assessed punishment. His two points of error involve the purported failure of the trial court to afford him a punishment hearing prior to sentencing and the voluntariness of his guilty plea. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
The State contends that we have no jurisdiction to entertain the cause since appellant filed a general notice of appeal. That is, because appellant pled guilty and was placed on deferred adjudication pursuant to the plea bargain, he was obligated to tender a notice of appeal complying with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(b)(3). This he did not do.
Rule 25.2(b)(3) requires that one appealing from a judgment rendered upon a plea of guilty and receiving punishment no greater than that recommended by the State (and agreed to by appellant) must include at least one of three statements in his notice of appeal. The three statements are: 1) that the appeal involves a jurisdictional defect, 2) that the substance of the appeal was raised below by written motion and ruled upon by the court, or 3) that the trial court granted permission to appeal. TEX.R.APP. P. 25.2(b)(3). Moreover, it is the inclusion of these statements which vests us with jurisdiction over the appeal. Should they be omitted, we are restricted to considering only those points averring jurisdictional defects or impugning the voluntariness of the initial plea. Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) ( ); see Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714-15 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) ( ). 1
As previously mentioned, appellant pled guilty and had his adjudication of guilt deferred pursuant to a plea bargain. The court subsequently adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to prison. Thereafter, appellant filed a notice of appeal that contained none of the statements required by Rule 25.2(b)(3). Consequently, we have jurisdiction over the appeal only to the extent that the points asserted concern a jurisdictional defect or the voluntariness of his plea.
In his first point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in assessing appellant's punishment without first conducting a punishment hearing. We overrule the point for two reasons. First, it does not implicate a jurisdictional defect as illustrated by the simple fact that the complaint can be waived. See Nirschl v. State, 923 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd) ( ). If a complaint is jurisdictional, i.e., if it concerns the court's power to adjudicate the dispute, it cannot be waived. See Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d at 134 n. 4 ( ). If the dispute can be waived, as is the case here, then it must not be jurisdictional. Thus, we cannot consider it on appeal.
Second, even if jurisdiction existed, we note that appellant neither objected to the error at the time it occurred nor otherwise brought it to the trial court's attention afterwards. Under such circumstances, the complaint was waived. Nirschl v. State, 923 S.W.2d at 219.
In his second and last point, appellant attacks the voluntariness of his initial plea. Consequently, we have jurisdiction to address it. Flowers v. State, supra. Appellant contends that the plea was involuntary due to various head injuries he had suffered, his "inadequate mental capabilities," and the trial court's improper admonishment as to the range of punishment. We overrule this point as well.
As to the admonishment, appellant contends the court improperly informed him that the range of punishment was two to twenty years imprisonment. Instead, he should have allegedly been told that the range was two to ten years. Yet, the record indicates that the State indicted appellant for intentionally and knowingly engaging in sexual contact with a minor by touching the minor's genitalia. Engaging in sexual contact with a minor is a felony of the second degree. TEX. PEN.CODE ANN. § 21.11(c) (Vernon 1994). Such a felony carries a term of incarceration of anywhere from two to twenty years. Id. at § 12.33(a). Thus, appellant is wrong; the court correctly admonished him. Having been correctly admonished, we can hardly hold that the admonishment somehow rendered appellant's plea involuntary.
As to the purported head injuries and mental inadequacies, we interpret the argument to be one implicating appellant's mental competence to enter a plea and acknowledge that statute requires one pleading guilty to be mentally competent. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon 1989). Competence is presumed until the accused (or appellant here) proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. McGowin v. State, 912 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1995, no pet.). In other words, appellant was obligated to prove that he...
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