Vidinliev v. Carey Intern., Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 October 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-762-TWT.
• Citation: 581 F.Supp.2d 1281
• Parties: Nikolai VIDINLIEV, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CAREY INTERNATIONAL, INC. et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

581 F.Supp.2d 1281

Nikolai VIDINLIEV, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CAREY INTERNATIONAL, INC. et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-762-TWT.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

October 3, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Tucker Ronzetti, Detra Shaw-Wilder and Kurt Zaner, for Plaintiffs.

ORDER

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR., District Judge.

This is a Fair Labor Standards Act case. It is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 90] and the Defendants' Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 113]. For the reasons below, the Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED and the Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

The Plaintiffs are current and former limousine drivers for the Defendants Executive Limousine Transportation, Inc., and Aaron's Limousine Service, Inc. (collectively "Carey Atlanta"). Carey Atlanta provides chauffeured transportation services out of Atlanta, Georgia, under a franchise agreement with the Defendant Carey International, Inc. ("Carey International"). Carey International advertises itself as "the world's premier chauffeured services company, offering the widest range of chauffeured ground transportation for personal travel, business travel, road shows, meetings and events, private aviation, luxury hotels and more." See Carey International, Inc., Corporate Brochure, http://www.carey.com/eCarey/brochures/CareyCorporateBrochure.pdf (last visited August 29, 2008).

While working for Carey Atlanta, the Plaintiffs often worked more than 40 hours per workweek but were not paid time and one-half for overtime. The Plaintiffs argue that by failing to pay overtime, the Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The Defendants admit that the Plaintiffs were not paid overtime. Instead, the Defendants rely upon the affirmative defense that Carey Atlanta is a "motor carrier" and is exempt from the overtime pay requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). Both sides request partial summary judgment on this issue. The Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment that the Defendants do not qualify for the motor carrier exemption after August 10, 2005. The Defendants move for partial summary judgment that the Defendants qualify for the motor carrier exemption during all relevant periods.¹

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court should view the evidence and any inferences that may be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

III. Discussion

A. Claims Before August 10, 2005

The Fair Labor Standards Act provides that any employee who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce shall be paid a minimum of "one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed for every hour over forty hours he works in a workweek." 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). But, under the motor carrier exemption, the overtime pay requirement does not apply to "any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act [of] 1935." 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). To figure out precisely which employees are subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation, and therefore exempt from the overtime pay requirement, requires a closer look at the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.²

The Motor Carrier Act provides that the Secretary of Transportation may regulate the "qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees ... of a motor carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b)(1) (emphasis added). However, this specific grant of jurisdiction is also qualified by the Motor Carrier Act's general limitation on jurisdiction which is limited to:

[T]ransportation by a motor carrier and the procurement of that transportation, to the extent that passengers, property, or both, are transported by motor carrier—(1) between a place in—(A) a State and a place in another State; (B) a State and another place in the same State through another State; (C) the United States and a place in a territory or possession of the United States to the extent the transportation is in the United States; (D) the United States and another place in the United States through a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States; or (E) the United States and a place in a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States; and (2) in a reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States or on a public highway.

49 U.S.C. § 13501.

Under the Motor Carrier Act, "motor carrier" and "motor private carrier" have "the same meanings given those terms in section 13102 of this title." 49 U.S.C. § 31501. The phrase "section 13102 of this title" is a reference to 49 U.S.C. § 13102 and that section defines motor carrier as a "person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation." 49 U.S.C. § 13102. Although the Motor Carrier Act does not define "employee," the Supreme Court has held that "the meaning of employees in [49 U.S.C. § 31502(b)(1)] is limited to those employees whose activities affect the safety of operation." United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 553, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940).

Based on its interpretation of this language, the Department of Labor has issued regulations defining the scope of the motor carrier exemption. "The exemption of an employee ... depends both on the class to which his employer belongs and on the class of work involved in the employee's job." 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a). The exemption:

[E]xtends to those classes of employees and only those who: (1) Are employed by carriers whose transportation of passengers or property by motor vehicle is subject to [the Secretary of Transportation's] jurisdiction under section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act [49 U.S.C. § 31502], and (2) engage in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public highways of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act.

Id. (citations omitted). In Baez v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 938 F.2d 180 (11th Cir.1991), the Eleventh Circuit has adopted this two-part test, and so this Court does the same.

The Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that they meet the two-part test. Cf. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th Cir.1995) ("The employer has the burden of showing that it is entitled to the exemption."). The Defendants easily meet the first part of the test. This part looks to the "class to which his employer belongs." 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a). The Defendants must show that Carey Atlanta is a carrier "whose transportation of passengers or property by motor vehicle is subject to [the Secretary of Transportation's] jurisdiction under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act [49 U.S.C. § 31502]." Id. Evidence that a carrier has a permit or license from the Department of Transportation is sufficient to prove jurisdiction. See Baez, 938 F.2d at 182 ("In fact, the permit issued by the [Department of Transportation] indicates that jurisdiction has already been exercised."). The Defendants have provided that evidence. Carey Atlanta operates multiple commercial motor vehicles and "was issued a commercial [motor] vehicle identification number by the United States Department of Transportation license in 2002." (Defs.' Statement Of Material Facts For Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Tried ¶ 2.) The "Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact." (Pls.' Response To Defs.' Statement Of Material Facts For Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Tried ¶ 2.) Moreover, Carey Atlanta "holds itself out as an interstate motor carrier and advertises interstate services," which is also evidence that a carrier is subject to the Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction. Walters v. American Coach Lines of Miami, Inc., 569 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1299 (S.D.Fla.2008).

The Defendants also meet the second part of the test. This part looks to the "class of work involved in the employee's job." 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a). The Defendants must show that the Plaintiffs belong to a class of employees who directly affect "the safety operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public highways of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act." Id. The Defendants have demonstrated that the Plaintiffs affect "safety operation" by pointing out that they belong to a class of full-time limousine drivers. See 29 C.F.R. § 782.3(b); Garcia v. Fleetwood Limousine, Inc., 511 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1238 (M.D.Fla.2007). The real issue is whether the Plaintiffs also belong to a class of employees involved in interstate motor vehicle transportation.

The Defendants do not have to show that every one of the Plaintiffs had actual involvement in interstate motor vehicle transportation. An entire class of employees may be "exempt even though the interstate driving of particular employees was sporadic and occasional, and in practice some...