Vieira v. Schupp
| Decision Date | 08 June 1981 |
| Citation | 383 Mass. 739,421 N.E.2d 771 |
| Parties | Louise M. VIEIRA et al. v. David A. SCHUPP et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Martin M. Zucker, Providence, R.I., for defendants.
Edward L. Gnys, Jr., Providence, R.I., for Louise M. Vieira.
Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, WILKINS, LIACOS, and NOLAN, JJ.
This case comes to use on certification from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island of two questions concerning certain provisions of our so called "no-fault" insurance law. In particular, we are concerned with G.L. c. 90, § 34M, and G.L. c. 231, § 6D, inserted by St.1970, c. 670, §§ 4, 5. See S.J.C. Rule 1:03, § 1, as amended, --- Mass. --- (1981).
The questions are as follows:
We respond as follows. To Question 1, we answer that the plaintiff's action is not barred by the fact that she has already received benefits. She has a viable tort action. To Question 2, we reply that the plaintiff's receipt of $319.14 for medical expenses under personal injury protection (PIP) benefits does not defeat her right to demonstrate, if she can, that her reasonable and necessary medical expenses exceed $500. Our analysis and reasons follow.
This action, with jurisdiction predicated on diversity of citizenship (see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)), was commenced on August 16, 1977, by the filing of a complaint seeking recovery for personal injuries to the plaintiff resulting from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on May 20, 1976. 1
An automobile registered in Rhode Island, operated by David A. Schupp and owned by Russell E. Schupp (both are defendants in this case), struck the rear of a vehicle operated by the plaintiff, Louise M Vieira, 2 while her vehicle was stopped on a highway within the Commonwealth. The defendants have moved to dismiss on the ground that two provisions of the "no-fault" insurance laws of Massachusetts (G.L. c. 90, § 34M; G.L. c. 231, § 6D) bar the action. At the time of the accident, the defendants were residents and citizens of Rhode Island. No PIP benefits, as that term is used in § 34M, were applicable to them. The plaintiff, a resident and citizen of Massachusetts at the time of the accident, was the named insured under a policy which did provide PIP benefits. Her policy did not contain a deductible provision as described in § 34M. On or about June 1, 1976, the plaintiff submitted a claim for PIP benefits. She received from her insurer the sum of $1,142 for lost wages and $379.14 3 for medical expenses. In her complaint, which alleges that the accident was caused by the defendant operator's negligence and recklessness, she seeks recovery for physical injuries, pain and suffering, and other compensable damages.
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island has ruled that under the conflicts of law rules of Rhode Island, which are applicable to this diversity action, Massachusetts law is controlling on the substantive legal issues presented in this case.
1. Question 1. The primordial case in Massachusetts on the subject of "no-fault" insurance is Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971), in which this court upheld the constitutionality of this radically different form of compulsory motor vehicle insurance. Although Pinnick is not directly responsive to the questions propounded to us in this case, its language as to the purpose and scope of no-fault insurance is instructive. Anticipating the lament of future litigants, the Pinnick court pointed out that a plaintiff loses nothing (with a single exception not here material) by no-fault insurance "(b)ecause the exemption of the tortfeasor is exactly matched to the availability of personal injury protection benefits to the plaintiff." Id. at 8, 271 N.E.2d 592.
This result is assured by G.L. c. 90, § 34M, second par., inserted by St.1970, c. 670, § 4, which contains the following language: "Every owner, registrant, operator or occupant of a motor vehicle to which personal injury protection benefits apply who would otherwise be liable in tort, and any person or organization legally responsible for his acts or omissions, is hereby made exempt from tort liability for damages because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle to the extent that the injured party is, or would be had he or someone for him not purchased a deductible authorized by this section, entitled to recover under those provisions of a motor vehicle liability policy or bond that provide personal injury protection benefits or from the insurer assigned" (emphasis supplied).
The clear meaning of this language is that the exemption from liability runs only to a tortfeasor to whom PIP benefits apply. The defendants in the instant case have no such coverage. The defendants do not qualify as "owner(s)" or "operator(s)" "of a...
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...questions certified to us have been phrased so that they may be answered either "yes," or "no." See Vieira v. Schupp, --- Mass. ---, --- - ---, 421 N.E.2d 771 (1981) (Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1346, 1346-1347); Jesionek v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 376 Mass. 101, 102, 378 N.E.2d 995 (1978); Feene......
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