Vielma v. Eureka Company

• Decision Date: 20 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-50181,99-50181
• Citation: 218 F.3d 458
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) EVA VIELMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EUREKA COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 458

218 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2000)

EVA VIELMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EUREKA COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-50181

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

July 20, 2000

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

Before GARWOOD, WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Eva Vielma (Vielma) brought this action against her employer, defendant-appellee Eureka Company (Eureka), alleging Texas law claims of age and disability discrimination. The district court found that Vielma's state claims were time-barred because she had not filed suit in state court within sixty days of receiving her "right to sue" letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Eureka. The district court also denied her motions to reconsider and to amend her complaint to add federal discrimination claims. Vielma now appeals the grant of summary judgment on her state claims, as well as the denial of her motion to amend. We hold that Vielma's state claims were not time-barred, and accordingly reverse the grant of summary judgement regarding those claims and remand them. We affirm, however, the denial of Vielma's motion to amend.

Facts and Proceedings Below

Vielma had been an employee of Eureka in El Paso, Texas since 1993, first as an assembler and later as a quality control inspector. In 1997, she received medical treatment for work-related injuries. Though her doctor released her to work with certain conditions on the kind of work she could perform, Vielma was unsatisfied with her subsequent job assignments from Eureka. Ultimately, Eureka informed her that it could not return her to work because it was unable to accommodate her medical restrictions. On February 3, 1998, Vielma filed a charge with the EEOC El Paso, Texas, Area Office, alleging that Eureka had discriminated against her on the bases of age and disability. Under the Worksharing Agreement between the EEOC and the Texas Commission on Human Rights (TCHR), the analogous state agency, Vielma's charge was effectively filed with the TCHR on that date as well. See Griffin v. City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[U]pon the EEOC's receipt of the complaint, the TCHR, for all legal and practical purposes, [also] received the complaint."). The EEOC dismissed her charge and on May 4, 1998, Vielma received from the EEOC El Paso Area Office a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, commonly known as a "right to sue" letter. This form letter provided in relevant part:

"Your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this Notice; otherwise, your right to sue based on this charge will be lost. (The time limit for filing suit based on a state claim may be different.)"

On August 3, 1998, Vielma filed suit in Texas state court, alleging that Eureka had discriminated against her because of her age and disability in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA).¹ Vielma requested and on August 12, 1998 received the TCHR version of a "right to sue" letter, titled "Notice of Right to File a Civil Action." Like the EEOC letter, the TCHR letter notified Vielma that her claims had been dismissed and that she had a certain period of time within which to file suit under the TCHRA. The letter stated in relevant part: "PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT YOU HAVE SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE TO FILE THIS CIVIL ACTION."

On September 3, 1998, Eureka filed its answer and removed the case to federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. On September 24, 1998, Eureka filed its motion for summary judgment, alleging that Vielma's claims were time-barred because she had not filed her state suit within sixty days of receiving the EEOC right to sue letter. The district court conducted a hearing on the motion on December 15, 1998, and granted the motion on January 21, 1999 in an order with reasons. The court held that the EEOC right to sue letter constituted notice for purposes of the TCHRA and that the sixty day limitations period for bringing the state claim began when Vielma received the EEOC letter. On the same day the district court entered on a separate document its judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

On January 29, 1999, Vielma filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that her state claim was not time-barred because receipt of the EEOC letter did not trigger the "right to sue" period under the TCHRA. On the same day, she also filed a motion to amend her earlier complaint, contending that the district court should allow her to include federal age and disability discrimination claims in her complaint. The district court denied these motions on March 23, 1999. Vielma now appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on her state claims, as well as its denial of her motion to amend.

Discussion

I. Triggering the TCHRA Sixty-Day Period

The primary issue raised by Vielma in this appeal is a relatively narrow one: whether the receipt of an EEOC "right to sue" letter, which starts the ninety-day period within which a complainant may bring a federal discrimination suit, also starts the sixty-day period within which a complainant may file suit under the TCHRA. The district court answered that question affirmatively and Vielma, unsurprisingly, challenges that conclusion. This is a question of first impression and depends in large part on the interpretation of the TCHRA.

This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same criteria the district court was obliged to apply. See Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994). In this appeal, there are no facts in dispute and the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Eureka was based purely on an interpretation of Texas law, which we also review de novo. See Floors Unlimited, Inc. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 55 F.3d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1995). When applying state law, "we interpret the state statue the way we believe the state Supreme Court would, based on prior precedent, legislation, and relevant commentary." See F.D.I.C. v. Shaid, 142 F.3d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1998). If a state's highest court has not spoken on the issue, we look to the intermediate appellate courts for guidance. See Wood v. Armco, Inc., 814 F.2d 211, 213 n.5 (5th Cir. 1987).

A. The Relationship Between the EEOC and the TCHR

The TCHRA "establishes a comprehensive administrative review system to carry out the policies embodied in Title VII," as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. 1991); see also Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.001(1)-(3) (West 1996). One of the primary goals of the statute is to coordinate state law with federal law in the area of employment discrimination. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.001(1)-(2). This dual state-federal system has resulted in similar, though not always identical, procedures for combating employment discrimination, and overlapping, though not always interchangeable, spheres of authority. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and 29 U.S.C. § 633(b), if a state has its own anti-discrimination laws and corresponding agency (as Texas does), the EEOC must defer its processing of a discrimination complaint until the state has had at least sixty days to investigate and attempt to resolve the complaint. See Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 485. Accordingly, the TCHRA created the TCHR as a "deferral agency" so that claims of employment (and now disability) discrimination could be addressed at the state level first. See id.

In both the federal and Texas state systems, a complainant must file a complaint with the appropriate agency before filing suit. See id. at 487. The complainant must do so within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.002(a). In 1989, the TCHR and the EEOC entered a Worksharing Agreement, to be amended annually, which was intended to minimize unnecessary duplication of effort and make the operations of the two agencies more efficient. See Griffin, 26 F.3d at 612.² In the 1998 Worksharing Agreement, "the EEOC and the [TCHR] each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges, including those that are not jurisdictional with the agency that initially receives the charges."³ 1998 Worksharing Agreement § II(A). In a case like this one, when a complainant files her initial charge with the EEOC, her charge will also be considered filed with the TCHR. See Griffin, 26 F.3d at 612-13; Price v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co., 934 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).⁴

In the case of a complainant pursuing state claims under the TCHRA, if the TCHR dismisses the complaint or has not resolved it within 180 days, it must notify the complainant in writing. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.208. A complainant who receives notice of dismissal may request a written notice of her right to file a civil action. See id. § 21.252. Once the complainant receives notice of her right to file a civil action, she must do so within sixty days. See id. § 21.254. The complainant does not have to wait for this letter before filing suit, however. See id. § 21.252(d) ("Failure to issue the notice of the complainant's right to file a civil action does not affect the complainant's right under this subchapter to bring a civil action against the respondent."); see also Eckerdt v. Frostex Foods, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). Whether she receives a letter or not, the complainant must institute her state suit within two years of filing the administrative complaint. See id. § 21.256.

The federal system is similar, but not identical. As noted above, a complainant alleging violations of federal law must file the complaint within 180...