Vieth v. Hope Salt & Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1902
• Citation: 41 S.E. 187,51 W.Va. 96
• Parties: VIETH v. HOPE SALT & COAL CO.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

41 S.E. 187

51 W.Va. 96

VIETH v. HOPE SALT & COAL CO.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

March 8, 1902

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where one places a steam boiler upon his premises and operates the same in lawful business with care and skill, so that it is no nuisance, in the absence of proof of fault or negligence in him, he is not liable for damages to his neighbor occasioned by the explosion of the boiler.

2. A presumption of negligence does not arise from the mere fact of the explosion of a steam boiler used by one engaged in lawful business. Negligence on his part must be shown.

3. While two special questions covering the same inquiry should not be put to a jury, yet if one covering some matter of another is so drawn as to more definitely and pointedly inquire as to a particular matter controlling the case it should be given.

Error to circuit court, Mason county; F. A. Guthrie, Judge.

Action by Marianna Vieth against the Hope Salt & Coal Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

H. R Howard and J. U. Meyers, for plaintiff in error.

W. R Gunn and C. E. Hogg, for defendant in error.

BRANNON J.

In an action of trespass on the case in the circuit court of Mason county, brought by Marianna Vieth against Hope Salt & Coal Company, the plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment against the defendant, and it has brought the case up to this court.

The ground of the action was that the defendant company carrying on the business of manufacturing salt, and using a boiler in its work, inflicted injury upon the plaintiff by damage done to her residence from the explosion of said boiler. We see at once that the case involves a conflict or clash between two plain rights vested in the parties to the suit. The right of the company is the right to use its own premises in legitimate lawful business. This is a constitutional right of liberty, and of the plainest import. The right of Mrs. Vieth is the right to abide upon her own premises in peace and security, free from hindrance or disturbance by anyone. She received injury from the defendant's act. Does that alone, without more, give her the right by law to call upon the company for reparation? Upon first impression we would likely answer this question in the affirmative. The plaintiff has received damage, without fault on her part, from the act of her neighbor, and it would seem plausible to say that this neighbor must make her whole. And such is the law under some decisions very well considered in England, particularly the case of Fletcher v. Rylands L. R. 1 Exch. 265, where a party constructed a water reservoir upon his land, and the water burst through into some coal shafts which had been made by another party, not known to the owner of the reservoir. The owner of the reservoir was held liable for damages, upon the ground that anyone who for his own purposes brings upon his own land anything that may do mischief, or does mischief, does so at his peril, and, if injury results therefrom to another, he is prima facie answerable for all damage therefrom. But such is not the American law. That law says that the English rule detracts from the right of the owner of land to use it in legitimate business, detracts from the efficacy of that ownership, cripples a plain right of ownership, and makes that owner an insurer against harm to others resulting from mere accident in the lawful use of his property. The American law does not make the mere damage a prima facie cause of action, but requires negligence on the part of him who inflicts the injury. That latest and best work on the subject of negligence, Thompson's Commentaries on the Law of Negligence (in volume 1, § 14), lays down the law thus "If, in the prosecution of a lawful act, a casualty purely accidental happen, and one which cannot be ascribed to any want of due care or skill on the part of the party sought to be made liable therefor, no matter how grievous, no action can be supported for the damage arising therefrom. The meaning is that where a man, proceeding in a lawful business, exercises reasonable care, the law does not make him an insurer of others against those consequences of his actions which reasonable care and foresight could not have prevented. The law justly ascribes such consequences to inevitable misfortune, or the act of God, and leaves the harm resulting from them to be borne by him upon whom it falls. The contrary would obviously be against public policy, because it would impose so great a restraint upon freedom as materially to check human enterprise. In such cases, therefore, the law contents itself with inquiring whether any other person than the sufferer was at fault, and, if so, it requires him to reimburse the sufferer for his loss, unless the sufferer himself was also at fault. This doctrine, however, is predicated only of unforeseen accidents, which result from the doing of lawful acts. If a person do an act which is wrongful per se, or in the nature of a public nuisance, he becomes, in respect of it, an insurer to the public, and is liable for any injury which may happen in consequence of it to a person in the exercise of ordinary care, irrespective of any question as to the degree of skill or diligence exercised by himself, his agents, or servants, to prevent such injury." In the notable case of Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 10 Am.Rep. 623, the case of injury from the explosion of a boiler to property of a neighbor was fully considered, and the court adopted this syllabus: "Where one places a boiler upon his premises and operates the same with care and skill, so that it is no nuisance, in the absence of proof of fault or negligence upon his part, he is not liable for damages to his neighbor occasioned by the explosion of the boiler." In the case of Cosulich v. Oil Co., 122 N.Y. 118, 25 N.E. 259, 19 Am.St.Rep. 475, this subject is fully considered, and the results stated that one conducting lawful business is not under obligation of saving others harmless from it by inevitable accident, and he performs his duty when he uses reasonable care to save others from injury, and that he who alleges negligence as a foundation of his right to recovery must point out by evidence the defendant's fault, as the presumption is, until the contrary appears, that every man has performed his duty. Thus it clearly appears that the plaintiff...