Vigil v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 25 April 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 21617,21617 |
| Parties | Emma O. VIGIL, Plaintiff in Error, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State or Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Gerald A. Kay, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
This is a Workmen's Compensation case which concerns a claim for compensation filed by Emma O. Vigil, a widow, for benefits assertedly due her as a dependent following the death of her husband, Fred A.
Emma claimed that sometime about July
Emma Claimed that sometime about July 31, 1961 Fred had suffered certain scratches on his leg while at work in a missile silo east of Denver. She also claimed that on August 23, 1961 he died either due to a hypersensitive reaction to an antibiotic drug (evidently administered as a result of the scratches) or due to his having been exposed to nitrogen gas while on the job.
The Referee, on September 4, 1962, found, among other things, from the evidence before him '* * * that the dependent claimant herein failed to establish that decedent sustained any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on August 23, 1961, or that decedent's death resulted from an accidental injury.' The Commission affirmed, and on petition to review, reaffirmed its Referee's Order denying compensation. Emma next petitioned the Commission to reopen and review her claim under C.R.S.1963, 81--14--19. This request was refused. The Commission's Final Order entitled 'SUPPLEMENTAL AWARD' denying compensation was entered on November 19, 1963. On April 10, 1964 claimant, however, again sought to reopen her case with the Commission. This petition was denied on April 20, 1964. On May 5, 1964, Emma filed a Complaint For Issuance of Citation to Show Cause Under Rule 106 in the Denver District Court. Therein she claimed that the Commission had abused its discretion in that it failed to find specific evidentiary facts so that the claimant 'could have a foundation' for an appeal to the courts. This, too, was of no avail when, on July 30, 1964, the trial court entered a judgment against her on a Motion to Dismiss. She now seeks relief under R.C.P. Colo. 106(a)(2) and (4) in this court by writ of error.
We thus have posed for determination the sole question as to whether a claimant, who fails to seek a review of a Commission Order in the District Court within the twenty day period specified by C.R.S.1963, 81--14--7, is thereafter barred from asking judicial review; or, whether such a claimant can obtain what amounts to similar relief by asserting a right under R.C.P. Colo. 106(a)(2) and (4).
C.R.S.1963, 81--14--8 reads in pertinent part:
'Jurisdiction of courts to review order or award--venue--parties.--Any person in interest, * * * being dissatisfied with any such finding, order or award of the commission issued or promulgated by virtue of the authority conferred in this chapter, may commence an action in the district court in and for the county wherein the injury was sustained or in the district court in and for the city and county of Denver against the commission as defendant to modify or vacate the same on the ground herein specified in which action any adverse party shall also be made a defendant; * * *'.
In our view, this statute provides the sole remedy for this claimant's cause of action; and, having failed to proceed thereunder in apt time (i.e., within twenty days after November 19, 1963) she was and is barred from seeking alternative relief as attempted here. The wording of the statute is definitive, clear and Exclusive. See Industrial Comm'n v. Plains Util. Co., 127 Colo. 506, 259 P.2d 282 (1953); Roper v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Colo. 250, 253, 25 P.2d 725 (1933); Tyler v. Hagerman, 88 Colo. 60, 63, 291 P. 1033 (1930); Stacks v. Industrial Comm'n, 65 Colo. 20, 23, 174 P. 588 (1918). We, therefore, reaffirm that the statutory method is the prescribed route one must use to secure judicial review of a claim such as the instant one. See Aragon v. Industrial Comm'n, Colo., 411 P.2d 331 (1966).
We see nothing in R.C.P. Colo. 106(a)(2) or (4) that can apply to...
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