Vilar v. Cnty. of Yolo
| Decision Date | 06 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:12-cv-01472-KJN,2:12-cv-01472-KJN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | BENJAMER F. VILAR, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF YOLO, et al., Defendants. |
Currently pending before the undersigned is a Motion For Summary Judgment Or Partial Summary Judgment filed by defendant Deputy Sam Machado ("defendant" or "Machado") of the Yolo County Sheriff's Department.1 (Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 22.) Defendant filed a Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts ("SUF") (SUF, ECF No. 22-2), a Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") (RJN, ECF No. 22-3), and an attorney declaration with various exhibits in support of his motion (Declaration of Amie McTavish ("McTavish Decl."), ECF No. 22-4).
Plaintiff Benjamer F. Vilar ("plaintiff" or "Vilar") filed a written Opposition brief in response to defendant's pending motion. (Opp'n, ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff also filed a Response To Defendant's Separate Statement Of Undisputed Facts ("RSUF") (RSUF, ECF No. 23-1 at 1-9), a Statement Of Additional Undisputed Facts ("Pl.'s SUF") (Pl.'s SUF, ECF No. 23-1 at 9-16), and an attorney declaration with supporting exhibits (Declaration of David Anderson ("Anderson Decl."), ECF No. 23-2).
Defendant filed a Reply brief in support of his moving papers (Reply, ECF No. 24), as well as a Response to Plaintiff's RSUF (Def.'s Response to RSUF, ECF No. 24-1) and a Response to Plaintiff's SUF (Def.'s Response To Pl.'s SUF, ECF No. 24-2).
The matter came on for hearing on November 21, 2013. Attorney Amie McTavish appeared on behalf of defendant. Attorney Jonathan Shugart appeared on behalf of plaintiff. The undersigned has fully considered the parties' submissions, oral arguments, and appropriate portions of the record in this case and, for the reasons that follow, grants defendant's motion for summary judgment.
On May 31, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint against several defendants. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964, and he also included state law claims for false imprisonment, false arrest, negligence, negligence per se, civil conspiracy, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Bane Act, and violation of the Ralph Act. (Id.)
Plaintiff's claims stem from his arrest on November 23, 2010. (Compl. at 3-5.) Plaintiff alleges that on that day, he was playing on a certain slot machine at the Cache Creek Casino and drinking a Styrofoam cup of coffee. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that after playing on the slot machine for about ten minutes, "his cup of coffee accidentally tipped over, spilling the liquid therein onto an area of the machine near the bill validator device," whereupon he cashed out and left the machine. (Id. at 4.)
An error light on the top of the slot machine started blinking. (Id.) Cache Creek security personnel then allegedly inspected the machine and found coffee in the bill validator. (Id.) Casino personnel then allegedly inspected the security tape footage and determined that plaintiff was the last person playing on that machine and that he "leaned forward" while at the machine prior toleaving it. (Id.) The security footage allegedly did not clearly show how the coffee got into the bill validator. (Id.)
Casino security personnel then allegedly found plaintiff on the gaming floor and began questioning him. (Id. at 5.) They eventually allegedly asked plaintiff to pay $864.80 to repair the bill validator. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that they did so without confirming that the bill validator actually required repair or replacement. (Id.) The Casino personnel then allegedly informed plaintiff that if he did not pay to repair the validator they would have him arrested. (Id.) Plaintiff allegedly did not agree to pay this amount, so Casino personnel allegedly placed him in handcuffs, escorted him to a holding cell, and called the County Sheriff's Office.2 (Id. at 5-6.)
Deputy Machado responded and allegedly questioned plaintiff while he was in the holding area. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Machado interrogated him in a manner calculated to mislead and coerced him into making false statements. (Id.) Following questioning, Deputy Machado then allegedly arrested plaintiff for vandalism, took him into custody, and brought him to the Yolo County Jail. (Id.)
Since he filed his pleading, plaintiff has dismissed various claims and defendants through a stipulated dismissal and a written non-opposition, and therefore those claims and defendants are not discussed herein. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 20-21, 23 at 23.)
For purposes of the pending motion for summary judgment, one defendant currently remains in this case: Deputy Machado. The remaining federal claims targeting Machado are for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (). The remaining state law claims are for violation of the Bane Act (); common law battery (putting handcuffs on plaintiff without probable cause to arrest him), and false arrest/detention (detaining plaintiff without probable cause). (Compl., ECF, No. 1.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought." It further provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).3 A shifting burden of proof governs motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). In summary judgment practice, the moving party:
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that "a party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact").
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the opposing party must establish that a genuine dispute as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). To overcome summary judgment, the opposing party must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute that is both material, i.e., it affects the outcome of the claim under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010), and genuine, i.e., "'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury couldreturn a verdict for the nonmoving party,'" FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A party opposing summary judgment must support the assertion that a genuine dispute of material fact exists by: "(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). However, the opposing party "must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Moreover, all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be viewed in a light most favorable to the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). However, to demonstrate a genuine factual dispute, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (citation omitted).
Defendant Machado argues that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that, as a matter of law, he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for felony vandalism. (Mot. for Summ. J. at 3-4.)
Probable cause to arrest is "knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been . . . committed by the personbeing arrested." Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007)). Probable cause to arrest exists if, at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances known to the officer through reasonably...
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