Viles v. Am. Realty Co.
Decision Date | 02 December 1924 |
Citation | 126 A. 818 |
Parties | VILES v. AMERICAN REALTY CO. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Kennebec County, at Law.
Action by Blaine S. Viles against the American Realty Company. On report from Supreme Judicial Court. Judgment for defendant.
Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and PHILBROOK, DUNN, MORRILL, WILSON, and DEASY, JJ.
Pattangall, Locke & Perkins, of Augusta, for plaintiff.
Ryder & Simpson, of Bangor, for defendant.
By written agreement dated September 18, 1916, the plaintiff agreed
This action is in assumpsit to recover that 50 cents per cord, and is before the law court upon report, upon the writ, pleadings, evidence, and finding by the jury for such final judgment "as the legal rights of the parties require."
Before approaching the decision of the case upon the issue which seems to us controlling, it is profitable, if not absolutely necessary, to interpret the written contract between the parties.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that "the written contract did not obligate Viles to deliver 10,000 cords more or less," and was not so intended; that the words "10,000 cords" indicate
We cannot so construe the contract; such construction is not in harmony with the situation and defined policy of the defendant, nor with the correspondence between the parties. The defendant corporation is a subsidiary of the International Paper Company, maintained by the latter company as a part of its organization for securing an adequate and constant supply of wood for its mills. In the fall of 1916 its agents were making contracts for its necessary supply of wood for the coming year. It was vital to the successful operation of the mills of the International Paper Company that an adequate and dependable supply of wood should be secured. Under such circumstances it cannot be considered, unless all other constructions fail, that the executives of the defendant would make a detailed written contract, with specifications as to delivery, and sealing and quality, with the intention of not binding either party, of simply affording a market for whatever amount of wood Mr. Viles might see fit to turn into Solon boom. The executives of large industrial organizations do not conduct business in that way.
In reply to the plaintiff's letter of December 28, 1916, in which he first suggested that the contract left the amount at his option, Amey replied tinder date of January 2, 1917, expressing surprise at the tenor of the letter, and concluding:
"We should not want any wood at more than $8.00 per cord delivered Solon, and we should like to hear from you definitely in regard to the amount you expect to deliver."
To this letter the plaintiff replied the next day, promising upon his return from Dead river to "attempt to give you some estimate of amount of wood we will have for you." He concludes:
This is not the language of a party whose contract did not obligate him to any extent, but is the language of a vendor on a tight market. It is entirely consistent with the construction for which the defendant contends that the contract was for the delivery of 10,000 cords within reasonable latitude consistent with good faith, and that the phrase in the contract, "at the option of said Blaine S. Viles," was an express affirmation that the latitude in amount was to be exercised within reasonable limits by the plaintiff. Their later correspondence harmonizes with this construction. On January 23, 1917, Amey wrote:
Viles replies the next day:
On February 1, 1917, Gilbert Oakley, resident manager of defendant, wrote:
Viles replied on February 7, 1917:
The above was only 500 cords less than the minimum amount named in the oral agreement. The record shows quite conclusively that the agreement for the additional 50 cents a cord, which the Jury has found, was made not earlier than February 7, 1917, and that it was not an independent contract, but a modification as to price of the existing contract, a concession on account of existing conditions of an additional 50 cents per cord for the delivery of substantially the same amount of wood in the written contract specified at 10,000 cords more or less in the oral modification of that contract specified as 9,000 to 10,000 cords.
In the view which we take of this case we need not decide whether the authority of Amey to make the oral agreement is proved, or whether the defendant corporation had clothed Amey with apparent authority to make it; nor need we decide whether consideration for the oral agreement is shown. See Savage v. No. Anson Mfg. Co., 124 Me. 1, 8, 124 A. 721.
Amey was discharged by the American Realty Company in July, 1917, and had died before the trial of this case. The alleged oral agreement to pay the additional 50 cents per cord was first called to the attention of George M. Stearns, then president of the defendant company, by the plaintiff early in August, 1917. This is the first knowledge of the oral agreement attributed to any official of the defendant, except Amey. Mr. Stearns promptly denied any authority on Amey's part to make the modification of the written contract, and positively refused to pay the additional 50 cents. They had a second interview, placed by Viles as after October 12, in which the denial of liability was repeated. At this latter conversation according to Mr. Viles, Mr. Stearns said that he would take the matter up with the directors. All later interviews have been between counsel.
The defendant has pleaded by brief statement that the demand in suit was settled...
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