Vill. of Newburgh Heights v. State

• Decision Date: 14 January 2021
• Docket Number: 109114,Nos. 109106,s. 109106
• Citation: 166 N.E.3d 632
• Parties: Village of NEWBURGH HEIGHTS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of Ohio, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

166 N.E.3d 632

Village of NEWBURGH HEIGHTS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.STATE of Ohio, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 109106

109114

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 14, 2021

Willa M. Hemmons, City of East Cleveland Director of Law, for appellant City of East Cleveland.

Nicola, Gudbranson & Cooper, L.L.C., Luke F. McConville, and Michael E. Cicero, Cleveland, for appellant Newburgh Heights.

Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Halli Brownfield Watson, and Renata Y. Staff, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

MARY J. BOYLE, A.J.:

{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Village of Newburgh Heights ("Newburgh Heights") and the city of East Cleveland ("East Cleveland"), appeal from a trial court judgment denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. Newburgh Heights raises the following three assignments of error:

1. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Newburgh Heights' motion for preliminary injunction based on its finding that Newburgh Heights had not established immediate irreparable injury.

2. The trial court erred by failing to conclude that * * * Newburgh Heights was likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that Amended House Bill 62 violates the Home Rule Amendment of the Ohio Constitution.

3. The trial court erred in failing to grant the preliminary injunction, because there was no possibility of substantial harm to the State of Ohio or other third parties, and granting of the preliminary injunction was clearly in the public interest.

{¶ 2} East Cleveland raises the following four assignments of error:

1. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied East Cleveland's motion for preliminary injunction based on its finding that East Cleveland had not established immediate irreparable injury, despite East Cleveland's uncontested evidence establishing irreparable harm to the public safety of its citizens.

2. The trial court erred by failing to conclude that the City was likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that Amended House Bill 62 violates the Home Rule Amendment of the Ohio Constitution even though the Ohio Supreme Court precedent establishes that municipalities' Home Rule authority to implement photo enforcement programs cannot be unconstitutionally burdened or penalized by the State.

3. The trial court erred by failing to conclude that the City was likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that Amended House Bill 62 violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Ohio Constitution where the State improperly circumvented the Ohio Supreme Court's decisions holding that municipalities' Home Rule authority to implement photo enforcement programs cannot be unconstitutionally burdened or penalized by the State.

4. The trial court erred by failing to conclude that the City was likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that Amended House Bill 62 violates the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution where the contested provisions of H.B. 62 were inserted as amendments to an appropriations bill on the eve of its passage.

{¶ 3} After review, we agree with the cities that the trial court erred when it denied their motion for a preliminary injunction with respect to their second and fourth contested provisions (reduction of local government funds and paying advance court costs). We therefore reverse the trial court's decision with respect to these two provisions. Regarding the cities' third contested provision (exclusive jurisdiction of municipal courts), however, we affirm the trial court's decision denying the preliminary injunction. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Procedural History

A. Trial Court

{¶ 4} On June 27, 2019, Newburgh Heights filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a declaratory judgment and a motion for preliminary and permanent injunction against defendant-appellee, the state of Ohio, asking the court to enjoin the enforcement of certain provisions of 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 62 ("H.B. 62"), which was set to become effective on July 3, 2019. Newburgh Heights alleged that the challenged provisions impermissibly infringed upon Ohio municipalities' home rule authority to enact and operate traffic photo enforcement programs.

{¶ 5} On August 14, 2019, East Cleveland filed a motion to intervene, a complaint, and a motion for preliminary and permanent injunction, also challenging provisions of H.B. 62. The state did not object to East Cleveland intervening, and the trial court granted East Cleveland's motion to intervene.

{¶ 6} The plaintiffs challenged the following provisions of H.B. 62: (1) the requirement that a law enforcement officer be present at every photo enforcement device location at all times during operation, (2) reducing the local government fund allocation by amounts collected from drivers who paid their traffic photo citation and eliminating local government funds for local authorities that fail to report revenues from a photo enforcement program, (3) conferring "exclusive jurisdiction" over such actions to municipal and county courts that eliminated a local authority's ability to appoint administrative hearing officers to adjudicate photo enforcement tickets, and (4) requiring local authorities to provide advance and non-recoverable court deposits to cover "all applicable court costs and fees" for civil actions related to the photo enforcement programs.

{¶ 7} After a hearing on the parties' motions for preliminary injunction, the trial court denied them in part and granted them in part in October 2019. The trial court granted the motions with respect to the first contested provision, i.e., the requirement that a law enforcement officer be present at every photo enforcement device location at all times during operation. The trial court denied the motions regarding the remaining contested provisions.

B. Appellate Background

{¶ 8} The cities appealed the trial court's decision denying their motions for preliminary injunction with respect to their second, third, and fourth contested provisions. This court consolidated the cases. The cities requested a stay in the trial court, which the trial court denied. The cities also requested this court to issue an injunction pending appeal. On December 4, 2019, this court issued the following order:

Motion by appellant City of East Cleveland for injunction pending appeal is granted in part. The state of Ohio is enjoined, pending the resolution of this appeal, from enforcing the contested provisions in H.B. 62 concerning (1) conferring exclusive jurisdiction over traffic camera tickets to municipal and county courts and (2) requiring local authorities to provide advance and non-recoverable court deposits to cover all applicable costs and fees pertaining to the tickets. The provision reducing the local government fund allocation does not become effective until July 25, 2020; therefore, there is no immediate irreparable harm as to that provision. The trial court has already granted an injunction regarding the requirement that a law enforcement officer be present at every traffic camera location. Once briefing is complete, the appeal shall be set for hearing at the earliest feasible date.

{¶ 9} In early July 2020, plaintiffs requested that this court reconsider the "irreparable harm determination" with respect to the second contested provision (a reduction in the local government fund allocation by the amounts collected from drivers who paid their traffic photo citation and eliminating local government funds for local authorities that fail to report revenues from a photo enforcement program) because the state would act on the provision on July 25, 2020.

{¶ 10} This court granted plaintiffs' motions on July 22, 2020, treating them as renewed motions for an injunction pending appeal due to new circumstances that existed.

{¶ 11} We will discuss the cities' assigned errors and arguments out of order where necessary for ease of discussion.

II. Preliminary Injunction

{¶ 12} The purpose of a preliminary injunction ordinarily is to preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits. Mears v. Zeppe's Franchise Dev. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90312, 2009-Ohio-27, 2009 WL 42061, ¶ 23. "An injunction is an extraordinary remedy in equity where there is no adequate remedy available at law. It is not available as a right but may be granted by a court if it is necessary to prevent a future wrong that the law cannot." Garono v. State , 37 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, 524 N.E.2d 496 (1988). Because an injunction is an extraordinary remedy, " ‘the moving party has a substantial burden to meet in order to be entitled’ " to a preliminary injunction. KLN Logistics Corp. v. Norton , 174 Ohio App.3d 712, 2008-Ohio-212, 884 N.E.2d 631, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), quoting Ormond v. Solon , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79223, 2001 WL 1243959, 2, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4654, 4 (Oct. 18, 2001). The party seeking the preliminary injunction must establish a right to the preliminary injunction by showing clear and convincing evidence of each element of the claim. Id. , citing Vanguard Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Edwards Transfer & Storage Co., Gen. Commodities Div. , 109 Ohio App.3d 786, 790, 673 N.E.2d 182 (10th Dist.1996).

{¶ 13} When ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial court must consider whether: (1) the movant has shown a strong or substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits, (2) the movant has shown irreparable injury, (3) third parties will be harmed if the injunction is granted, and (4) the public interest would be served by issuing the preliminary injunction. KLN Logistics Corp. at ¶ 12, citing Vanguard Transp. Sys., at 790, 673 N.E.2d 182. No one factor is dispositive. Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. , 115 Ohio App.3d 1, 14, 684 N.E.2d 343 (8th Dist.1996). When there is a strong likelihood of success on the merits, preliminary injunctive relief may be justified...