Villa v. Arrizabalaga
| Decision Date | 24 February 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 5817,5817 |
| Citation | 86 Nev. 137,466 P.2d 663 |
| Parties | A. William VILLA, Appellant, v. Ramon ARRIZABALAGA, Mrs. Hazel Erskine, Samuel W. Belford, O. H. Christoffersen, Mrs. Del Harrison, George Jurad, Keith W. MacDonald comprising the Nevada State Welfare Board, Respondents. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Harry E. Claiborne, and James J. Brown, Las Vegas, for appellant.
Harvey Dickerson, Atty. Gen., Norman H. Samuelson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order of the Eighth Judicial District Court denying a petition for a writ of mandamus, vacating an alternative writ of mandamus, and from an order affirming the findings and decision of the Nevada State Welfare Board relating to appellant's application for increased aid to the blind.
Appellant is and has been for some years recipient of financial aid to the blind under NRS 426.010--426.500. At the time of the hearing, appellant was receiving $198 per month. He claims his actual needs are $291.67 per month.
Incident to his application for increased aid, appellant requested and was granted a hearing before an examiner of the Nevada State Welfare Board pursuant to NRS 426.450. At the hearing, both appellant and the District Administrator of the Welfare Division presented evidence.
Specifically, appellant contended by factual presentation and argument of law he was not receiving his 'actual need' as provided in NRS 426.420.
On review of the transcript by the Welfare Board, appellant's claim for additional benefits was denied. The Board found that appellant's grant of $198 per month was correctly computed in accordance with uniform standards developed by the Welfare Division. The Board concluded that 'actual need' referred to in NRS 426.420 meant 'need standards developed by the Welfare Division and approved by the Welfare Board.' That meaning does not relate to 'actual need' in fact in the ordinary sense of the words, but payments limited by legislative appropriation.
Appellant first sought mandamus from the lower court, later amending his petition alleging a second cause of action for judicial review of the decision by the Welfare Board pursuant to NRS 426.450. We think the proper procedure is judicial review, because it is an adequate remedy in law. See NRS 34.170.
The issues thus presented for our review in determining whether the lower court erred in affirming the findings and conclusions of the Welfare Board decision are these:
I. Does the term 'actual need' as used in NRS 426.420 refer to need standards developed by the Welfare Division or to the needs in fact of a particular recipient?
II. May the term 'actual need' be limited by the appropriation of funds for aid to the blind by the legislature?
A subordinate issue requires our determining whether respondents are proper parties to this action.
1. Certain legislative enactments establish the right of needy blind persons in Nevada to financial aid from the state. The legislature has seen fit to deal with this class of person separate and distinct from all other welfare recipients. Blind persons are a 'special class' (NRS 426.030(3)); their needs may differ materially from the needs and problems of other classes of aid recipients (NRS 426.030(3), 426.310(3)); the aid contemplated to be given is for the 'individual needs' of the blind claimant (NRS 426.040(2)); each claimant should receive the 'maximum amount of aid to which he is entitled' (NRS 426.400); and where a claimant's needs exceed the prescribed minimum he 'shall be entitled to receive aid in an amount which shall meet such actual need' (NRS 426.420). Those functions are assigned to the Welfare Division by the legislature.
The Administrative Procedure Act applies to 'all agencies of the executive department' (NRS 233B.020), and 'agency' means 'each public agency, bureau, board commission, department, division, office or employee of the executive department' (NRS 233B.030). NRS 233B.040 provides that (Emphasis added.)
Thus, any regulations adopted by the Welfare Board relating to 'actual need' of a blind recipient authorized by NRS 426.420 must be reasonable.
The regulations adopted by the Welfare Board relative to 'actual need' established uniform state-wide standards, predicated principally upon the amount of funds appropriated by the legislature rather than actual need in fact of any authorized recipient. The decision of the Welfare Board relating to appellant found that appellant's grant was carrectly computed using those principles, and denied any increase.
Evidence presented at the hearing by the representative of the Welfare Division upon the question whether appellant's grant in fact met his actual need was as follows: ...
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Miller v. West
...for injunction first filed by the respondent was not a proper vehicle for seeking redrees through the courts. See Villa v. Arrizabalaga, 86 Nev. 137, 139, 466 P.2d 663 (1970). If the amended complaint meets the statutory requirements it confers jurisdiction upon the district court. Las Vega......
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...dependents.' Neither Clark v. New Hampshire Department of Health and Welfare, N.H., 315 A.2d 187 (1974), nor Villa v. Arrizabalaga, 86 Nev. 137, 466 P.2d 663 (Nev.Sup.Ct.1970), cited by plaintiffs, sheds any light which would aid us in the determination of the solution to our problem, as ea......
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Clark v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health and Welfare, 6843
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