Keller v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 28 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 5690,5690
• Citation: 56 Haw. 183,532 P.2d 664
• Parties: Violet KELLER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Myron THOMPSON, in his capacity as Director, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, and Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 664

532 P.2d 664

56 Haw. 183

Violet KELLER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Myron THOMPSON, in his capacity as Director, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, and Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii Defendants-Appellants.

No. 5690.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Feb. 28, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In construing statutes, the primary duty is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and to implement that intention to the fullest degree.

2. A uniform practical construction given to a statute for a considerable period by an executive department of a government which is charged to carry out such statute, although not controlling, is entitled to much weight in case of doubt as to the meaning of the statute.

3. Where the statute does not spell out a precise formula or technique for computing the amount of general assistance, and where there is nothing in the terminology of the statute which can be read to preclude the implementation of a flat grant system, the court will not hold that the promulgation of flat grant regulations for general assistance by the Department of Social Services and Housing was violative of the state's general welfare assistance statute on its face.

4. Appropriation acts considered and enacted by the legislature may in appropriate circumstances express legislative intent. This rule applies where the legislature appropriated funds to the Department of Social Services and Housing for welfare assistance with full knowledge that these funds were to be utilized for flat grant assistance.

5. HRS § 346-73 authorizes the Department of Social Services and Housing to exercise its judgment in setting the amount of assistance permitted. The statute contains an explicit ceiling on assistance and an implied floor. General assistance may not exceed minimum needs, yet, is to supply benefits which, in the judgment of the department, will provide for the minimum needs of recipients. The judgment of the Department of Social Services and Housing must not be arbitrary or capricious. If it develops that some play in the joints is necessary to avoid arbitrary and capricious action, then the department must provide regulations that will allow for reasonable additional individualized assistance where the demonstrated need of the recipient exceeds the amount provided him under the flat grant plan.

6. While the statute requires the Department of Social Services and Housing to establish a ceiling for general assistance through proper exercise of judgment as to the minimum needs of recipients, it does not absolutely preclude the possibility that some recipients may receive more assistance than they require to meet their minimum needs on an individualized basis.

7. It is well settled that summary judgment should not be granted unless the entire record shows a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and establishes affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances.

8. Summary judgment should not be granted in a case of first impression on a guestion of vast public importance.

Peter J. Levinson and Steven Guttman, Deputy Attys. Gen., Honolulu (George Pai, Atty. Gen., Honolulu, of counsel), for defendants-appellants.

Paul Alston, Stanley E. Levin, Michael A. Town, Staff Attys., Legal Aid Society of Hawaii, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., KOBAYASHI, OGATA and MENOR JJ., and LEWIS, Retired Justice, assigned by reason of vacancy.

OGATA, Justice.

This appeal is concerned with the validity of the rules and regulations of the Department of Social Services and Housing (hereinafter 'DSS&H') announced by it in January 1974, in its Manual Memo No. 250, distributed to its public welfare staff (income maintenance), that effective as of February 1, 1974, it would implement a full flat grant system of payment of benefits to eligible general assistance single persons and childless couples. Previous to such proposed effective date, eligible general assistance single persons, as well as childless couples, had received their monthly benefit payments on a partial flat grant basis, that is, each had been allotted an amount for non-shelter needs which was determined by averaging the costs for such needs on statewide basis as determined by DSS&H and in addition thereto a separate payment for shelter cost, if any.

Under the full flat grant plan announced by DSS&H, an eligible single person or a childless couple would be entitled to receive maximum monthly standardized benefit which varied depending upon their living arrangements. A single general assistance recipient would be allowed a monthly sum of $77.00, if he has no shelter expense; he would receive a monthly sum of $130.00, if he shares rental or lives in public housing accommodations; or his monthly allowance would be $166.00, if he rents private housing accommodations. Likewise an eligible general assistance couple without children would be entitled to receive a monthly sum of $135.00, if they have no shelter expense; they would be allowed a monthly sum of $195.00, if they share rental or live in public housing accommodations; or their monthly allowance would be 249.00, ¹ if they rent private housing accommodations. ²

On February 5, 1974, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against defendants, Myron Thompson, in his capacity as Director of DSS&H, ³ and DSS&H, seeking a declaratory judgment that the flat grant plan sought to be implemented by defendants was null and void, and for an injunction to enjoin defendants from reducing the general assistance benefits payable to plaintiffs and others similarly situated below such sum which would be necessary to provide for minimum needs compatible with the maintenance of decency and health. This complaint was amended by plaintiffs on February 26, 1974.

On April 11, 1974, after the trial court had denied defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' first amended complaint, plaintiffs filed under Rule 56 HRCP a motion for partial summary judgment. On April 23, 1974, during the hearing on this motion in the court below, the motion was re-entitled motion for summary judgment by agreement of counsel. Upon the conclusion of the hearing on this motion, the court granted the motion for summary judgment based upon the single ground explicitly mentioned therein:

'. . . that the flat grant regulation promulgated and implemented by Defendants (See Exhibit A attached to the Complaint filed herein, and later amended by Defendants' emergency regualtions (sic), see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 attached to the Deposition of Edwin Tam filed herein) was not authorized or permitted by the governing state statute, H.R.S. section 346-71, et seq., particularly H.R.S., section 347-73 (sic).'

An order granting summary judgment and permanent injunction was filed with the records of this case on May 17, 1974. In that order the court concluded 'that the Defendants have exceeded their statutory authority in implementing a flat grant system of welfare assistance.' A judgment for the plaintiffs and against defendants was filed on June 4, 1974. We reverse.

In their answer filed on April 8, 1974, in the court below by defendants they have categorically denied that plaintiffs are entitled to any relief prayed for in their first amended complaint. Defendants have further specifically denied paragraphs 24, 25, 27, 29, 32 to 34, and 36 to 39 of the first amended complaint. On March 25, 1974, the plaintiffs had further amended their first amended complaint by the addition thereto, after paragraph 27, of a new paragraph numbered 27a, which alleged that 'Defendants' actions in promulgating and enforcing the regulations herein are in conflict with the requirements of law inasmuch as they are not based on any rational relationship to the minimum needs (including food, shelter, clothing, utilities and incidentals) compatible with the maintenance of decency and health and that they are unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.' Although the allegations of this additional paragraph were not denied by the defendants, because of the nature and tenor of the defendants' answer we think this was simply inadvertent, and we would treat the factual allegations of the additional paragraph as though denied.

Plaintiffs supported their motion for summary judgment based upon the pretrial depositions of Jack T. Wakayama, Chief of Research and Statistics Office of DSS&H, and Edwin Tam, Public Welfare Administrator of DSS&H. Plaintiffs further assert that the affidavits which were filed together with their motion for preliminary injunction on March 7, 1974, although these affidavits were not referred to in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, factually justifies the court in arriving at its decision to grant a summary judgment.

Preceding the hearing on the motion, defendants filed four affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In his affidavit, Dr. Marvit, a doctor of medicine and currently an associate professor of mental health, school of public health, University of Hawaii, and also an associate clinical professor of psychiatry, school of medicine, University of Hawaii, stated that it was his opinion as an expert in the fields of public health, mental health and psychiatry 'that a flat grant system encourages the poor to develop more autonomous functioning and greater self esteem; that a flat grant system is likely to leave the poor less disaffiliated from society at large hence less resentful of their life situation than a non-flat grant system.' It was his further 'opinion that a non-flat grant system creates a sense of hopelessness and powerlessness, and promotes unhealthy dependency.'

Mr. Jack T. Wakayama's affidavit recited the development and adoption of a standard monthly assistance requirement by the DSS&H in 1950, the actual levels of payment of...