Villafane v. Comm'r of Corr.
| Decision Date | 11 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | AC 40615 |
| Citation | 190 Conn.App. 566,211 A.3d 72 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Angel VILLAFANE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION |
Cheryl A. Juniewic, assigned counsel, New Haven, for the appellant (petitioner).
Nancy L. Walker, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, former state's attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Keller, Moll and Bishop, Js.
The petitioner, Angel Villafane, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and improperly (1) denied his motions to appoint habeas counsel, and (2) rejected his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. We disagree and, accordingly, dismiss the petitioner's appeal.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On December 17, 2014, the petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (2) and one count of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223. The petitioner also admitted to violating his probation in two instances and violating a conditional discharge in violation of General Statutes § 53a-32. According to the factual basis provided by the state at the petitioner's plea hearing, the petitioner forced his way into a house occupied by a woman with whom he had a previous relationship, where he proceeded to strike her "several times in the head, and then grabbed a knife from the kitchen and attempted to stab her ...." The prosecutor indicated that the woman's daughter called the police, and, at that time, the petitioner fled from the residence. After canvassing the petitioner, the court determined that the pleas had been "knowingly and voluntarily made" and were supported by a factual basis.
At the petitioner's sentencing hearing on February 25, 2015, the court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration followed by seven years of special parole. The court terminated the other probations that the petitioner was serving at the time.
On June 29, 2015, the petitioner, who was self-represented at the time, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that he was living at the victim's house on the day on which the crime was committed. He contended that, because he lived there, he "could not be guilty of burglary in the first degree ...." Based on this contention, he alleged that his attorney at the time of the plea hearing, public defender David Egan, provided ineffective assistance by recommending that he plead guilty to that crime and "take [nine] years and [seven] years special parole." Id. He also contended that Egan never "did his due diligence to remotely look into fighting" his case, nor did he investigate "the facts in the case or the witnesses ...." Additionally, the petitioner asserted that Egan and the trial court, Iannotti , J. , had violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights because Egan was ineffective and the trial court had refused to grant his motion to dismiss Egan as his attorney.
In his return, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, indicated that he was without sufficient information to admit or deny any of the factual allegations contained in the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As such, the respondent indicated he would leave the petitioner to his proof.
On July 9, 2015, after the court received the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it referred the petitioner to the Office of the Chief Public Defender for appointment of counsel. On August 17, 2015, Attorney James Ruane and his law firm, Ruane Attorneys at Law, entered an appearance on the petitioner's behalf. On December 6, 2016, however, the petitioner moved to dismiss counsel because, in his view, since the time he was appointed counsel, the petitioner had been "represented by [three] different attorneys" from the firm. He argued that each of the attorneys had "done nothing at all in the petitioner's case" and that his most recent attorney, Daniel F. Lage, had refused to investigate his case. The petitioner requested that the habeas court dismiss Lage and permit him to represent himself, and that a trial be scheduled for March 20, 2017.
On January 30, 2017, the habeas court, Bright, J. , heard arguments on the petitioner's motion to dismiss counsel. After canvassing the petitioner and cautioning him about the challenges of self-representation, the court stated:
On May 9, 2017, fifteen days before the habeas trial was scheduled to begin, the petitioner filed a written motion with the habeas court for "[appointment] of special counsel." The petitioner indicated in the motion that he wanted "special counsel to assist the petitioner with his habeas case." The court, Sferrazza, J. , who presided over the habeas trial, denied the motion, indicating that the "petitioner specifically asked to dismiss appointed counsel and proceed [self-represented]."
The petitioner's habeas trial was held on May 24, 2017. At the outset of the proceeding, the petitioner renewed his request for counsel to assist him in his representation. He stated: "Now, being that I got the private investigator and the expert psychologist to do the work ... I need ... an attorney to be able to help me represent this because I'm having problems to understand why am I still being charged with burglary one when I live at that address and I have all the proof ...." The court responded: The petitioner did not revisit his request for counsel.
At trial, the self-represented petitioner presented testimony from three witnesses, including himself, and offered twelve exhibits, nine of which were admitted into evidence. The respondent presented no evidence.
In a memorandum of decision dated May 26, 2017, the habeas court denied the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court aptly observed that the petitioner claimed that trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to conduct adequate pretrial investigation and preparation, (2) failing to request that the petitioner undergo a competency examination pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d, and (3) failing to advise the petitioner that one cannot burglarize one's own residence. The court concluded that the petitioner was unable to prevail on any of these claims.
Soon thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal; see General Statutes § 52-470 (g) ; and an application for waiver of fees, costs, and expenses and appointment of counsel on appeal (fee waiver application). See General Statutes § 52-259b. He asserted the following grounds for his proposed appeal: "(1) I don't have money I'm flat broke," and The habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal but granted the fee waiver application and appointed counsel for purposes of the appeal. This appeal followed.
The petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and improperly (1) denied his motions to appoint habeas counsel, and (2) rejected his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Section 52-470 (g) provides: "No appeal from the judgment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted of a crime in order to obtain such person's release may be taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the case is decided, petitions the judge before whom the case was tried or, if such judge is unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in the decision which ought to be reviewed by the court having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies."
As our Supreme Court has explained, one of the goals our legislature intended by enacting this statute was "to limit the number of appeals filed in criminal cases and hasten the final conclusion of the criminal justice process ...." Iovieno v. Commissioner of Correction , 242 Conn. 689, 699, 699 A.2d 1003 (1997). "[T]he legislature intended to discourage frivolous habeas appeals." Simms v. Warden , 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). "[ Section] 52-470 (b)1 acts as a limitation on the scope of review, and not the jurisdiction, of the appellate tribunal." (Footnote added.) Logan v. Commissioner of Correction , 125 Conn. App. 744, 750, 9 A.3d 776 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 918, 14 A.3d 333 (2011).
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...12-115, § 1, of the 2012 Public Acts, subsection (b) of § 52-470 was redesignated as subsection (g).’ Villafane v. Commissioner of Correction , 190 Conn. App. 566, 572 n.1, 211 A.3d 72, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 902, 215 A.3d 160 (2019)." Whistnant v. Commissioner of Correction , 199 Conn. Ap......
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