Village Charter School v. CHESTER SCHOOL

• Citation: 813 A.2d 20
• Parties: VILLAGE CHARTER SCHOOL, Petitioner, v. CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT; Board of Control, Chester Upland School District; and Charles B. Zogby, Secretary of the Department of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents.
• Decision Date: 16 December 2002
• Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

813 A.2d 20

VILLAGE CHARTER SCHOOL, Petitioner, v. CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT; Board of Control, Chester Upland School District; and Charles B. Zogby, Secretary of the Department of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued September 11, 2002.

Decided December 16, 2002.

Reconsideration/Reargument Denied January 15, 2003.

Kevin M. McKenna, Malvern, for petitioner.

Karen S. Feuchtenberger, Harrisburg, for respondent, C. Zogby.

Leo A. Hackett, Media, for respondent, Chester Upland School District and Board of Control.

BEFORE: SMITH-RIBNER, Judge, and COHN, Judge, and MIRARCHI, JR., Senior Judge.

Reconsideration/Reargument En Banc Denied January 15, 2003. OPINION BY Senior Judge MIRARCHI.

The Chester Upland School District (School District) and the Board of Control of the School District (Board of Control) have filed preliminary objections to the amended "complaint" of the Village Charter School (Village), which is treated as an amended petition for review filed in our original jurisdiction. We sustain the preliminary objections and dismiss Village's action.

On June 13, 2002, Village commenced the instant action against the School District, the Board of Control and the Secretary of the Department of Education (Secretary) invoking original jurisdiction of this Court. To support its action, Village alleged as follows in the amended petition for review. Village was established in December 1997 under a charter granted by the Board of School directors. Village is a nonprofit, independent public school located in the School District. Currently, 664 students are enrolled in the pre-kindergarten through the twelfth grade, and 619 students are residents of the School District. The Board of Control is responsible for the operation and affairs of the School District.

Pursuant to Section 1725-A(a) of the Charter School Law (Law), Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, added by Section 1 of the Act of June 19, 1997, P.L. 225, 24 P.S. § 17-1725-A(a), the School District is required to provide funding for Village's operation. Section 1725-A(a)(5) of the Law provides:

Payments shall be made to the charter school in twelve (12) equal monthly payments, by the fifth day of each month, within the operating school year. A student enrolled in a charter school shall be included in the average daily membership of the student's district of residence for the purpose of providing basic education funding payments and special education funding.... If a school district fails to make a payment to a charter school as prescribed in this clause, the secretary shall deduct the amount, as documented by the charter school, from any and all State payments made to the district after receipt of documentation from the charter school.

On June 5, 2002, Village received from the School District a check in the amount of $173,512.18, which was only one half of $347,024.38 allocated to Village for the month of June 2002. After informing the School District of its failure to pay the full amount due on June 5, 2002, Village on June 6, 2002 sent the Secretary a letter requesting that the unpaid amount of the funding for June 2002 be deducted from the state education subsidies for the School District and that the deducted amount be directly remitted to Village. Village also submitted documents supporting its request to the Secretary.

Based on these allegations, Village sought (1) judgment declaring that the School District, the Board of Control and the Secretary have obligations under Section 1725-A(a) of the Law to provide the funding for Village's operation (Counts I and II); (2) injunctive relief enjoining them from failing to provide the funding to Village (Counts III and IV); and (3) judgment in mandamus directing them to provide the funding to Village in the current and following school years (Counts V and VI).¹ The Secretary filed a timely answer to the amended petition for review, asserting that the relief sought by Village against the Secretary should be denied. The School District and the Board of Control thereafter filed the preliminary objections to the amended petition for review raising, inter alia, (1) lack of this Court's original jurisdiction over the School District and the Board of Control, and (2) Village's failure to exhaust administrative remedies available under Section 1725-A(a)(5) of the Law.²

Before addressing the merits of the preliminary objections, we must address Village's contention that the preliminary objections are time-barred for failure to file within twenty days after service of the amended petition for review, as required by Rule 1026(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa. R.C.P. No. 1026(a). The twenty-day time period under Pa. R.C.P. No. 1026(a) is, however, inapplicable to this action filed in our original jurisdiction. Pa. R.A.P. 1516(c) provides that "[e]very pleading subsequent to the petition for review shall be filed within 30 days after service of the preceding pleading." Therefore, the amended petition for review filed twenty-six days after the service of the amended petition for review was timely.

Village further contends that the issues raised in the preliminary objections were already decided by the single judge during the preliminary injunction hearing and that reconsideration of those issues is, therefore, precluded by the law of the case doctrine, under which a court involved in the later phase of a litigation should not reopen questions decided by another judge of the same court in the earlier phase of the litigation. Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., 550 Pa. 254, 705 A.2d 422 (1997).

Although the judge, who held the preliminary injunction hearing, commented on some of the issues raised in the preliminary objections of the School District and the Board of Control to the application for preliminary injunction, he did not rule on those issues during the hearing. He instead dismissed the preliminary objections, without prejudice, as improperly filed under Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028(a).

Even assuming that the single judge preliminarily decided the issues of lack of this Court's original jurisdiction and Village's failure to exhaust administrative remedies raised by the School District and the Board of Control by considering the application for preliminary injunction, the Court's consideration of those issues only for the purpose of deciding the application for preliminary injunction is not a final determination of the Court. Aitkenhead v. Borough of West View Water Authority, 40 Pa.Cmwlth. 547, 397 A.2d 878 (1979). Consequently, a panel of this Court is not precluded from subsequently reconsidering those issues. Pa. R.A.P. 123(e); Balfour Beatty Construction, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 783 A.2d 901 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). Moreover, "whenever a court discovers that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or the cause of action it is compelled to dismiss the matter under all circumstances, even where we erroneously decided the question in a prior ruling." Hughes v. Pennsylvania State Police, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 409, 619 A.2d 390, 393 (1992),appeal denied, 536 Pa. 633, 637 A.2d 293 (1993) (emphasis in original).

Turning to the merits of the preliminary objections to the amended complaint, the School District and the Board of Control contend that they are political subdivisions, not Commonwealth agencies, and that Village's action against the School District and the Board of Control should be dismissed for lack of this Court's original jurisdiction under Section 931(a) of the Judicial Code, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. § 931(a), which provides that "[e]xcept where exclusive original jurisdiction of an action or proceeding is ... vested in another court of this Commonwealth, the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings...." Village argues, on the other hand, that this Court has "ancillary jurisdiction" over the School District and the Board of Control in this action under Section 761(c) of the Judicial Code, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(c),³ because its claims against the School District, the Board of Control and the Secretary are all "inextricably intertwined." Village's Brief, p. 8.

Section 761(a) and (b) of the Judicial Code, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a) and (b), provides that this Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions or proceedings "[a]gainst the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity," except certain actions or proceedings inapplicable to this matter. Under Section 761(a) and (b) of the Judicial Code, therefore, this Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the Secretary as an officer of the Commonwealth.

It is well established that merely naming the Commonwealth or its officers in an action does not conclusively establish original jurisdiction of this Court. Pennsylvania State Education Ass'n v. Department of Education, 101 Pa.Cmwlth. 497, 516 A.2d 1308 (1986). Further, a joinder of a Commonwealth party who are only tangentially involved is improper. Id. Only when the Commonwealth party is an indispensable party in an action, this Court has original jurisdiction against the Commonwealth party and the non-Commonwealth party. Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 686 A.2d 1380 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996).

In general, an indispensable party is one whose rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants that no relief can be granted without infringing upon those rights. Pennsylvania School Boards Ass'n v. Commonwealth Ass'n of School Administrators, Teamsters Local 502, 696 A.2d 859 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), appeal dismissed,550 Pa. 228, 704 A.2d 631 (1998). Section 7540(a) of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7540(a), similarly describes the concept of an indispensable party: "When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which...