Village of Aurora v. Commissioner of Taxation

• Decision Date: 31 March 1944
• Docket Number: No. 33549.,No. 33548.,33548.,33549.
• Parties: VILLAGE OF AURORA et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

14 N.W.2d 292

217 Minn. 64

VILLAGE OF AURORA et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION et al.

No. 33548.

No. 33549.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 31, 1944.

Certiorari to Board of Tax Appeals.

Certiorari proceedings upon the relation of the Oliver Iron Mining Company, Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, and St. James Mining Company to review separate decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals increasing the assessed valuations for tax purposes of certain mineral properties, wherein the Village of Aurora and Independent School District No. 40, St. Louis County, appeared as interested parties.

Writs discharged.

Elmer F. Blu and Clarence J. Hartley, both of Duluth, for Oliver Iron Mining Co. and Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines.

Gillette, Nye, Harries & Montague, of Duluth, for St. James Mining Co.

Patrick J. Ryan, of St. Paul, and Fred A. Cina, of Virginia, for Village of Aurora and School District.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., and P. F. Sherman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Commissioner of Taxation.

YOUNGDAHL, Justice.

Certiorari upon the relation of Oliver Iron Mining Company, Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, and St. James Mining Company to review separate decisions of the board of tax appeals increasing the assessed valuations for tax purposes as of May 1, 1940, of certain mineral properties.

Pursuant to statute, the commissioner of taxation, hereinafter referred to as the commissioner, functioning as the board of equalization to consider the equalization of certain iron ore properties, was requested to make a revaluation thereof for the purpose of lowering the assessment. Hearings were held on October 28, 1940, and December 16, 1940. Pursuant to notice thereof given by the commissioner, the respondents, Village of Aurora and Independent School District No. 40, St. Louis county, hereinafter referred to as the municipalities, appeared as interested parties.

On December 19, 1940, the commissioner determined that the assessed valuation of a certain leasehold interest known as the Burt Land Mine and located in the assessment district of the town of Balkan, St. Louis county, held by the Oliver Iron Mining Company and Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, was $153,356. He simultaneously fixed at $161,441 the assessed valuation of certain property owned in fee by the St. James Mining Company, located in the assessment district of Village of Aurora. The commissioner's determination reduced the valuations at which the two properties had been previously assessed.

Contending that the assessments were inadequate, the municipalities, on February 7, 1941, appealed to the board of tax appeals, hereinafter referred to as the board, from the commissioner's determination. Pursuant to § 278.01 (§ 2126-1), an action was commenced within 10 days in the district court of St. Louis county by the mining companies, hereinafter referred to as taxpayers, in which the assessments were claimed to be excessive. This action is now pending and undetermined.

The issues involved in the two appeals to the board were substantially identical insofar as taxpayers were concerned, and the actions were consolidated for hearing.

Prior to the hearing on appeal, taxpayers moved for a stay of proceedings before the board while the district court action was pending. This motion was denied. Thereafter and at the commencement of the hearing on appeal, taxpayers made an alternative motion to stay proceedings or dismiss the appeal upon grounds hereinafter discussed. The board denied this motion in its entirety and proceeded to hear the appeal de novo pursuant to § 271.06, subd. 6 (§ 2362-15[f]). Findings of fact were made by the board and separate decisions rendered increasing the assessed valuation of the Burt Land Mine to $184,154 and that of the St. James Mine to $200,132. Taxpayers are before this court by certiorari.

Since the issues involved here as to the two taxpayers are for the most part identical, all matters herein will be considered as applicable to both parties, unless specifically distinguished. In addition to the contention that the board erred in raising the valuation of the properties, the assignments of error raise certain procedural and jurisdictional questions going to the authority of the board to hear the appeal.

1. Taxpayers contend that the notices of appeal did not raise the issue that the assessed value of the property was greater than the amount determined by the commissioner's order of December 19, 1940; that they contain only allegations of error as to certain factors used by the commissioner in computing the valuation thereof. They assert: "A formula is nothing but a mental path followed by the Commissioner in reaching the valuation. It is the final result, the valuation, that counts — not the course followed in reaching it."

What shall be included in a notice of appeal to the board is governed by § 271.06, subd. 2 (§ 2362-15[b]), which provides in part as follows:

"* * * The notice of appeal shall refer to the order appealed from, state specifically the points of both law and fact which are questioned by the appellant, * * *. Every appellant shall be deemed to have waived all defenses and objections not specified in the notice of appeal."

The municipalities' respective notices of appeal specifically state that the appeals are from that "order and decision dated December 19, 1940, equalizing and fixing the assessed valuation of the following described property, included in said order." Then follow particular references to certain factors used by the commissioner in arriving at his conclusion, which the municipalities contend are erroneous. The last assignment of error in each notice, except for a difference in figures on the value of the mines, is as follows:

"In determining the total value of said property he arrived at a computed full and true value of * * * and an assessed value of * * *.

"He should have determined that the total full and true value thereof was at least the sum of * * *, and that the assessed value thereof was at least the sum of * * * which valuation would have resulted and will result from a computation of value upon the plan and method employed by him, if modified as hereinbefore set forth, * * *."

Taxpayers contend that this claim of error does not adequately raise the issue of undervaluation. We believe this to be too narrow and strained an interpretation of the notices of appeal, and that it is without merit. The quoted claim of error, in our opinion, unmistakably sets forth that the issue involved is the undervaluation of the properties. The jurisdiction of the board was not defeated by the specification of error as to certain factors used in the computation. The most that can be said is that the statement as to the factors is mere surplusage.

The primary purpose of a notice of appeal is to apprise opposing parties of what issues will be litigated upon appeal. In considering the sufficiency of a notice of appeal, this court stated in Re Estate of Devenney, 192 Minn. 265, 268, 256 N.W. 104, 105:

"* * * By a more discriminate selection of words a better notice might have been drafted. But, in the final analysis, this court is not dealing with niceties. * * * We do not believe that this court should look with favor upon objections which reach only the form of the notice and not its substance. This notice should be liberally construed as pleadings in general are liberally construed by this court. The notice is sufficient. See In re Estate of Parcker, 183 Minn. 191, 192, 236 N.W. 206; First Unitarian Society v. Houliston, 96 Minn. 342, 343, 105 N.W. 66, where similarly worded notices were held sufficient."

This is in accord with the general rule stated in 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, p. 1059, § 593, as follows:

"* * * Notices of appeal, however, should be liberally construed, and as a rule the notice is sufficient if it reasonably shows that an appeal is intended and the judgment, order, or decree appealed from substantially states the other facts required by the statute to be shown; the notice will not be rendered insufficient by mere clerical errors or other defects which could not have misled, or by mere surplusage." (Italics supplied.)

See also Roddy v. Gazette Co., 163 Iowa 416, 144 N.W. 1009; Morrison & Skaug v. Connery, 54 S.D. 329, 223 N.W. 210; Johnson v. California-Washington Timber Co., 159 Wash. 214, 292 P. 418; Haydel v. Morton, 3 Cal.App.2d 364, 39 P.2d 454; 1 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. §§ 319, 323.

There was only one final order of the commissioner fixing the valuations involved herein. The appeal clearly specified that it was being taken from that order. The record indicates that taxpayers were fully aware of the issue to be litigated and that no prejudice resulted from the language employed in the notice of appeal. We conclude that the notice was sufficient to raise the issue of inadequate valuation of the properties.

2. The municipalities joined in both appeals to the board. Error is claimed by taxpayers because the board refused to dismiss the appeal for misjoinder of parties. The Burt Land Mine is located in the assessment district of Independent School District No. 40 but not within the village of Aurora. The St. James Mine is located in the assessment district of the village but not within Independent School District No. 40. Taxpayers base their argument upon the provisions of § 270.19 (§ 2372-1). This section, which is the same as § 1 of L.1931, c. 304, provides in part that when any taxpayer or property owner has applied for the reduction of the assessed valuation of any real or personal property in an amount exceeding $15,000, it shall be the duty of the commissioner to give written notice to the officials of the municipality wherein such property is located, and to permit such municipality to have reasonable opportunity to be heard thereon. Taxpayers contend, therefore, that, insofar as the specific property involved is not within the confines of a...