Village of Brookfield v. Ricker

• Decision Date: 21 December 1920
• Docket Number: No. 13425.,13425.
• Parties: VILLAGE OF BROOKFIELD v. RICKER et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

295 Ill. 316

129 N.E. 100

VILLAGE OF BROOKFIELD

v.RICKER et al.

No. 13425.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 21, 1920.

A petition to the county court for a special assessment by the Village of Brookfield to pave an avenue was allowed, and a commissioner appointed to spread the assessment, and objections thereto overruled, and the assessment confirmed. From such judgment, Konrad Ricker and others appeal.

Judgment affirmed.Appeal from Cook County Court; John H. Williams, Judge.

William T. Hapeman, of Chicago, for appellants.

Arthur A. Huebsch, of Chicago (George E. Brannan, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

CARTER, J.

A petition was filed in the county court of Cook county, asking that a special assessment be levied by the authorities of the village of Brookfield to pave Ogden avenue from the east to the west line of said village, including the roadways of intersecting streets, with a Portland cement concrete pavement, to be paid for, according to the provisions of the Local Improvement Act, by special assessment on the property benefited. Thereafter a commissioner was appointed to spread the assessment, who made a report to the county court, which assessed $31,539.51 as public benefits to the village of Brookfield, and benefits to private property of $66,078.48. Objections were filed in the county court by appellants to the confirmation of this assessment. These objections were overruled, and the assessment roll confirmed. From the judgment overruling the objections, and confirming the assessment, this appeal was prayed.

The objections raised below, and overruled, and now urged here, are that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter; that the power to make this improvement existed only in the state of Illinois, as to the county of Cook, under the Road and Bridge Act of this state; and, further, that the ordinance is void in providing for paving an 18-foot strip by the county of Cook and charging the same as a public benefit against the village.

The evidence shows that Ogden avenue is the main thoroughfare leading into Brookfield from the east and west, and leading from Brookfield to Chicago; that this street has been paved in Lyons, which is the municipality immediately east of Brookfield, with concrete for about a mile, and that in Berwyn, which is the municipality immediately east of Lyons, Ogden avenue is being paved with concrete 24 feet wide; that Ogden avenue, in Brookfield, has been improved with sewers and water pipes, and with sidewalks for part of the distance on one side, and all of the distance on the other; that this roadway through a part of Brookfield is in its present condition practically impassable.

Appellee introduced on the hearing as to the legal objections in the county court the record of the meeting of the board of county commissioners of Cook county held October 4, 1919, at which a resolution was passed providing, among other things, that Ogden avenue, beginning at the intersection of Lawndale avenue, and extending westerly through the villages of Lyons, Brookfield, La Grange, and other municipalities to the county line, should be improved with an 18-foot concrete roadway at an estimated cost of $155,000, and that the board of county commissioners of Cook county should arrange to borrow $5,000,000 on the credit of the county for the purpose of constructing state-aid roads in said county. The argument of counsel for appellants is to the effect that by this resolution the county of Cook took jurisdiction over this roadway for its entire distance through the village of Brookfield, and that under the Road and Bridge Act passed on July 1, 1913, and since amended, the county and state authorities have entire charge over the paving of Ogden avenue through the village, and that under the provisions of said act all authority by the village to construct a pavement on said roadway under the Local Improvement Act has ceased.

There can be no question that the Legislature of this state has the power, by a law duly enacted, to deprive the municipalities of this state of all their authority with reference to local improvements, unless such law would contravene some provision of the state or federal Constitution. City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753, and authorities there cited. The chief question to be decided here is whether or not, by the passage of the Road and Bridge Act of 1913, as since amended, the Legislature did intend to deprive the municipalities of authority to put down pavements under the Local Improvement Act. We think it is manifest from a mere reading of the Road and Bridge Act of 1913 that the Legislature did not so intend. The third paragraph of section 9 of article 4 of said act (Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 2521) provides that no road or part thereof lying within the corporate limits of any city or village situated within any county of the first or second class, or any city or village having a population exceeding 20,000 by the last preceding federal census, situate within any county of the third class, shall be improved or constructed with state aid, and further provides that any road or part thereof lying within the corporate limits of any city or village having a population of 20,000 or less so ascertained, situate within any county of the third class, may be improved or constructed with state aid under certain conditions, and provides also that a...