Village of Golden Valley v. Minneapolis, N. & S. Ry.

• Decision Date: 25 February 1927
• Docket Number: No. 26008.,26008.
• Citation: 212 N.W. 585,170 Minn. 356
• Parties: VILLAGE OF GOLDEN VALLEY v. MINNEAPOLIS, N. & S. RY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

212 N.W. 585

170 Minn. 356

VILLAGE OF GOLDEN VALLEY v. MINNEAPOLIS, N. & S. RY.

No. 26008.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

February 25, 1927.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; E. F. Waite, Judge.

Suit by the Village of Golden Valley against the Minneapolis, Northfield & Southern Railway for an injunction. From an order continuing in effect a restraining order, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Grant L. Martin and Lancaster, Simpson, Junell & Dorsey, all of Minneapolis, for appellant.

F. T. Persinger and C. A. Pidgeon, both of Minneapolis, for respondent.

QUINN, J.

This is an appeal from an order continuing in full force and effect an order, formerly issued, restraining appellant from erecting an automobile sheltering house upon lots 155 and 156, facing west on Virginia avenue, in the village of Golden Valley, Hennepin county.

The village was organized under chapter 145, Laws 1885. It contains 10½ sections of land and has a population of about 2,500. Appellant is a corporation operating a railroad which passes through the village. Its railroad shops are on lots opposite the proposed site, facing east on Virginia avenue. There are two dwellings within 100 feet of the proposed site, a few within 200 feet, and about 75 some six blocks distant therefrom. The character of the proposed structure is sufficiently indicated in the application for a building permit, made to the village council by appellant, which is as follows:

"The Minneapolis, Northfield & Southern Railway hereby makes application for a building permit to construct an automobile shelter on lots Nos. 155 and 156, Glenwood.

"The automobile shelter house will be constructed substantially on the ground as shown on the sketch inclosed you herewith. The shelter will be constructed with 56-foot frontage on Virginia avenue, with a 125-foot depth, with 8-foot corner posts, frame construction on concrete foundation, and will have corrugated iron sides and composition roof. The floor will be of tamped cinders. The building permit fee of 25 cents is also inclosed herewith."

The application for the permit is dated October 13, and it was denied by the council on October 19, 1926. On October 18th, appellant began the construction of the building and on November 8th, at the time the restraining order herein was served, the construction had progressed so that a portion of the corrugated iron was attached to the studding.

In September, 1924, the village passed an ordinance, which was approved on October 7, as follows:

"An Ordinance Concerning the Issuance of Building Permits.

"Section 1. No person shall erect any building or structure without first having obtained a permit for the same in a manner herein provided, and all permits issued under the provisions of this ordinance shall contain a description of the building and the location of the lot or property.

"Sec. 2. That all requests for permits under this ordinance shall have one reading before the council previous to action being taken thereon.

"Sec. 3. The cost of any one building permit shall not exceed $.25.

"Sec. 4. Any person violating any of the above provisions of this ordinance shall, upon conviction thereof before the village magistrate or justice of the peace, be fined not to exceed $100 or be imprisoned until such fine is paid, not exceeding 90 days.

"Sec. 5. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force from and after its publication."

It is contended that this ordinance is unreasonable and void. It is the rule that an ordinance may be declared void, when, from its inherent character or from competent proof, its operation is shown to be unreasonable, unless the contrary appears from the text thereof or is established by proper evidence. Village of Minnesota v. Martin, 124 Minn. 498, 145 N. W. 383, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 40, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 812, cases cited. The question whether the power to forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or for a particular use is to...