Village of Tarrytown v. Woodland Lake Estates, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 November 1983
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 2,No. 1,1,2,3
• Citation: 468 N.Y.S.2d 513,97 A.D.2d 338
• Parties: The VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, Appellant-Respondent, v. WOODLAND LAKE ESTATES, INC., Respondent-Appellant. (Action) WOODLAND LAKE ESTATES, INC., et al., Respondents-Appellants, v. The VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, Appellant-Respondent; et al., defendants. (Action) SPA HOLDING CORP., Respondent-Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, Appellant-Respondent. (Action)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 513

468 N.Y.S.2d 513

97 A.D.2d 338

The VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, Appellant-Respondent, v. WOODLAND LAKE ESTATES, INC., Respondent-Appellant. (Action No. 1)

WOODLAND LAKE ESTATES, INC., et al., Respondents-Appellants, v. The VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, Appellant-Respondent; et al.,

defendants. (Action No. 2)

SPA HOLDING CORP., Respondent-Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, Appellant-Respondent. (Action No. 3)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Nov. 14, 1983.

William F. Plunkett, Jr., Sp. Counsel, Village of Tarrytown, for appellant-respondent.

Bleakley Schmidt, P.C., White Plains (Maurice F. Curran, White Plains, of counsel), for respondents-appellants.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and LAZER, WEINSTEIN and RUBIN, JJ.

LAZER, Justice.

At issue on these cross appeals are rights of ownership, possession and compensation relative to certain roads, sewer mains and water mains in a subdivision in the Village of Tarrytown. The dispute has endured for almost a generation and its resolution now depends on principles underlying the doctrines of estoppel, dedication, easement by prescription and inverse condemnation.

On June 21, 1948, Woodland Lake Estates, Inc. (Woodland), the owner of acreage it intended to subdivide in the Village of Tarrytown, entered into a contract with the village in which it agreed to construct the subdivision roads, dedicate them to the village and improve the areas to be dedicated by installing sewer mains, water mains, drainage facilities and hydrants. In return, the village agreed to accept the dedication and to make specified payments to Woodland for each house constructed on the tract plus 50% of the cost of rock excavation and retaining wall construction. Between 1948 and 1958, Woodland filed seven separate subdivision maps and after completion of each section--except for two--deeded the roads to the village. After each dedication, the village maintained and repaired the roads and the mentioned utilities in the subdivision. The village refused to accept title to roads in two of the sections alleging that the road construction was substandard. Title to the road known as Mallard Rise located in section 6 was acquired by the village independently of the 1948 agreement when a third party made the conveyance.

The litigative phase of the dispute commenced after the village refused to make the payments required under the contract. Woodland sought arbitration under the terms of the contract but was met with the contention that the contract was illegal because it had not been preceded by a referendum (see Village Law, former § 128-b). Arbitration was stayed by a judicial determination dated June 30, 1964, which declared that the contract was invalid. The determination was affirmed on appeal (see Village of Tarrytown v. Woodland Lake Estates, 24 A.D.2d 618, 261 N.Y.S.2d 1014, affd 19 N.Y.2d 660, 278 N.Y.S.2d 853, 225 N.E.2d 547).

After the affirmance of the judicial declaration of invalidity, Woodland repudiated its offer of dedication and demanded that the village convey back to it the roads and utilities within the subdivision. When the village refused this demand, Woodland erected a barrier across one of the streets in December of 1970. The village responded by commencing an action seeking a declaration that it owned the subdivision streets and obtained an order restraining Woodland from blocking access to the streets. Woodland counterclaimed for a judgment declaring itself to be the owner of the subdivision streets and utilities. In a second action, Spa Holding Corporation, Woodland's successor in interest, sought the same relief as Woodland sought in its counterclaim in the first action and the village counterclaimed for a judgment identical to its demand for relief in the first action. Another action, brought by Woodland and Spa Holding Corporation against the owners of property adjoining the subdivision, was subsequently rendered moot when the property was sold. After a nonjury trial, Special Term ruled that Woodland was entitled to resume possession of certain streets and utilities since its offer of dedication derived from the invalid 1948 contract, that the village acquired a public easement by adverse use of certain streets it completed prior to 1955 that were never conveyed to the village, that property owners in the subdivision had acquired private easements for access, water and sewer usage, and that under a theory of inverse condemnation Woodland was entitled to compensation from the village for certain of the roads and underlying utilities in the subdivision.

Dedication is the intentional donation of land by its owner for a public use and essentially it is in the nature of a gift (Scarborough Prop. Corp. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, 278 N.Y. 370, 16 N.E.2d 369; Flack v. Village of Green Island, 122 N.Y. 107, 25 N.E. 267; Domus Dev. Corp. v. Monroe County Pure Water, 84 A.D.2d 929, 446 N.Y.S.2d 701). Where, however, a person conveys land for a public purpose upon the agreement of the municipality to pay for it, the conveyance constitutes a sale of land (Scarborough Prop. Corp. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, supra, 278 N.Y. pp. 377-378, 16 N.E.2d 369). Since the 1948 agreement subsequently was declared invalid for the same reasons as were stated in Scarborough (supra), there was neither a valid sale of land nor a dedication by Woodland and it was entitled to resume possession of the property (see Scarborough Prop. Corp. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, supra, p. 376, 16 N.E.2d 369). Under these circumstances, the fact that Woodland acquiesced in the public use of the roads prior to the judicial declaration of invalidity cannot estop Woodland from denying that a dedication took place, since its offer to dedicate was conditioned on the performance of a contract which was invalid from its inception and which was subsequently judicially declared to be invalid (see 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations [3d ed], § 33.63; cf. Hubbard v. City of White Plains, 18 A.D.2d 674, 236 N.Y.S.2d 9; Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc.2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, affd 45 A.D.2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957).

Nevertheless, we accept in part Tarrytown's contention that it acquired an easement by prescription as a result of its maintenance and repair of the roads and utilities within the subdivision and by the public use of those facilities between the date of completion of each section (1948 to 1958) and the commencement of the first of these actions in 1970. Since public and village maintenance of the streets and utilities commenced prior to the effective date of the CPLR in 1963, the 15-year prescription period under section 34 of the former Civil Practice Act governs (see Reiter v. Landon Homes, 31 A.D.2d 538, 295 N.Y.S.2d 103). With respect to the roads never conveyed to the village and completed prior to 1955, we agree with Special Term that the village acquired an easement by prescription through its maintenance, repair and control of the roads plus their continuous and uninterrupted use by the public (see Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N.Y. 139, 44 N.E. 966; Impastato v. Village of Catskill, 55 A.D.2d 714, 389 N.Y.S.2d 152). In addition, the village established prescriptive rights to the utilities underlying these roads by its continuous use, maintenance and control over these facilities (see Village of Schoharie v. Coons, 34 A.D.2d 701, 309 N.Y.S.2d 545, affd. 28 N.Y.2d 568, 319 N.Y.S.2d 612, 268 N.E.2d 325; Greenwood v. Rahill, 412 A.2d 228 [R.I.]; Ann., 55 A.L.R.2d 1144; 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations [3d ed], § 31.12). While Special Term's interlocutory judgment recognized these prescriptive rights, the final judgment failed to do so, and we now modify the final judgment in this respect. As to the streets conveyed to the village by deed, however, no prescriptive easement was acquired since maintenance of those streets and underlying utilities by the village...