Villages, LLC v. Longhi
Decision Date | 05 July 2016 |
Docket Number | AC 36844 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | VILLAGES, LLC v. LORI LONGHI |
Lavine, Sheldon and Mullins, Js.
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Wiese, J.)
Gwendolyn S. Bishop, with whom was P. Timothy Smith, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Kristan M. Maccini, for the appellee (defendant).
Our Supreme Court said of zoning laws and commissions: (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Patrick's Church Corp. v. Daniels, 113 Conn. 132, 139, 154 A. 343 (1931).
The plaintiff, Villages, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its complaint against the defendant, Lori Longhi, a member of the Enfield Planning and Zoning Commission (commission), on the ground that the defendant is absolutely immune from liability in this action under the litigation privilege. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in ruling that the defendant is absolutely immune from suit in this action under the litigation privilege because the conduct alleged does not implicate that privilege, but instead is governed by the provisions of General Statutes § 52-557n (c).1 We agree with the plaintiff and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The parties appear before this court for a second time. The underlying facts previously were set out in Villages, LLC v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission, 149 Conn. App. 448, 89 A.3d 405 (2014), appeals dismissed, 320 Conn. 89, 127 A.3d 998 (2015). In May, 2009, the plaintiff filed an application for a special use permit and an application to develop an open space subdivision for residential housing on property it owned in Enfield. Id., 450. The commission held a public hearing on the plaintiff's applications on July 9, 2009, July 23, 2009, September 3, 2009, and October 1, 2009, and closed the public hearing on October 1, 2009. Id. On October 15, 2009, the commission met and voted to deny both applications. Id.
The plaintiff filed an appeal with respect to each application (zoning appeals). In its appeals, the plaintiff alleged that "the commission illegally and arbitrarily predetermined the outcome of each of its applications prior to the public hearing and was motivated by improper notions of bias and personal animus when it denied each of the applications." Id., 450-51.
Following a trial, the court, Hon. Richard M. Rittenband, judge trial referee, (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Id., 451.
The court found two instances of conduct by the defendant that gave rise to the plaintiff's claim of bias against her, only one of which was relevant to the zoning appeals. Id., 451. In the incident described by the court, the defendant had stated that "she wanted [Patrick Tallarita] to suffer the same fate of denial by the commission that she had suffered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 452. "At trial, Anthony DiPace testified that [the defendant] had stated to him that the commission, when it previously considered an application that she had submitted, had 'screwed her and treated her unfairly when it denied that application. She was unhappy with [Patrick] Tallarita, who was then mayor, because he did not intervene on her behalf. She stated in the presence of DiPace that she wanted [Patrick] Tallarita to suffer the same fate, i.e., that the commission deny the plaintiff's applications. [Patrick] Tallarita did not become aware of [the defendant's] statement regarding the fate of the plaintiff's applications until after the commission had closed the public hearing [on the plaintiff's applications]. The court found that [the defendant's] comments were blatantly biased [against Patrick] Tallarita and should not be tolerated. The court also found that it had not been possible for the plaintiff to bring [the defendant's] comments regarding [Patrick] Tallarita to the attention of the commission because he learned of them after the hearing had closed and the commission had denied the plaintiff's applications.
"Credibility was a deciding factor in the court's decision regarding [the defendant's] ex parte communication. [Patrick] Tallarita, DiPace, and Bryon Meade testified during the trial. The court found each of the men was a credible witness. [The defendant] also testified at trial, but the court found that her testimony was filled with denials of the allegations and concludedthat her 'comments did not ring true. The court found that Meade, a representative of the Hazardville Water Authority, testified with confidence that [the defendant] had met with him in person regarding the plaintiff's applications during the first week of October, 2009. [The defendant] testified, however, that Meade must have been confused because she met with him regarding another property. The court stated that [the defen-dant's] testimony was just not credible.
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 452-53.
The court (Footnote omitted.) Id., 453-54.
Judge Rittenband concluded that, (Emphasis added.) Id., 455. The commission appealed, and this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Id., 467. The commission's appeals to our Supreme Court were dismissed. Villages, LLC v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission, 320 Conn. 89, 127 A.3d 998 (2015).
The plaintiff commenced the present action on October 1, 2012. The two count complaint against the defendant alleged intentional fraudulent misrepresentation2 and intentional tortious interference with business expectancy.3 The plaintiff alleged that it owns land in Enfield and that it had filed certain applications with the commission, seeking to develop the land. At all times relevant, the defendant was a member of thecommission and engaged in ex parte communication with respect to the plaintiff's applications, yet participated in the public hearing in which the commission denied the plaintiff's applications.
The defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged three special defenses as to each count, including that the action was barred by the doctrines of governmental immunity and absolute immunity. The plaintiff denied each of the special defenses.
In December, 2013, the defendant filed a motion that the court either dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action or render summary judgment in her favor. Only the motion to dismiss is relevant to this appeal.4 In her memorandum of law in support of the motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that she was entitled to absolute immunity because she was acting in an administrative capacity and performing a quasi-judicial function when she reviewed and voted on the plaintiff's applications. Nonetheless, she recognized the case of Towne Brooke...
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