Villarreal v. State
Decision Date | 29 April 2009 |
Docket Number | No. PD-0984-08.,PD-0984-08. |
Citation | 286 S.W.3d 321 |
Parties | Noel Ronaldo VILLARREAL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Marc F. Gault, Fort Worth, for Appellant.
Debra Ann Windsor, Asst. Criminal District Atty., Fort Worth, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Atty., Austin, for State.
The principal question presented in this case is whether the evidence adduced at appellant's trial was legally sufficient to support his conviction for violation of a protective order. We hold that the evidence was legally sufficient, and we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
On June 30, 2006, a Tarrant County grand jury returned an indictment charging appellant with violation of a protective order under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(1).1 The indictment alleged, in relevant part, that, on or about March 2, 2005, appellant:
"did intentionally or knowingly in violation of an order of the Arlington Municipal Court . . . issued on February 8th, 2005, . . . commit an act of family violence, namely intentionally causing bodily injury to Shannon Love, by striking her with his hand or pushing her with his hand, and said act of family violence was intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury or assault."
The indictment also alleged, for purposes of punishment enhancement, that appellant had two prior felony convictions.
Trial under the indictment was had before a jury on appellant's plea of not guilty. At the guilt stage of trial, the State presented five witnesses and several exhibits.2 The State's witnesses included Rosalia Maddock, Judge of the Arlington Municipal Court and a magistrate of Tarrant County; Shannon Love, the complainant; David Paden, an eyewitness to the offense; Sidney Turner, a second eyewitness to the offense; and Greg Wilkinson, an Arlington police officer.
The State's evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and reasonable inferences therefrom, established the following: In January 2005, appellant and Love began an intimate dating relationship. They maintained separate residences, but occasionally each of them spent the night with the other at the other's residence.3 Their relationship eventually soured. On or about February 8, 2005, appellant was arrested for committing some type of family violence against Love.4 Shortly after appellant's arrest, he was taken before Judge Maddock. At that time, Judge Maddock, acting under Article 17.292 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, issued an emergency protective order enjoining appellant, for a period of 61 days, from committing further family violence against Love and certain named members of her family. Judge Maddock gave a copy of the protective order to appellant and explained to him orally what it prohibited.5 On March 2, 2005, just 22 days after Judge Maddock issued the protective order, appellant again committed family violence against Love, to wit: he assaulted and injured her in the parking lot of an Arlington bar.
The protective order, admitted in evidence as State's Exhibit Four, was two pages in length and entitled "Magistrate's Order for Emergency Protection-Family Violence." It stated, in relevant part, that:
On page two of the protective order, below Judge Maddock's signature, the following definitions appeared:
The trial court, in its jury charge, instructed the jurors that "a person commits the offense of violation of a protective order if, in violation of an order issued under Article 17.292, Code of Criminal Procedure, he knowingly or intentionally commits family violence and the person has violated the protective order by committing an assault." The court also instructed the jurors, over appellant's objection, that "`[f]amily violence' means dating violence as hereinafter defined." The court then defined the terms "dating violence" and "dating relationship" in accordance with the definitions in Texas Family Code § 71.0021. See footnote one, supra.
The jury, after deliberating, found appellant guilty as charged in the indictment. The trial court, after hearing additional evidence, assessed appellant's punishment, enhanced by two prior felony convictions, at imprisonment for sixty years.
On direct appeal, appellant brought three points of error, arguing that: (1) the evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the evidence adduced at trial was factually insufficient to support his conviction, and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that "family violence" meant "dating violence" and in defining for the jury the terms "dating violence" and "dating relationship." With respect to his evidentiary-insufficiency points, appellant noted first that, "in [this] case, the protective order . . . limit[ed] the definition of `family violence' to actions involving family and household members."8 Appellant then argued:
With respect to his jury-charge point, appellant argued that the trial court erred because "the protective order excluded dating violence from [its] definition of family violence, and [evidence of] dating violence, therefore, is not sufficient to support a conviction for violating the protective order's family violence prohibition."
The court of appeals overruled appellant's points of error and affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction. Villarreal v. State, No. 02-06-00393-CR, 2008 WL 1777982 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008) ( ). With respect to appellant's evidentiary-sufficiency points, the court of appeals first rejected his argument that the protective order limited the definition of "family violence" to actions involving family and household members and that, therefore, evidence of dating violence was insufficient to support a conviction for violating the protective order's prohibition of family violence:
Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted).
The court of appeals then explained that the State's burden at trial was to prove that appellant intentionally or knowingly, in violation of a protective order, committed an act of "family violence" as that term was defined in the Texas Family Code. Id. at 6-7. Finally, the court of appeals, after reviewing the evidence presented at trial and after summarizing the relevant law, stated, "Applying the appropriate standards of review, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's judgment." Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
With respect to appellant's jury-charge point of error, the court of appeals explained that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on "dating violence" because "section...
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...by reference to the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must c......
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...is obliged to include in the jury charge statutory definitions that affect the meaning of elements of the crime, Villarreal v. State , 286 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), the charge must also be tailored to the facts presented at trial. That is, the trial court must submit to the ju......
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Table of cases
...8 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref’d) 1:140, 6:1910 Vick v. State 991 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) 6:2210 Villarreal v. State 286 S.W.3d 321 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009 7:325 Vuong v. State 830 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) 1:50 W Waddell v. State 37 Tex. 354 (Tex. 1872) 11:50 Wade ......