Villars v. Villars
| Citation | 305 P.3d 321 |
| Decision Date | 19 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. S–14416.,S–14416. |
| Parties | Olga H. VILLARS, Appellant, v. Richard J. VILLARS, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Olga H. Villars, pro se, Solana Beach, California, Appellant.
Richard J. Villars, pro se, Marrero, Louisiana, Appellee.
Before: FABE, Chief Justice, CARPENETI, WINFREE, STOWERS, and MAASSEN, Justices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Olga Villars sued her former husband, Richard Villars, for his failure to pay spousal support during the year 2010. Following a trial at which both parties appeared telephonically and pro se, the trial court ruled that the amount Richard owed Olga had to be reduced to account for (1) the smaller size of her household while her daughter was living with Richard, (2) the lower federal poverty level in California, where Olga had moved, (3) the substantial contributions for support Olga received from her second husband, and (4) Olga's earned income. On appeal, Olga challenges these rulings and certain aspects of the trial procedure. Because we find that the trial court clearly erred in its calculation of the amount of support contributed by Olga's second husband, we remand for further consideration of this issue while affirming on all others.
II. BACKGROUNDA. Facts
Richard and Olga were married in December 2004 in Kiev, Ukraine. Olga moved to Alaska in July 2005 with her minor daughter, Linda, to be with Richard. As Olga's immigration sponsor, Richard filed an INS Form I–864 affidavit of support, in which he agreed to maintain Olga and Linda “at an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal poverty guidelines.” 1
Richard and Olga divorced on January 12, 2009. Their divorce decree incorporated Richard's support obligations under his I–864 affidavit and calculated monthly payments based on the federal poverty level for a two-person household in Alaska.
On February 22, 2009, Olga and Linda moved to California. There Olga married George Nasif on October 18, 2009. Olga's daughter Linda moved to Louisiana to live with Richard from December 2009 until June 14, 2010, under a temporary guardianship agreement.
Olga's home life was unsettled during 2010, the only year at issue here. She and George maintained separate residences for much of the year; at one point George secured a restraining order against her. Olga was evicted from her apartment in April and moved into a motel, where she lived for several months until moving into another apartment with George and Linda. Olga's marriage to George was annulled in November 2010.
Richard did not make any support payments to Olga for the first eleven months of 2010. Olga filed a motion in Alaska to enforce the divorce decree, and Richard made payments for December 2010 and January 2011 pursuant to a temporary support order. His obligations for the first eleven months of 2010 were resolved at trial.
B. Proceedings
Trial was held in superior court in Fairbanks in February 2011; both parties attended telephonically. After hearing from Richard, Olga, and George, the court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court first ruled that Richard's 2010 support payments should be determined by the federal poverty level in California, not Alaska. The court ruled further that the payments would be determined by the federal poverty level for a single-person household, not a two-person household, for the months Linda was living with Richard. Finally, the court ruled that Richard's support obligation would be offset by the amount of support that George provided to Olga and Linda during 2010. With some inconsistencies noted below, George testified at trial that his 2010 income was approximately $24,000, and that he spent this entire amount to support Olga, Linda, and himself. The trial court credited this testimony and calculated an offset assuming that all of George's income went to pay all of the family's living expenses. Accordingly, the trial court divided George's income evenly between him and Olga for the months Linda was away and among the three of them for the months she was there, for a total of $14,202.80 in support from George for Olga and Linda.
After a few other minor adjustments—$175 in income that Olga made in a few days of work and $275.90 “at minimum” in qualifying support that Richard paid toward the end of the year—the trial court found that Richard owed no further support for 2010. Also, although finding that Olga had satisfied any duty to mitigate that may have existed by applying unsuccessfully for a number of jobs while living in California, the court held that she had a responsibility to “continue seeking employment in earnest” or risk losing her “right to payments from Mr. Villars.”
After the entry of judgment, Olga filed a motion to alter or amend it under Civil Rule 59, basing her request on financial records that she had not produced at trial. The trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, Olga raises many objections to the trial court's findings and procedure. As to its findings, Olga challenges the trial court's decision to account for California's lower federal poverty rate and for Linda's absence from the household for part of the year when calculating Richard's support obligations. She challenges the trial court's use of George's support to offset Richard's support obligation. She also contests the trial court's finding as to the amount of support that George provided. Olga also argues that the income she earned in 2010 should not be used to offset Richard's obligations.
Olga contests the fairness of the trial on two grounds. First, she argues that the trial court did not provide her with an interpreter and that she was not able to understand or be understood by the court. Second, she argues that her opportunity to participate in the trial was prejudiced by her lack of a reliable telephone connection.
Finally, Olga argues that the court erred by denying two of her motions: first, her Civil Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment based on late-filed evidence, and second, her motion to strike the trial testimony of George Nasif.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.2 We will find clear error if “after review of the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake occurred.” 3 Richard's obligations under the divorce decree and the INS Form I–864 affidavit are both questions of contract interpretation and are thus questions of law that we review de novo. 4 Interpreting INS Form I–864 requires the interpretation of federal statutes, and statutory interpretation is also a question of law that we review using our independent judgment.5 The amount of income imputed to Olga to offset Richard's support obligations is a question of fact that we review for clear error.6 The denial of Olga's motion to alter or amend a judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,7 as are the trial court's decisions regarding the need for an interpreter and telephonic participation.8
IV. DISCUSSIONA. The Trial Court Correctly Adjusted Richard's Support Obligations To Account For Olga's Move To California, Linda's Temporary Absence From The Household, And Olga's Earnings.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law that accompanied Richard and Olga's 2009 divorce decree, and that were made a part of it by reference, incorporated Richard's support obligations under the INS Form I–864 affidavit and stipulated that this obligation was governed by federal law. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A), Richard must maintain Olga and Linda “at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line.” We have interpreted § 1183a to mean that “a sponsor is required to pay only the difference between the sponsored non-citizen's income and the 125% of poverty threshold.” 9 The “Federal poverty line” in § 1183a is defined as “the official poverty line ... that is applicable to a family of the size involved.” 10 Accordingly, federal courts have held that a sponsor's support obligations must be adjusted downward when a family member leaves the household.11 The trial court was therefore correct to reduce Richard's support obligations to account for the time that Linda was living with him instead of with Olga.
The trial court was also correct to adjust Richard's support obligations to account for Olga's move to California. The purpose of § 1183a is to provide a minimum level of support so that the sponsored immigrant does not become a public charge.12 Failing to take into account changes of location would frustrate this statutory purpose; it would provide either a windfall or insufficient support to an immigrant who moved to a state with a different cost of living. The “official poverty line ... applicable to” the sponsored family, for purposes of § 1183a(h), is the one in effect where the family is physically residing, and where it is paying for the goods and services necessary to daily life.
Olga argues that the divorce decree requires Richard's support obligation to be calculated with reference to the federal poverty line for a two-person household in Alaska, regardless of whether his I–864 affidavit would require it. She is incorrect. The decree incorporates the affidavit's duty of support but holds that the duty “is governed by Federal law” and that Richard's support obligation “shall be adjusted to match” any changes in the federal poverty guidelines. Where federal law would require an adjustment in Richard's support obligation, the divorce decree does as well.
Olga is also incorrect in arguing that Richard's support obligations should not be offset by her 2010 earnings. Olga's argument directly contradicts our holding in Barnett in which we adjusted a sponsor's support obligations by the sponsored immigrant's earned income.13
B. The Trial Court Clearly Erred In Its Calculation Of George's Contributions Of Support To Olga And Linda.
It was Richard's burden at trial to prove...
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