Villars v. Villars

Decision Date01 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. S–14094.,S–14094.
Citation277 P.3d 763
PartiesRichard Jude VILLARS, Appellant, v. Kathleen Estelle VILLARS, Appellee.
CourtAlaska Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Sen K. Tan, Judge.

Andrew J. Fierro, Law Office of Andrew J. Fierro, Inc., Anchorage, for Appellant.

Douglas C. Perkins, Hartig, Rhodes, Hoge & Lekisch, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellee.

Before: CARPENETI, Chief Justice, FABE, WINFREE, and STOWERS, Justices.

OPINION

STOWERS, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Richard Villars and Kathleen Villars were married on August 31, 1984. They jointly filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on February 4, 2002. Richard served in the military for most of the marriage, first in the United States Air Force and later in the Alaska Air National Guard. Prior to filing their dissolution, the parties drafted a settlement agreement dividing their property such that each person was to receive half of the marital estate. The value of Richard's military retirement benefits was not known at the time of dissolution because he had not yet qualified for benefits. However, Richard and Kathleen agreed to split the marital portion of Richard's military retirement benefits 50/50 should Richard receive them. Richard began collecting his military retirement benefits in 2009 at the age of 48, twelve years earlier than he and Kathleen had expected at the time of dissolution. Kathleen asserted she was entitled to collect her marital portion of Richard's military retirement benefits when Richard began collecting them. Richard disagreed, arguing that the parties intended Kathleen to collect only when Richard turned 60 years old.

The superior court determined that the settlement agreement was unambiguous and the parties intended to divide equally the marital portion of Richard's military retirement benefits when he began receiving them, not when he turned 60. The superior court ordered Richard to repay Kathleen 50% of the marital portion of the retirement benefits he had received to date. Richard appeals, arguing that the superior court's finding on the parties' intent was erroneous and that the retirement benefits are his separate property until he reaches the age of 60. Richard further argues that the superior court impermissibly modified the settlement agreement. Because the findings of the superior court were not clearly erroneous and the superior court did not make an impermissible modification to the settlement agreement, we affirm.

II. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS

Richard Villars and Kathleen Villars were married on August 31, 1984. One year prior, on June 1, 1983, Richard began active duty with the United States Air Force at the age of 22. Richard remained on active duty for eight years until July 1991. Richard joined the Alaska Air National Guard in May 1992. At the time of dissolution, Richard was employed by the Alaska Air National Guard and was also a pilot with United Airlines.

Richard and Kathleen jointly filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the superior court on February 4, 2002. They appended to the petition “Attachment A,” a six-page spreadsheet showing how they agreed to divide their assets and debts. The first page of “Attachment A” showed the total value of their property, which they agreed to split 50/50. The composition of property adding up to fifty percent differed for each of them. Kathleen wanted to keep the entirety of her retirement accounts, which had greater value than Richard's accounts. Richard received cash and personal property to equalize the value of the parties' property division.

To address the division of Richard's United Airlines and military pensions, the parties checked the box on the petition for dissolution stating:

Our agreement about the distribution of retirement or military pension benefits is attached. If this agreement is not accepted by the retirement plan administrator as a qualified domestic relations order [QDRO], we agree that the court, upon motion by a party, may make any necessary corrections. We agree any such court-ordered modifications will be effective retroactive to the date of the original dissolution decree.

They handwrote underneath, “QDRO's [sic] will be presented at court.” Richard's United Airlines and military pensions were included in the asset breakdown in “Attachment A,” but their values were unknown because Richard had not yet retired at the time of dissolution. The line item in “Attachment A” pertaining to Richard's military retirement contained the description, “Alaska Air National Guard (monthly benefit at age 60) and the formula, “1/2 x years of marriage during service/years of service.”

On March 13, 2002, Richard and Kathleen appeared in person and testified at a dissolution hearing before Standing Master Suzanne Cole. Master Cole reviewed “Attachment A” with Richard and Kathleen, including the division of the retirement benefits.

THE COURT: And the way that I understand the division here is the plan is to equalize the retirement benefits 50/50 between the two of you.

MR. VILLARS: Yes.

The parties explained that the QDROs were not ready for presentation to the court, and Master Cole sought clarification on how the parties were dividing the pensions.

THE COURT: Regarding retirement benefits then, based on your division of other property, there is no intent to claim an interest in the other one's retirement benefits? You're leaving them as they are?

MS. VILLARS: Other than the pensions. We had two QDROs written up. They have not yet been mailed back to us.

...

THE COURT: Okay. You still have lost me here. I'm not quite sure what you're doing with the pensions, because at least what's listed here, unless I'm missing something....

MR. VILLARS: The—the present value, we're cashing out 50—50 percent on the retirement.

...

MR. VILLARS: And the future value, we are agreeing to, according to the QDRO....

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VILLARS: ... so it's a 50 percent share there.

Master Cole, seeking to be clear regarding the parties' description of the pension division in “Attachment A” and their testimony, summarized it again in her own words.

THE COURT: Regarding the retirement benefits earned by Mr. Villars during the marriage, and that is specifically the employment benefits, the plan is that Ms. Villars is to receive 50 percent of the retirement benefits through QDRO of the employment benefits earned by Mr. Villars; is that right?

MS. VILLARS: For the air national guard.

...

THE COURT: It's 50 percent of the benefits earned ...

MS. VILLARS: Of today.

THE COURT: ... during the marriage.

MS. VILLARS: Yes.

MR. VILLARS: Yes.

MS. VILLARS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And no other claim is being made on any benefits obtained by Mr. Villars.

MS. VILLARS: Exactly.

Because the QDROs were still being drafted by Colonel Edward Schilling, an attorney retained by Richard, the parties agreed to file the QDROs after the dissolution was finalized. Richard and Kathleen then acknowledged that the divisions in property discussed at the hearing were “final decisions” they would not be able “to modify ... later on” absent a showing of fraud or duress. Master Cole found that the agreement between Richard and Kathleen was “fair and just” and recommended approval of the dissolution agreement. On March 22, 2002, the superior court accepted the master's recommendation, issued a dissolution decree, and the marriage was dissolved.

Colonel Schilling prepared a QDRO for the military benefits soon after. The document, entitled “Order for the Division of the Marital Interest in Military Retired Pay” (hereinafter 2002 QDRO”),1 expressed Kathleen's fractional interest in Richard's military pension in terms of points rather than years because the Reserve National Guard Retirement System accounts for time spent in the military in terms of points. Section 5 of the 2002 QDRO described the formula to calculate Kathleen's share:

5. As her property interest in [Richard's] disposable retired pay,2 Former Spouse is awarded a portion of said pay calculated as follows:

50% x (5026 points/points creditable for retirement upon retirement).[3

Section 9 stated, “The appropriate pay center shall pay the sums called for above directly to Former Spouse to the extent permitted by the law at the same time the Member receives retired pay. (Emphasis added.) Section 11 read, “With the exception of the amounts specifically awarded to Former Spouse, the balance of Member's retired pay is awarded to Member as his sole and separate property.” Richard and Kathleen signed and filed the 2002 QDRO and on June 19, 2002, the superior court accepted it.

After the dissolution, Richard worked for six more years as a part-time National Guard member. A part-time guard member typically accumulates credit towards retirement under the reservist system in which a guard member must accrue a minimum of 50 points a year for twenty years to qualify for a pension at age 60.4 This means that even if the guard member acquires the twenty qualifying years before age 60, the member must wait until age 60 to start collecting the pension. In contrast, under the active retirement system, once a service member accumulates 20 years of service, that service member can retire immediately regardless of whether that member has reached age 60. Once a member in the reservist system accumulates 7,300 points, the member is transferred from the reservist retirement system to the active duty retirement system.5

Even though Richard was a part-time reservist, he acquired far more than 50 points a year; in fact he averaged over 300 points per year towards retirement during the sixteen years he was in the National Guard. These high point totals while in the National Guard combined with his eight years of active service from 19831991 allowed Richard to transfer from the reservist retirement system to the active duty retirement system. Richard retired from the military at age 48 in July 2009 with 7,919...

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    ...viewing the contract as a whole and the extrinsic evidence surrounding the disputed terms.'" Id. at 607-08 (quoting Villars v. Villars, 277 P.3d 763, 768-69 (Alaska 2012)). Contract "interpretation becomes a task for the trier of fact when the parties present extrinsic evidence to clarify a......

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