Ville v. First Choice in Home Care
| Decision Date | 12 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. C17-0548JLR |
| Parties | ISATU VILLE, Plaintiff, v. FIRST CHOICE IN HOME CARE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Before the court is Defendant First Choice In-Home Care's ("First Choice") motion for summary judgment. (MSJ (Dkt. # 31).) Plaintiff Isatu Ville opposes the motion. Ms. Ville was represented by counsel at one point, but is now proceeding pro se. (See Mot. to Withdraw (Dkt. # 22); Order (Dkt. # 24).) The court has examined the motion, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable
//
// law. Being fully advised,1 the court GRANTS First Choice's motion and DISMISSES this case with prejudice for the reasons set forth below.
Ms. Ville was employed by First Choice as a homecare aide from November 3, 2015, to July 25, 2016. (Compl. (Dkt. # 5) at 2; Answer (Dkt. # 10) ¶¶ 3-4.) Ms. Ville served as a homecare aide for a number of different clients while employed by First Choice. (See Compl., Ex. 1 (Dkt. # 5-1) at 20-27.) A standard workweek for First Choice employees is Sunday through Saturday. (Lord Decl. (Dkt. # 33) ¶ 1.) When an employee works more than 40 hours in a standard workweek, that employee is paid overtime wages at time and one-half for each hour over 40 hours. (Id.) First Choice "makes every effort to mitigate overtime hours" because it cannot bill Medicaid through the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services for overtime wages. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.) In other words, First Choice is "100% responsible for covering the cost of the half time pay received by the employee working overtime." (Id. ¶ 4.) First Choice requires that its employees first receive authorization before working overtime. (Id. ¶ 2.) However, a homecare aide who works unauthorized overtime is still entitled to wages at time and one-half. (Id.)
From Sunday, July 17, 2016, through Friday, July 22, 2016, Ms. Ville worked 39 hours. (Bigby Decl. (Dkt. # 32) ¶ 1, Ex. 1 at 1-8.) The parties disagree about whetherMs. Ville was originally scheduled to work for client N.H. on Saturday, July 23, 2018. (See 6/15/2018 Letter (Dkt. # 28) at 9 (); Gaviglio Decl. (Dkt. # 34) ¶¶ 1-3 ().) Both parties agree, however, that on July 22, 2016, Brenda Jackson, a Senior Direct Care Supervisor at First Choice, called Ms. Ville and instructed her to not work for N.H. on July 23, 2016. (See Gaviglio Decl. ¶ 3; Bigby Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 4 ("Ville Dep.") at 33:11-21; Compl. at 2-3.)
At 9:23 a.m. on July 23, 2016, Angel Gaviglio, a Direct Care Supervisor with First Choice, received a phone call from John Clark, a First Choice caregiver who was at N.H.'s residence and who was scheduled to work with N.H. from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. that day. (Gaviglio Decl. ¶ 4; Lord Decl. ¶ 3.) Mr. Clark informed Ms. Gaviglio that Ms. Ville had arrived at N.H.'s residence at 8:00 a.m. intending to complete a work shift. (Gaviglio Decl. ¶ 4; see also Bigby Decl., Ex. 1 at 1; Compl. at 3.) Ms. Gaviglio immediately called Ms. Ville on her cell phone to instruct her to leave the premises, but the call went to voicemail. (Gaviglio Decl. ¶ 4.) Ms. Gaviglio eventually reached Ms. Ville on N.H.'s home phone shortly before 10:00 a.m., and instructed her to leave the premises. (Id. ¶ 5.) Ms. Ville responded that she would not leave unless the directive was put in writing. (Id.; Compl. at 3; Ville Dep. at 36:3-18.) Ms. Gaviglio called Ms. Ville back shortly after 10:00 a.m., and instructed her that, if she did not leave N.H.'s residence, then Ms. Gaviglio would call the police. (Gaviglio Decl. ¶ 6.) At 10:30 a.m., Ms. Jackson called Ms. Ville and directed her to leave to N.H.'s home. (Id. ¶ 7.) Ms.Ville again refused. (Id.) At 10:36 a.m., Ms. Gaviglio called the police and requested assistance in removing Ms. Ville from N.H's premises. (Id.; Compl. at 3.) At 11:44 a.m., Ms. Gaviglio received confirmation from the police that Ms. Ville had been removed. (Gaviglio Decl. ¶ 7; Bigby Decl., Ex. 1 at 1.)
On July 25, 2016, Ms. Ville met with Ms. Gaviglio, Ms. Jackson, and T.J. Ford, First Choice's Director of Human Resources. (Gaviglio Decl. ¶ 8; Compl. at 4.) First Choice claims that it entered this meeting intending to retain Ms. Ville, in part because there is a shortage of eligible homecare aides in Washington. (Lord Decl. ¶ 6.) However, according to First Choice, at the meeting Ms. Ville refused to take responsibility for her July 23, 2016, actions and represented that she would continue to disregard company directives. (Gaviglio Decl. ¶ 8.) Ms. Ville states that, at the meeting, she refused to sign a "warning for insubordination" and "paperwork about having sole responsibility of (sic) the police being contacted." (Compl. at 4.) Ms. Ville's employment was terminated after this meeting. (Bigby Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 2 ("Termination Letter").) First Choice's termination letter states that Ms. Ville was fired as a "result of insubordination and refusing to abide by First Choice In-Home Care's policies and procedures." (Id.)
Ms. Ville filed a complaint with the EEOC, which was dismissed on March 16, 2017, after the EEOC determined that it was "unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes." (Compl., Ex. 1 at 1.) Ms. Ville filed the present case on April 10, 2017, alleging employment discrimination based on race, sex, color, and national origin, as well as retaliation. (See Dkt.; Compl. at 2.; see also Ville Dep. at 24:13-17.) Ms. Ville is a black female who was born in Sierra Leone. (Compl. at4.) Ms. Ville argues in part that Mr. Clark, who is a white American male, was allowed to work overtime hours for N.H. while Ms. Ville was denied this opportunity. (See Resp. at 5.) First Choice explains that Mr. Clark was N.H.'s primary caregiver, which is a role "based on the length of time the caregiver has been assigned to the client, the caregiver's ability to provide task training to other assigned caregivers, and the number of monthly hours the caregiver is providing to that client." (Lord Decl. ¶ 3.) Mr. Clark worked with N.H. from December 2014 until October 2017, when N.H. passed away. (Id.) As N.H.'s primary caregiver, Mr. Clark was given the majority of N.H.'s caregiver hours and overtime hours when necessary, though he still needed permission from a Direct Care Supervisor before working overtime. (Id.; MSJ at 8.)
On August 1, 2018, First Choice filed this motion for summary judgment on all of Ms. Ville's allegations, claiming that, as a matter of law, Ms. Ville cannot prove that First Choice discriminated or retaliated against her. (See MSJ at 6.) Ms. Ville responded on September 7, 2018. (See Resp.) The court now addresses the motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Galen v. Cty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to prevail as amatter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets his or her burden, then the nonmoving party "must make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of the essential elements of his case that he must prove at trial" in order to withstand summary judgment. Galen, 477 F.3d at 658. A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "'genuine' only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party." Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49).
In determining whether the fact-finder could reasonably find in the nonmoving party's favor, "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Nevertheless, the nonmoving party Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
The court may only consider admissible evidence when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2002). "Conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data cannot defeat summary judgment." Rivera v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003).
//
Ms. Ville alleges four kinds of discrimination: (1) disparate treatment based on race; (2) disparate treatment based on color; (3) disparate treatment based on national origin; (4) and disparate treatment based on sex. (See Compl. at 2; see also Ville Dep. at 24:13-17.) Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful for an employer to "discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Similarly, under the Washington Law Against...
To continue reading
Request your trial