Villegas-Reyes v. Universidad Interamericana, 104.

• Decision Date: 16 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 104.,Civil No. 05-1997(JP).,104.
• Parties: Emilia VILLEGAS-REYES, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE P.R., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 84

476 F.Supp.2d 84

Emilia VILLEGAS-REYES, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE P.R., Defendant.

No. 104.

Civil No. 05-1997(JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

February 16, 2007.

Anibal Escanellas-Rivera, Esq., Escanellas & Juan, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Amancio Arias-Guardiola, Esq., Arias Cestero & Arias Guardiola, Lorraine Juarbe-Santos, Esq., Interamerican University

of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

The Court has before it the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff's opposition. This action is brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and for violations of Puerto Rico law. Plaintiff Emilia Villegas Reyes alleges she is fifty-one years old, and worked for defendant Interamerican University of Puerto Rico ("IAU") from May 17, 1987 until she was terminated on February 24, 2005. She claims the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her age, and retaliated against her for filing discrimination charges with the Anti-discrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor, and the EEOC. The defendant moves for summary judgment on the ADEA claims on the grounds that there is no evidence on the record of age discrimination, or retaliation. The Court GRANTS the defendant's motion for summary judgment (No. 35), and dismisses the Title VII claims as a matter of law for failure to state a claim.

I. STANDARD

Summary judgment serves to assess the proof to determine if there is a genuine need for trial. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when "the record, including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir.1999) (stating that summary judgment is appropriate when, after evaluating the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence "fails to yield a trial worthy issue as to some material fact"); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993); Canal Ins. Co. v. Benner, 980 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir.1992). The Supreme Court has stated that "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In this way, a fact is material if, based on the substantive law at issue, it might affect the outcome of the case. See Mack v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989).

In a summary judgment motion, the movant bears the burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the [record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party who may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must affirmatively show, through the filing of supporting affidavits or otherwise, that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1116.

II. MATERIAL FACTS NOT IN GENUINE ISSUE OR DISPUTE

The following material facts are properly supported, and are not in genuine issue or dispute.

1. Defendant IAU is a private educational institution.

2. As all other educational institutions whose students may qualify for federal aid programs for the payment of tuition and other covered expenses, IAU's operations are audited for compliance purposes, by both internal and external auditors. The external auditors include federal officers.

3. Plaintiff Emilia Villegas was born on May 28, 1953.

4. On May 17, 1987, Villegas became a full-time employee of IAU. At that time, Villegas occupied a Typing Clerk position at IAU's Law School, Financial Aid Office.

5. By May 17, 1987, Villegas received five or six years of experience in student financial aid matters.

6. In January 1988, Villegas was appointed to the position of Administrative Assistant assigned to IAU's Study and Work Program. Villegas was transferred to IAU's Metropolitan Campus.

7. In mid-1988, there was an opening for an Official position in IAU's Metropolitan Campus, Students' Financial Aid Office. Villegas was appointed to this position which she occupied for several years.

8. Thereafter, Villegas was reclassified to the position of Official II.

9. While employed with IAU, Villegas reported to the State Insurance Fund ("SIF") on several occasions.

10. Specifically, Villegas first reported to the SIF in 1990. At said time, she reported to the SIF following an accident in which she fell from a chair. The SIF did not place Villegas on leave of absence in connection with the referenced accident.

11. In 1994, Villegas reported to the SIF following an accident in which she suffered a fall in a stairway. As a result of this accident, the SIF placed Villegas on a fifteen-day leave of absence. IAU granted Villegas the leave of absence. Following said leave, Villegas reported back to work without any restrictions. Accordingly, Villegas was allowed to continue performing her regular duties with IAU.

12. In 1995, Villegas reported once again to the SIF, this time because of problems with her vision. Villegas was told by the SIF that her problem was age-related, and accordingly her case was closed by the SIF. The SIF did not place Villegas on a leave of absence in connection with this condition.

13. In 1996, Villegas reported to the SIF due to pain in the cervical and lower back regions. The SIF provided Villegas with medication and physical therapies, but did not place Villegas on a leave of absence in connection with these conditions. The SIF determined that the referenced conditions were not work-related.

14. In 2001, Villegas reported to the SIF due to pain in the cervical, dorsal and shoulder areas. The SIF provided Villegas with physical therapies and medication, but did not place Villegas on a leave of absence in connection with these conditions. She received her physical therapies while performing her regular duties.

15. Villegas' job as Official assigned to the Financial Aid Office included the following essential duties:

a. determining the students' eligibility for financial aid;

b. conducting the reimbursement process when students processed official and non official drops;

c. revising and analyzing financial aid files for accuracy and compliance purposes d. verifying information to determine financial aid eligibility time period;

e. checking facts contained in the Financial Aid Requests to the Federal Government;

f. processing different transactions in connection with different types of financial aids;

g. transmitting federal financial assistance requests;

h. paying federal loans;

i. processing the Study and Work payrolls;

j. entering information on the proper forms for FWSP payrolls and processing payment;

k. assigning students to Study and Work programs;

l. processing financial aid transcripts at the request of other institutions;

m. revising lists submitted by the Central System Office;

n. preparing the files for the Central Collections and Loans Office, and

o. carrying out other duties assigned by the person's supervisor.

16. In 2002, Villegas reported to Glenda Diaz ("Diaz"), who occupied the position of Financial Director. Villegas considered Diaz to be a strict supervisor.

17. Villegas was authorized to teach a two-credit course during the time period from January to March 2003.

18. On August 13, 2003, Diaz issued a letter, which stated that during the months of June and July 2003, Villegas had two students placed in the IAU's Study and Work Program, though they were ineligible for the program.

19. In her August 13, 2003 letter, Diaz stated that after the mistake was discovered, Villegas was instructed to verify the Institutional Student Information Records for the years 2003 — 2004, as well as the Banner System to detect any additional mistakes.

20. Villegas failed to conduct the review, and another employee identified two cases where the student's files contained outdated immigration documentation.

21. Due to Villegas' mistakes assigning ineligible students to the Work and Study Program, IAU had to repay the amounts at issue through institutional funds.

22. In August 2003, Villegas reported to the SIF, after receiving a one-month suspension from work.

23. On August 29, 2003, Claudio Prieto, Chancellor of IAU, issued Villegas a letter in which he stated she was suspended from employment for one month beginning September 1, 2003, because she entered Diaz's office on August 16, 2003 without authorization.

24. In Diaz's opinion, Villegas' actions constituted an invasion of her privacy, insubordination, and unethical behavior. In a letter dated August 19, 2003, Diaz expressed to Deal Elsa Magaly Gonzalez ("Gonzalez") her concern about Villegas' actions, and about Villegas' work on federal matters.

25. On August 16, 2003, Villegas physically removed files from Diaz's office to examine them.

26. IAU conducted an investigation before suspending Villegas.

27. Diaz advised Villegas that the Chancellor made the decision to suspend her.

28. As part of the investigation IAU interviewed and took written statements from employees who...