Villines v. State
| Decision Date | 01 February 1896 |
| Citation | 33 S.W. 922,96 Tenn. 141 |
| Parties | VILLINES v. STATE. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Error to criminal court, Davidson county; J. M. Anderson, Judge.
D. M Villines was indicted for carrying on a retail drug business without having complied with statutory provisions relating to registered pharmacists. From a judgment against him entered on a verdict of guilty, he brings error. Affirmed.
Lee Brock, for plaintiff in error.
W. H Washington and J. M. Quarles, for the State.
The plaintiff in error was a druggist in Nashville, in this state. He was indicted for carrying on his business as such in violation of section 1, c. 39, of the Acts of the Legislature of 1893, which, as far as it is necessary to set it out, is as follows: "Be it enacted," etc "that from and after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful for any person, not a registered pharmacist, within the meaning of this act, to open or conduct any pharmacy, or retail drug or chemical store as proprietor thereof, unless he shall have in his employ and place in charge of such pharmacy or retail drug or chemical store a registered pharmacist, within the meaning of this act, who shall have the supervision and management of that part of the business requiring pharmaceutical skill and knowledge or to engage in the occupation of compounding or dispensing medicines or prescriptions of physicians, or of selling at retail for medical purposes any drugs, chemicals, poisons or pharmaceutical preparations within this state, until he has complied with the provisions of this act: provided, that nothing in this section shall apply to or in any manner interfere with the business of any physician or prevent him supplying to his patients such articles as may seem to him proper," etc. There were two counts in the indictment, the first charging him with carrying on a pharmacy or retail drug store without having in charge of its operations a registered pharmacist, qualified according to the requirements of that act; and the second alleging that he had unlawfully engaged in the business of compounding and dispensing medicines, and of selling at retail for medical purposes drugs, chemicals, poisons, and pharmaceutical preparations, without having complied with the provisions of the act. Upon the trial, he was found guilty on both counts, and judgment was accordingly entered against him. The trial judge having overruled his motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, he has brought the case to this court.
It is insisted here that his motion in arrest should have been sustained in the court below, because the indictment failed to state that the defendant did not fall within the proviso or exception to the first section of the act as set out above. The question presented in this contention has been productive of much confusion, and some real or apparent conflict of authority. It is a general rule that where an offense is created by statute, an indictment setting out the offense in the words of the statute is sufficient (State v. Ladd, 2 Swan, 225); and if the statutory words embrace an exception, then "it is clear that no indictment founded upon the statute can be good which does not contain an allegation that the accused is not within the exception, as it is universally true that no indictment is sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege all the ingredients of which the offense is composed." Rex v. Mason, 2 Term R. 581. On the other hand "if the language of the section defining the offense is so entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the offense may be accurately and clearly defined without any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely omit any such reference, as the matter contained...
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Scopes v. State
...The statute being sufficiently definite in its terms, such an indictment is good. State v. Odam, 2 Lea (70 Tenn.) 220; Villines v. State, 96 Tenn. 141, 33 S.W. 922; Griffin v. State, 109 Tenn. 17, 70 S.W. 61. assignments of error, which challenge the sufficiency of the indictment and the un......
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Knowling v. State
...to negative the exception or exempting proviso in the indictment, and the duty to carry the burden of proving the negative on the trial. The Villines case supports the first proposition that the indictment charge that the exception or proviso has not been met. This has been settled in this ......
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Griffin v. State
...... defendant could not be held guilty if the female was living. an unchaste life at the time of the abduction, and this would. be merely a matter of defense, to be shown by the accused. For the principle as referring to negative exceptions in. statute, see Villines v. State, 96 Tenn. 141, 33. S.W. 922; State v. Jackson, 1 Lea, 680, and. Lambeth v. State, 3 Tenn. Cas. 754. . . 2. It. is next objected that the indictment is bad because it avers. that the defendant "did take," etc., the said. female from the custody of her mother, etc., ......
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Thornberg v. E.T. & W.N.C. Motor Transp. Co.
...... . . The. first ground of demurrer is "Because plaintiff's. warrant does not state a cause of action against the. defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, sued. on, or otherwise.". . . Demurrers. ... pleading unless the exception is incorporated in and a part. of the general clause conferring the right upon which. plaintiff sued. Villines v. State, 96 Tenn. 141, 146, 33 S.W. 922." Hobbs v. Smith, 171 Tenn. 176, 101 S.W.2d. 474, 475. . . The. same rule applies to ......