Vinal v. Spofford

• Citation: 29 N.E. 288,139 Mass. 126
• Parties: VINAL v. SPOFFORD.
• Decision Date: 25 March 1885
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

139 Mass. 126

29 N.E. 288

VINAL

v.SPOFFORD.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 25, 1885.

Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk county; BRIGHAM, Chief Justice.

Replevin in the municipal court of Boston by Henry J. Vinal against Samuel W. Spofford for one horse, two vehicles, and two sets of harness. Judgment in that court for plaintiff for the vehicles and harness, and for defendant for the horse. Plaintiff appealed to the superior court, where judgment was rendered for him for the horse also. Defendant excepts. Affirmed.

The property in question belonged originally to plaintiff's father, and was kept at defendant's livery stable. On January 4, 1883, plaintiff's father, being embarrassed, executed a bill of sale to his stock of groceries, and the horse, vehicles, and harness, to plaintiff, for which plaintiff paid a valuable consideration. At this time there was due defendant for the keep of the horse between $160 and $190. Plaintiff continued the business, and to keep his horse at defendant's stable, but defendant had no notice of the sale. After this, defendant demanded payment of his bill from plaintiff's father, and, on its being refused, took possession of the horse, vehicles, etc., and put them in his stable.

E.C. Gilman, for plaintiff.

H.J. Edwards, for defendant.

HOLMES, J.

1. When replevin is brought for a number of chattels, some of which belong to the plaintiff and others to the defendant, although all are declared for in one count, the case is dealt with as if there were two counts, and each party was entitled to prevail upon one. Seymour v. Billings, 12 Wend. 285;Williams v. Beede, 15 N.H. 483. Each party is an actor, and each may have a judgment and legal costs, as happened in this case. Powell v. Hinsdale, 5 Mass. 343. These judgments are distinct, and it follows that an appeal by one party only from the judgment against him does not reopen the judgment in his favor. Pub.St. c. 154, §§ 39, 43; Id. c. 155, § 28. Justice and analogy lead to the same result. See Downing v. Coyne, 121 Mass. 347;Whiting v. Cochran, 9 Mass. 532;May v Gates, 137 Mass. 389;McDonough v. Dannery, 3 Dall. 188, 198.

2. The jury have found that the plaintiff bought the horse in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and that it was not obtained from the defendant's stable by fraud. On the bill of exceptions we must assume that the previous owner of the horse rightfully took it from the defendant's custody, and delivered it to the plaintiff. Such a transaction would divest a common-law lien. Perkins v. Boardman, 14 Gray, 481. We are of opinion that it equally divested that which the defendant had previously acquired under Pub.St. c. 192, § 32, (St.1878, c. 208.) That statute creates a lien in cases where the common law has not recognized one. Goodrich v. Willard, 7 Gray, 183. But it gives no intimation that it uses the word “lien” in any different sense from that which is known to the common law. On the contrary, it in terms supposes that the animals in question have been placed in the care-that is to say, in the possession-of the party to whom the lien is given. The provisions for sale would seem to imply the same thing. To admit that it was intended to create a tacit hypothecation, like that enforced from...