Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 02 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 73826,73826 |
| Citation | 833 S.W.2d 859 |
| Parties | Rita Marie VINCENT, a minor, by her Next Friend, Rita VINCENT, and Rita Vincent and Robert Vincent, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-Appellants, v. Vernon L. JOHNSON, M.D., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Donald L. Schapprizzi, Margaret M. Neill, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-respondents/cross-appellants.
Kenneth C. Brostron, Susan S. Harper, Lisa O. Stump, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant/cross-respondent.
Richard S. Brownlee, III, Mary D. Winter, Jefferson City, for amicus curiae Mo. State Medical Ass'n.
Ronald R. McMillin, Lori J. Levine, Jefferson City, for amicus curiae Missouri Hosp. Ass'n.
Both plaintiffs and defendant appeal the judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Louis City in a medical malpractice case. Because the cross-appeal alleges the unconstitutionality of §§ 538.210, 538.220, 538.230 RSMo 1986, 1 this Court has exclusive jurisdiction. Mo. Const. Art. V, § 3. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part; this case is remanded for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
Plaintiff Rita M. Vincent is the natural daughter of plaintiffs Rita K. Vincent and Robert A. Vincent. This cause of action implicates the negligence of defendant Vernon L. Johnson, M.D., and the alleged negligence of codefendants James Belcher, M.D., and NME Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Lutheran Medical Center, during Rita's birth on December 15, 1986. Plaintiffs' evidence indicated that defendants failed to perform a timely caesarian section, and thereby caused permanent brain damage to Rita M. Vincent. Plaintiffs--but not defendants--also presented evidence regarding damages.
At the end of the first week of a two-week trial, codefendant NME Hospitals settled the case for $550,000. All parties agreed at that time that, rather than the jury apportioning the fault of NME Hospitals, an "appropriate" reduction could be made from any judgment.
The jury's verdict found for all the plaintiffs against Dr. Johnson, and for Dr. Belcher against all the plaintiffs. As required by § 538.215, damages were itemized rather than being awarded as one lump sum figure, as follows:
For Rita M. Vincent
Past Non-economic Damages $ 250,000
Future Non-economic Damages $ 500,000
Future Economic Damages (Non"Medical) $ 1,000,000
Future Medical Damages (Post age 18) $ 250,000
------------
Total $ 2,000,000
------------
------------
For Rita K. Vincent and Robert A. Vincent
Past Economic Damages $ 0
Future Medical Damages (Pre-age 18) $ 0
------------
Total $ 0
------------
------------ After trial, the circuit court approved Rita M. Vincent's part of the settlement with NME Hospitals, $150,000. Following several other hearings, the circuit court entered judgment in this case. In determining the judgment, the circuit court first reduced the total of both past and future non-economic damages ($750,000) to reflect the cap imposed on such damages by § 538.210 ($401,000) for a reduction of $349,000, and then credited the entire $550,000 settlement against the verdict.
These reductions--totaling $899,000--resulted in a judgment of $1,101,000 for plaintiff Rita M. Vincent against defendant Dr. Vernon L. Johnson. Of this final award, $640,000 was to be paid immediately; the remainder was payable in installments over a 20-year period at an 8% interest rate compounded monthly, which was calculated by the circuit court as a payment of approximately $3850 per month.
Plaintiffs raise three issues on cross-appeal. First, plaintiffs allege that §§ 538.210, 538.220, 538.230 are unconstitutional. Second, plaintiffs allege that the verdict was erroneous in not finding any past economic losses or any future, pre-age-18, medical expenses. Third, plaintiffs allege that the circuit court erred in its application of the entire settlement with NME Hospitals to reduce the judgment against Rita M. Vincent.
Defendant also raises three issues. First, defendant alleges that the verdict was erroneous in finding more future economic damages than the plaintiffs' evidence supported. Second, defendant alleges that a new trial was required due to the bias of the jury as shown by inconsistencies in the verdict. Third, defendant alleges that the circuit court erred in the payment schedule for the judgment.
The essence of plaintiffs' argument on the statutes governing medical malpractice is that various provisions of the Missouri Constitution create a constitutional right to causes of action that existed at common law and to full recovery of damages.
The same issues were presented to this Court in Adams v. Children's Mercy Hospital, 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. banc 1992). There is no need to repeat the same reasoning in this opinion. In light of Adams, plaintiff's arguments are without merit.
The parents claim that the jury verdict was inadequate in that, despite awarding future medical costs for the time after Rita M. Vincent reaches age 18, no award was given for her economic costs before age 18 (past costs and future pre-age-18 medical costs). Both sides concede that the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Long v. Hooker, 443 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Mo.1969).
While the evidence supporting plaintiffs' alleged damages was uncontested, it was not stipulated. The burden of proof was plaintiffs'. As such, the jury could believe or disbelieve all or any part of the evidence supporting the plaintiffs' alleged damages. Under § 537.068 RSMo Supp.1991, the court may have had a duty to increase the verdict to cover proven losses, but the only losses that were arguably proven--those for which bills were submitted--came to less than $100,000. Any verdict for Rita K. Vincent and Robert A. Vincent would have been credited by their settlement with NME Hospitals. § 538.230. As this settlement exceeds "proven" damages, any error by the trial court in refusing to order an additur is harmless error. Therefore, the judgment for plaintiffs Rita K. Vincent and Robert A. Vincent is affirmed.
As the settlement with the parents was credited against the verdict for Rita M. Vincent, however, the failure to reduce that credit by those medical expenses that were proven is not harmless error with respect to her judgment. Thus, on remand, the circuit court shall reduce the credit against Rita M. Vincent's verdict by any past and future pre-age-18 medical expenses that were actually proven at trial.
The reduction of the judgment against defendant Johnson by plaintiffs' settlement with defendant NME Hospitals raises two questions. First, should the settlement with the parents be credited against the verdict for the child? Second, in crediting non-economic damages with the appropriate part of the settlement, is there one defendant or two, and thus are there one or two caps on non-economic damages?
The provisions of § 538.230.3 dictate reducing a verdict by the equitable share of the total obligation attributable to a party that settled. 2 The remaining provisions of § 538.230 make apportionment by the jury automatic "unless otherwise agreed by all the parties." See § 538.230.1. All remaining parties in this case agreed to waive apportionment and to have the circuit court credit the settlement against the verdict. They did not agree how to credit the settlement. In the future, to avoid the problems discussed below, a court shall not accept such a partial agreement as a valid waiver of apportionment, but rather shall require agreement on all details of the credit, including the effect of different potential verdicts.
The problem is that, in reality, there were two verdicts and two settlements: one verdict and settlement for plaintiff Rita M. Vincent, and another verdict and settlement for her parents. As one of the plaintiffs was a minor, a court must approve her portion of the settlement. § 507.184. In a medical malpractice case, postponing a decision on the appropriateness of a minor's settlement could and did create an impossible situation. The requirement that fault be apportioned between all potential defendants (unless all parties waive that requirement) creates chaos when a minor's settlement is not yet approved. Unfortunately, the circuit court did not require that the terms of the settlement be detailed and approved before releasing NME Hospitals. While in the future such a procedure shall be followed, 3 the problem in this case is whether the terms of the settlement approved after the trial determines the amount credited against the verdict.
The answer to this issue is determined by the words and actions of the attorneys for the parties at the time they waived jury apportionment. The attorneys for the defendants insisted that the entire settlement be credited against any verdict before they waived apportionment. The attorney for the plaintiffs agreed to have the verdict reduced by any payments by "a concurrent tort feasor." The attorney for the plaintiffs erroneously insisted that defendants did not have the right to jury apportionment. Given the insistence of the defendants that the verdict would be reduced by the entire $550,000, the plaintiffs had the duty to clarify the terms of the agreement if they disagreed with such clear terms and, if an agreement could not be reached on the exact terms, to get a ruling from the trial judge on the issue of jury apportionment. In the absence of a response disagreeing with defenda...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sanders v. Ahmed
... ... Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Mo. banc 1992). First, all past damages must be paid ... ...
-
Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs.
... ... Mura, Center for Constitutional Litigation, Washington, D.C., Roger Johnson, Johnson, Vorhees & Martucci, Joplin, for Watts. Kent O. Hyde, David E. Overby, Hyde, Love & Overby ... Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Mo. banc 1992). Appellate courts ask whether a circuit ... ...
-
Romero v. US
... ... In Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.banc.1992), there was a single injurious incident, namely the ... ...
-
Lowe v. Mercy Clinic E. Cmtys.
... 592 S.W.3d 10 Vincent LOWE, Respondent /Cross-Appellant, v. MERCY CLINIC EAST COMMUNITIES, James D. Cassat, M.D., Bryan ... 538.220.4," 592 S.W.3d 30 Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson , 833 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Mo.banc 1992). Thus, because here the trial court was timely informed that ... ...