Vincent v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 19 April 1921
• Docket Number: 16278.
• Citation: 197 P. 618,115 Wash. 475
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: VINCENT v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

197 P. 618

115 Wash. 475

VINCENT v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

No. 16278.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

April 19, 1921

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Geo. D. Abel, Judge.

Action by George Vincent, as executor of the last will and testament of Robert Charles Vincent, deceased, against the City of Seattle, a municipal corporation, and others. From a judgment granting a temporary injunction after the overruling of their demurrer, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Walter F. Meier and Edwin C. Ewing, both of Seattle, for appellants.

Piles &amp Halverstadt, of Seattle, for respondent.

TOLMAN J.

Respondent as plaintiff, brought this action to enjoin the city of Seattle and its officers from revoking a license theretofore granted for the operation of certain amusement devices on private property. The city demurred to the complaint but made no other return in response to the show cause order. Upon a hearing the demurrer was overruled, and, the city electing to stand thereon, a temporary injunction was granted, and the city appeals.

The complaint alleges that the respondent is the duly qualified and acting executor of the last will and testament of Robert Charles Vincent, deceased, who, in his lifetime, was the owner of certain lots in the city of Seattle, upon which he had erected and installed a Ferris wheel, and a merry-go-round, which, with other equipment, were of the value of $27,000, and which he conducted as a place of public amusement at a profit, under a license duly issued by the city comptroller after the payment of a fee of $200 therefor which license by its terms will expire on September 3, 1921; that such amusement devices have at all times been operated in full compliance with the city ordinances; that the place where they are situate is a fit and proper one; that the plaintiff is a fit and proper person to hold and operate such a license; that a substantial good will has been built up; and that the city and the defendant city councilmen threaten to cancel such license, and will do so unless restrained, under and by virtue of section 10 of Ordinance No. 36204 of the city of Seattle, which reads:

'Section 10. The city council may, at any time, at its discretion, revoke any license issued under the provisions of this ordinance. Before such revocation, the person holding the license shall be notified in writing that the city council has under consideration the revocation of his license, giving the number and kind thereof. If the holder of such license so desires, he shall be heard in opposition to said revocation before said license is declared revoked.

'Any person, firm or corporation whose amusement license has been revoked, as herein provided, shall not again be licensed to operate or conduct any place of amusement in the city of Seattle for a period of one (1) year.

'The city council may, by resolution, suspend any license issued under the provisions of this ordinance for a period of not more than sixty (60) days.'

The complaint further recites that by such threatened action respondent's property will be rendered useless, its value destroyed, his profits and good will lost, and that the ordinance quoted is in violation of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and sections 3 and 12 of article 1 of the Constitution of the State of Washington, in that it deprives respondent of his property without due process of law, and permits arbitrary and discriminatory action.

The demurrer, which admits all of the facts properly pleaded, seems to raise the question of whether or not, under this state of facts, the city might revoke this particular license so long as by the terms of the ordinance other similar amusement devices might be licensed, and permitted to operate, as well as the right to injunctive relief against the proposed legislative act, if the act revoking the license be construed as such.

Under the statute, Rem. Code, § 7507, subsec. 33, cities of the first class are given power:

'(33) To grant licenses for any lawful purpose, and to fix by ordinance the amount to be paid therefor, and to provide for revoking the same: Provided, that no license shall be granted to continue for longer than one year from the date thereof.'

And the city charter recognizes this power in the same language. Subsection 33 of section 18, art. 4, Seattle City Charter. The ordinance pleaded would seem to have been enacted in pursuance of these provisions for the purpose of providing a method by which they shall be carried into effect. So far as appears, this is the only ordinance on the subject of revocation of licenses and purports to give the city council full power to revoke a license without prescribing how its final judgment to do so shall be evidenced. Appellant seems to contend that the city council must, under the terms of the city charter, enact an ordinance in order to revoke the license; but, even so, a special ordinance revoking a...