Vincent v. Foss & Crabtree, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 July 1934
• Citation: 160 So. 49,118 Fla. 717
• Parties: VINCENT, Harbor Master v. FOSS & CRABTREE, Inc.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

160 So. 49

118 Fla. 717

VINCENT, Harbor Master v. FOSS & CRABTREE, Inc.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

July 23, 1934

On Rehearing March 13, 1935.

Bill by Foss & Crabtree, Inc., against D. O. Vincent, as Harbor Master of the Port of Jacksonville. Decree for complainant and defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

BROWN and ELLIS, JJ., dissenting in part. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Elwyn Thomas, Judge.

COUNSEL

Milam McIlvaine & Milam, of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Elliott Adams, of Jacksonville (Kay, Adams, Ragland & Kurz, of Jacksonville, of counsel), for appellee.

OPINION

BROWN Justice.

Appellee presented its bill in the circuit court of Duval county seeking an injunction against the appellant, the harbor master of the port of Jacksonville, to prevent the collection of fees from complainant under sections 3902-3916, Comp. Gen Laws of 1927. The defendant filed his answer, and, the cause coming on to be heard before Circuit Judge Elwyn Thomas upon bill and answer, the prayer of the bill for injunction was granted, and the defendant as harbor master was perpetually enjoined from assessing against the plaintiff, or its vessels, any charges or assessments by virtue of the said statutes, except such charges as may be due defendnat for services actually rendered to the said vessels to the plaintiff upon the request and employment of the defendant as such harbor master. From this decree, the defendant took this appeal, assigning the rendition thereof as error.

In a well-prepared opinion rendered in connection with the decree the chancellor held that the complainant was entitled to the relief prayed for under the case of Webb v. Dunn, 18 Fla. 721, which appears to be the only expression of this court on the matter presented.

The bill alleged that the plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the business of operating vessels in foreign and interstate commerce; that it operated two schooners, which frequently called at the port of Jacksonville, both from foreign ports and in coastwise trading; that the defendant, as harbor master and ex officio member of the board of port wardens and pilot commissioners of the port of Jacksonville, Fla., purporting to act under the statutes above referred to, is attempting to assess, demand, and collect from the defendants $10, for each and every call of said vessels at the port of Jacksonville, and is threatening to sue the plaintiff and to libel the said vessels, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff does not require, nor had it required, the services of the defendant as harbor master in connection with the said vessels; that said defendant claims authority to make such assessments and collections for stationing and assigning berths at wharves for the vessels of the plaintiff, which the plaintiff alleged was entirely unnecessary, for the reason that plaintiff maintains its own wharves for the docking of said vessels; that said defendant further claims that said sums of money so assessed are due and payable to him for the inspection of said vessels and the policing of the said harbor and said vessels against nuisances or the polluting of the water of said port and the facilitating of the orderly discharge of cargoes and the policing of said vessels against violation of safety measures and the hazards of fire or breaching of health measures or safety measures; and yet the plaintiff alleges that the attempt to make such assessments and collections constitute a duty of tonnage and an impost or duty on imports and exports in violation of Article 1, § 10, of the United States Constitution, and that the same lays a burden upon interstate and foreign commerce and deprives the plaintiff of its rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

The defendant in his answer alleged that the state of Florida, in adopting the measures here involved, was acting in the reasonable exercise of its general police powers, and also under the power reserved to it under article 1, § 10, cl. 2, of the Constitution of the United States, in the exercise of its powers to adopt and enforce reasonably necessary inspection laws in the interest of the port of Jacksonville, the ships and vessels using such port, and the public generally of said state, in the following particulars:

'(a) Enforced observance of the quarantine laws and imposition of safeguards against noxious and contagious or infectious diseases with suitable information and reports to the health authorities when necessary;

'(b) Enforcement of health measures by use of approved rat-guards or mooring lines and cargo inspection of ships from infested areas when such precautionary measures are necessary for the protection and health and welfare of the Port, those using the Port and the public of the State of Florida;

'(c) Enforcement of all reasonable health measures imposed by the State or the port authorities in the interest of the Port, those using the Port, and the public at large, relating to disposal of garbage or sewerage by vessels using the harbor;

'(d) Enforcement of special assignment to berths, anchorage, docks or wharves, of vessels carrying or discharging dangerous or offensive cargoes;

'(e) Enforcement of measures designed to protect the harbor, shipping therein, and the port against undue or unusual fire hazards created by ships or vessels carrying dangerous or hazardous cargoes without smoke screens and mooring or anchoring in the proximity of inflammable vessels, docks, wharves, or buildings, and inflammable merchandise such as rosin, turpentine, and other like commodities stored along the waterfront;

'(f) Enforcement of protective measures designed to protect against offensive or dangerous discharge of petroleum or petroleum products on the waters within said port, creating undue fire hazards or hazards to the health of the community.

'All of which services are performed in the interest of the State, the port, those using the harbor, and the general public by the defendant Harbor Master under the inspection or police powers of the State specifically reserved to the State under the mentioned section of the Constitution of the United States, which services cannot be performed by any other constituted authority other than the Harbor Master, defendant herein.

'And the defendant specifically denying plaintiffs a legation that no services are performed by the defendant Harbor Master for the benefit or protection of the plaintiff, shows unto the Court that the services mentioned as required of the defendant Harbor Master by state statute and by the regulation of the port authorities inure to the direct and special benefit of the plaintiff in the following specific particulars:

'(a) The defendant Harbor Master is by the statutes complained of charged with the specific duty of keeping open lanes of travel in said harbor for plaintiff's use in moving its vessels and shipping into and out of said port and especially in the movement of such ships or vessels to or from the private docks and wharves of the plaintiff;

'(b) In preventing ships and vessels other than those of the plaintiff from the use of unauthorized anchorage which might obstruct the plaintiff's vessels and shipping in moving to and from its private docks or cause such movement to be cumbersome or dangerous and causing the removal of any such obstruction occasioned by unauthorized anchorage of other vessels;

'(c) Protection of the harbor and the plaintiff's ships and the plaintiff's docks and wharves from undue and unusual fire hazards occasioned by the proximity of ships carrying dangerous or hazardous cargoes and from the discharge or leakage of oil or petroleum products on the waters of the harbor.

'(d) Protecting the plaintiff's docks and wharves, the plaintiff's ships moored thereto, and the plaintiff's ships entering and leaving the harbor from all violations of safety regulations as to speed and controlling of vessels using the harbor.

'(e) Protection of plaintiff's ships and crews and those working in connection therewith in all matters of health controlled by harbor regulations.

'All of which services defendant harbor master performs for the specific benefit and advantage of the plaintiff by maintaining an office in said port with telephone communication so that he can be reached at any time of the day or night and continuously maintaining harbor patrol with suitable marine equipment engaged constantly and continuously in enforcing harbor regulations for the benefit of the plaintiff and all those using said harbor.

'7. Further answering paragraph 6 of the plaintiff's bill of complaint, the defendant Harbor Master shows that the statute complained of authorizes the assessment of inspection fees up to the maximum sum of Twenty Dollars ($20.00) for each vessel calling at the Port of Jacksonville where services are rendered such vessel. That said statutory fee of $20.00 is charged by the defendant against only those vessels requiring special services of the harbor master in addition to the general services enumerated; that the fee complained of in the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) is the minimum fee assessed and charged by the defendant harbor master against any vessel entering and using the Port of Jacksonville where no special or particular service is required; that under the State Statute complained of the cost of the State's inspection service rendered necessary in the interest of the port, the citizens thereof and the vessels using the harbor may be met from inspection fees only and that the defendant harbor master is unable to maintain offices so that his services may be constantly available and maintain marine equipment and harbor

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