Vincent & Vincent, Inc. v. Spacek
| Decision Date | 21 April 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-566,80-566 |
| Citation | 306 N.W.2d 85,102 Wis.2d 266 |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
| Parties | VINCENT & VINCENT, INC., Plaintiff, v. Steve SPACEK, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, Ford Motor Company, a foreign business corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. * |
Wilcox & Wilcox and William J. Westerlund, Eau Claire, and Foley & Lardner, Jon P. Christiansen and Nancy J. Sennett, Milwaukee, for third-party defendant-appellant.
DeBardeleben & Snyder, Park Falls, for defendant and third-party plaintiff-respondent.
Before FOLEY, DEAN and GARTZKE, JJ.
Pursuant to sec. 808.03(2), Stats., this court granted Ford Motor Company leave to appeal the trial court's order directing Ford to answer Steve Spacek's written interrogatories and imposing costs and attorney's fees on Ford. Ford argues that the interrogatories imposed an undue burden and expense entitling Ford to a protective order under sec. 804.01(3), Stats. Ford also argues that the trial court's imposition of costs and attorney's fees under sec. 804.12, Stats., was error. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs and fees against Ford, we affirm the award. Because we conclude that the trial court did, however, abuse its discretion in ordering the discovery, we reverse the court's order denying Ford's motion for a protective order.
In 1974, Spacek purchased a 1974 truck that had been manufactured by Ford Motor Company. After the twelve-month/12,000-mile warranty had expired, the truck's engine failed. Spacek took the truck to Vincent & Vincent, Inc., for repair and while repairing the engine, Vincent discovered and repaired damage to the transmission. Spacek refused to pay Vincent for the repair causing Vincent to bring this action. Spacek joined Ford as third-party defendant for the cost of the truck's repairs, plus incidental damages, based on claims of implied or extended warranty and negligent manufacture. Spacek claims $2,200 in damages from Ford.
To obtain discovery, Spacek served written interrogatories on Ford. Two of Spacek's interrogatories requested information concerning each claim or complaint made against Ford between 1974 and 1979 based on a defect in engine valves, heads, or pistons in all Ford motor vehicles. The interrogatories also requested information concerning claims or complaints alleging both defects in engine valves, heads, or pistons, and transmission failures in the model Spacek owned. The interrogatories further requested the name, address, and telephone number of each of the claimants, the nature of the complaint, and Ford's disposition of the complaint.
In response to Spacek's interrogatories, Ford requested a protective order against discovery. Ford claimed that the desired discovery was unduly burdensome and would cause great expense. Ford's affidavits in support of its request stated that the information was not compiled in a central location, but was kept at thirty-four service division district offices. Additionally, the complaints were not filed by vehicle or type of complaint. This would require Ford to spend hundreds of hours manually sifting through hundreds of records and microfilm at thirty-four district offices and 6,500 dealerships across the country. It was estimated that it would take over 250 hours to search the various files for the details requested by the interrogatories. Spacek offered no affidavits in response to Ford's affidavits.
The trial court denied Ford's request for a protective order and ordered it to answer the interrogatories. In denying Ford relief, the trial court observed that given modern information storage and retrieval systems, Ford had apparently deliberately made the requested information relatively inaccessible to parties seeking discovery. The trial court clearly relied on this observation as a fact in reaching its decision.
The standard of review of trial court discovery decisions is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering or prohibiting discovery. Shibilski v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Marshfield, Inc., 83 Wis.2d 459, 470-71, 266 N.W.2d 264, 270 (1978). See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973). An abuse of discretion occurs where a trial court exercised discretion based on a mistake of fact. See Van Wyk v. Van Wyk, 86 Wis.2d 100, 108, 271 N.W.2d 860, 863 (1978). An appellate court will accept a trial court's findings of fact unless they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis.2d 243, 249, 274 N.W.2d 647, 650 (1979).
From our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's finding that Ford had deliberately made the requested information relatively inaccessible is not supported by the evidence. Ford's uncontradicted affidavits indicated that it did not have the requested information readily available. Spacek failed to introduce any affidavits to the contrary. In addition, Ford's affidavits contained nothing that would support an inference that it deliberately caused the relative inaccessibility of the information. The trial court's discretionary order was therefore based on a mistake of fact.
We may still uphold the discretionary order of the trial court if we can conclude from the record that facts existed to support the trial court's decision had discretion been exercised based on those facts. See Conrad v. Conrad, 92 Wis.2d 407, 415, 284 N.W.2d 674, 678 (1979). This requires our independent determination of whether justification for a protective order from Spacek's interrogatories existed. From our review of the record, we conclude that facts do not exist to support the trial court's order.
Section 804.08, Stats., requires a party served with an interrogatory to provide the requested information if it "is available to the party." Upon a showing of "good cause," sec. 804.01(3) authorizes a court to protect a party from discovery that would result in annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. The burden of establishing good cause for the protective order is upon the party seeking the protective order. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Manufacturing Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414...
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