Vineseck v. Great Northern Railway Company
| Decision Date | 16 February 1917 |
| Docket Number | 20,084 - (217) |
| Parties | STANLEY VINESECK v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $75,000 for personal injury received while in the employ of defendant as car repairer. The answer to the amended complaint set up the two allegations mentioned in the first paragraph of the opinion. The case was tried before Dickinson, J., who at the close of the opening statement of counsel for plaintiff to the jury granted defendant's motion, based upon that statement, to dismiss the action on the ground stated at the end of the first paragraph of the opinion. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment, plaintiff appealed. Reversed.
Release procured by fraud -- question for jury.
1. The record is held to present facts sufficient to require a trial of the action upon its merits, and to justify the submission to the jury, if sufficient evidence be produced, of the issue whether a release signed by plaintiff was procured by the fraud of defendant.
Rule against splitting cause of action -- estoppel against defendant.
2. The rule against splitting a cause of action into several parts and bringing an action upon each is primarily for the benefit of defendant in the action, which he may waive, or preclude himself from invoking by his fraud.
Judgment -- not res judicata as to omitted item.
3. Where an item of a single cause of action is omitted from the complaint in an action brought to recover thereon by reason of the fraud of defendant, or the clearly established mutual mistake of the parties, the judgment in such action is not res judicata as to the omitted item.
Judgment -- vacation of judgment.
4. In such case a subsequent action may be brought upon the omitted item without first applying for a vacation of the former judgment. Such vacation of the judgment is unnecessary.
John P Nash, William M. Nash, John P. Devaney and Arthur M. Higgins for appellant.
M. L. Countryman, Cobb, Wheelwright & Dille, and G. M. Bracelen, for respondent.
This action was brought to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant. Defendant interposed in defense, in addition to a general denial of the allegations of the complaint: (1) That plaintiff's right of recovery was barred by a judgment duly rendered by the United States Circuit Court for the district of North Dakota, in a former action between the same parties brought for the same alleged negligence; and (2) that long prior to the commencement of this action plaintiff fully settled with defendant for his injuries, and executed to defendant a formal written release and discharge of all claims on account thereof. Plaintiff replied that the settlement was procured by fraud and fraudulent representations of defendant's agents. At the trial counsel for plaintiff made the usual opening statement of the case to the jury which, in connection with certain concessions of counsel in reference to the defense of settlement and release, and the recovery of the former judgment, was made the basis of a motion by defendant to dismiss the action on the ground that the settlement and release, and the former judgment, were conclusive against plaintiff's right of recovery. The court granted the motion and plaintiff appealed from an order denying a new trial.
The facts as disclosed by the statement of counsel to the jury, and the concessions made for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, are substantially as follows:
Plaintiff is a native of Poland, 28 years of age; he has resided in this country eight years or more, but speaks and understands the English language to a limited extent only. At the time of the injury of which he complains, he was in the employ of defendant as a car repairer in its yards at Williston, in the state of North Dakota. While engaged in the discharge of his duties he received certain injuries as the result of the negligence of defendant, namely: (1) To his leg, which was so crushed as to necessitate the amputation thereof above the knee; and (2) a severe blow upon the head, rendering him for some time unconscious, and which affected his eyes, resulting finally in total blindness. Both injuries were caused at the same time and by the same act of negligence. Immediately following the accident plaintiff was taken to a hospital and placed in charge of the defendant's local physician, who amputated the injured leg and continued to treat plaintiff until he was discharged from the hospital, further treatment then being deemed unnecessary. The physician was active on behalf of defendant in efforts to effect a settlement with plaintiff for his injuries and joined with a claim agent of defendant in an offer of $750 therefor. The offer was made when plaintiff was at the hospital and still under treatment. During the time of the treatment, and when this offer of settlement was made, he called the attention of the physician to the injury to his eyes, and complained of having trouble with them. The physician stated to him that the trouble with the eyes was temporary, not serious, and that he would fully recover therefrom when the nervous shock had passed away. Plaintiff declined the offer of $750 and upon his discharge from the hospital, some months after the accident, he employed attorneys and they brought an action for him against defendant in the district court of North Dakota to recover for the injury to and loss of his leg, making no claim for the injury to his head or eyes. The action was in due course of procedure removed by defendant to the United States Circuit Court for the district of North Dakota. At the time of the commencement of the action plaintiff was still at Williston, and thereafter the physician who had treated him for his injuries and a claim agent of defendant renewed their efforts to effect a settlement with him. The negotiations were carried on through an interpreter produced by the claim agent or physician. At this time plaintiff again complained of his eyes, and the physician again assured him that his eye trouble was only temporary, and that his recovery therefrom would be complete. Plaintiff accepted an offer then made of $1,250, in full for the injury to the limb; and, relying upon the statement of the physician that his eyes were only temporarily affected, made no claim in that respect. However, he signed a prepared release expressly discharging defendant of all claims on account of the injuries received, which necessarily included the injury, if any, to plaintiff's eyes. The money was paid over, part of which went to plaintiff's attorneys, and the latter entered into a stipulation for a dismissal of the action with prejudice, which as heretofore stated involved only the injury to plaintiff's limb. Judgment was formally entered in the Federal court, where the action was then pending, dismissing the action with prejudice, but without costs to either party. The accident occurred in March, 1913, and the settlement was effected and the judgment of dismissal entered in September of the same year.
Thereafter plaintiff removed to this state where he has since continued to reside. The trouble with his eyes continued, gradually increasing, and he finally became totally blind, a direct and proximate result of the injury to his head. The present action was commenced in the courts of this state in January, 1916.
In dismissing the action the trial court necessarily held either: (1) That the claim of fraud and fraudulent representations interposed by plaintiff to impeach the release was affirmatively disproved by the facts presented in counsel's opening statement to the jury; or (2) whether such facts appeared or not, that the judgment of the Federal court in the former action is a conclusive bar to the present action. In other words, that on the facts stated plaintiff had but one cause of action, each item of which he was bound to bring forward in the former action, and, though the claim of injury to the eyes was not in fact included, it could have been included, and the bar of the judgment is effective notwithstanding the fact that the particular claim may have been omitted because of the wrongful conduct and fraud of defe...
To continue reading
Request your trial