Vining v. State, 75915
| Decision Date | 28 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 75915,75915 |
| Citation | 637 So.2d 921 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly S251 John Bruce VINING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Larry B. Henderson, Asst. Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Margene A. Roper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
John Bruce Vining, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and armed robbery and the attendant sentences. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution, and affirm both the convictions and sentences.
On December 8, 1987, surveyors discovered the partially decomposed body of a woman in a remote grassy area in Apopka, Florida. The body was fully clothed in a two-piece dress, but no jewelry, purse or shoes were found. Through dental records, the woman was identified as Georgia Caruso. The medical examiner determined that death had occurred two to three weeks prior to the discovery of the body. The medical examination revealed a possibly fatal gunshot wound to the left side of Caruso's jaw and a fatal gunshot wound to her left temple. There were no signs of a struggle where Caruso's body was found, and it appeared that she had been killed elsewhere and transported to the grassy area.
In November 1987, Caruso had placed advertisements in several papers offering diamonds for sale. In response to those advertisements, a man met with Caruso at her fingernail care business, on November 13, 16, and 18, 1987. Caruso introduced the man to Joann Ward, a nail technician employed by Caruso, as "George Williams, a man interested in jewelry I have to sell." Ward described Williams as being in his fifties, five feet eleven inches tall, around 175 pounds, thinning light brown hair, long face, loose facial skin, and wearing a gold watch and glasses. On November 18, 1987, Caruso asked Ward to accompany her to meet Williams in order to have the jewelry appraised. According to Ward, Williams arrived in an older model black Cadillac Fleetwood with tinted windows, and Ward saw him use an inhaler/aspirator. Ward and Caruso followed Williams to the Winter Park Gem Lab. Ward ran errands while Caruso accompanied Williams to the gem lab.
Earlier in the day, Caruso had arranged for Ellen Zaffis and Kevin Donner, gemologists at the Winter Park Gem Lab, to appraise gems for a prospective buyer. Caruso arrived at the gem lab accompanied by a man that she identified as George Williams. Both Zaffis and Donner gave a description of Williams that was consistent with Ward's description. Donner appraised a 6.03-carat pear-shaped diamond and a 3.5-carat round diamond at a total value of $60,000.
After the appraisal, Caruso told Ward that Williams had decided to buy the diamonds and that she was going to accompany him to the bank to put the purchase money in a safe deposit box. Ward returned alone to work, and never saw Caruso again. Ward and Zaffis testified that when they last saw Caruso she was wearing a two piece dress, black shoes, black earrings, a gold Rolex watch, an anniversary ring, a solitaire engagement ring, the 6-carat pear-shaped diamond ring, and was carrying a black purse.
Pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 1 the Orange County Sheriff's Department placed a detainer against John Bruce Vining on May 5, 1989, eighteen months after Caruso's death. At that time, Vining was serving consecutive fifteen-year sentences for kidnapping and aggravated assault in Georgia. On June 5, 1989, the State of Florida charged Vining with the first-degree murder and armed robbery of Caruso.
The State's case against Vining was based upon circumstantial evidence. Zaffis and Ward identified Vining's picture as George Williams when shown a photographic lineup. At trial, Zaffis, Ward, and Donner also identified Vining as George Williams. Phone records indicated that two calls were made from Vining's residence to a diamond dealer who advertised in the same newspaper as Caruso, but that dealer refused to meet with the caller under circumstances similar to those requested in the instant case. Vining's phone number is 774-6159 and Caruso's personal notebook listed George Williams phone number as 774-6158. Vining used his mother's black 1978 Cadillac which was discovered burning in a rock pit in Marion County the day after the media reported the discovery of The jury convicted Vining of first-degree murder and armed robbery. Using a special verdict form, the jury also specified that Vining had committed both premeditated and felony murder. The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one. Again using a special verdict form, the jury found four statutory aggravating factors proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the crime was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; 2 2) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to the person; 3 3) the crime was committed during a robbery; 4 and 4) the homicide was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. 5 The trial judge found the same statutory aggravating factors as the jury, found no statutory mitigating factors, and gave little weight to the nonstatutory mitigating factor of military service. The judge imposed a death sentence for the first-degree murder conviction and sentenced Vining as an habitual offender to life imprisonment on the armed robbery conviction.
Caruso's body. Phone records indicate that a call was placed to Vining's residence from a pay phone near the rock pit on the day that the car was burned. The day after Caruso disappeared, Vining sold a diamond that had been entrusted to Caruso for consignment. Vining also uses an inhaler/aspirator.
Vining argues that the trial court erred during the guilt phase of his trial by: 1) denying his motion to dismiss due to an alleged violation of the IAD; 2) allowing the State to present hypnotically-refreshed testimony; and 3) restricting defense counsel's questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire and denying valid challenges for cause.
Vining maintains that because he was not brought to trial on the charges within 120 days of his arrival in Florida under the IAD, his motion for discharge was improperly denied. 6 The State accepted temporary custody of Vining under the IAD on July 21, 1989, when an Orange County assistant state attorney agreed to accept temporary custody "in connection with an inmate's request for disposition of a detainer." Vining arrived in Florida on August 31, 1989. On January 10, 1990, Vining sought discharge based on violation of the IAD speedy trial time, but the motion was denied. On January 12, 1990, the State moved to extend the time for speedy trial and the motion was granted by the court on January 24, 1990. Trial commenced January 22, 1990.
Under the IAD, a prisoner in one participating jurisdiction may require the speedy disposition of charges pending against that prisoner in another participating jurisdiction when those charges provide the basis for lodging a detainer against the prisoner. Sec. 941.45(3), Fla.Stat. (1987). The IAD also permits the jurisdiction which has lodged the detainer to request custody of the prisoner, but for any proceeding which is made possible by this subsection "trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state." Sec. 941.45(4)(c), Fla.Stat. (1987). If the action is not brought to trial within the time periods specified, then the court "shall enter an order dismissing the [indictment, information, or complaint] with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect." Sec. 941.45(5)(c), Fla.Stat. (1987).
Vining contends that because the 120-day time limit provided by subsection (4)(c) began to run upon his arrival in Florida on Although we do not agree with the State that the time limits were tolled in this case, we find that the trial court properly denied Vining's motion to dismiss. "[I]n computing whether or not the requirements of [subsection (4)(c) ] have been satisfied, it is appropriate to exclude all those periods of delay occasioned by the defendant." United States v. Scheer, 729 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir.1984). In this case, the original trial date of January 22, 1990, was set at Vining's arraignment on September 7, 1989. Even though Vining filed a number of motions, the original trial date was never changed. Thus, no delay can be attributed to Vining's motion practice.
August 31, 1989, the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. The State contends that Vining's pretrial motions tolled the time limits under the IAD.
However, "the time period formally set forth in a statute or rule does not establish absolute per se prejudice but [rather] ... is 'a triggering mechanism' which establishes that the delay is presumptively prejudicial." R.J.A. v. Foster, 603 So.2d 1167, 1171 (Fla.1992). In R.J.A., this Court determined that a statute which granted juveniles a right to be tried within ninety days did not overrule the juvenile speedy trial rule that allows the state an additional ten-day window to try cases that do not come within the ninety-day period.
Like the statutory provision at issue in R.J.A., the IAD grants prisoners subject to a detainer the right to trial within 120 days of arrival in Florida. This Court has previously stated that we will not grant greater dignity to the IAD's speedy trial time limit than to Florida's speedy trial rule which protects the constitutional right to a speedy trial enunciated in article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution. Johnson v. State, 442 So.2d 193, 196 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963, 104 S.Ct. 2181, 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984). Thus, in order to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Geralds v. Inch
...sound discretion of the court and will not be interfered with unless that discretion is clearly abused." Id. (quoting Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1994)). Further, "where a juror's attitude about a particular legal doctrine ... is essential to a determination of whether challe......
-
State v. Steele
...state intends to prove." We reaffirmed this principle both before Ring, see Cox v. State, 819 So.2d 705, 725 (Fla. 2002); Vining v. State, 637 So.2d 921, 927 (Fla.1994), and after, see Kormondy v. State, 845 So.2d 41, 54 (Fla.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 950, 124 S.Ct. 392, 157 L.Ed.2d 283 (20......
-
Lynch v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
...is unconstitutional because it fails to provide notice as to aggravating circumstances-is rejected based on the ruling of Vining v. State, 637 So.2d 921 (Fla.1994). There this Court wrote: “The aggravating factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a death sentence are limited......
-
MILLER v. State of Fla.
...(citations omitted); see also Cox v. State, 819 So.2d 705, 725 (Fla.2002); Mann v. Moore, 794 So.2d 595, 599 (Fla. 2001); Vining v. State, 637 So.2d 921, 927 (Fla.1994); Medina v. State, 466 So.2d 1046, 1048 n. 2 (Fla.1985); Tafero v. State, 403 So.2d 355, 361 (Fla.1981); Menendez v. State,......
-
Dui defense
...A trial court’s ruling on the scope of voir dire will be upheld unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. [ Vining v. State , 637 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1994).] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by limiting voir dire if such limits are reasonable and do not restrict counsel’s ab......