Vinson v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 April 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:12–CV–3670–L.
• Citation: 942 F.Supp.2d 630
• Parties: Patricia VINSON, Plaintiff, v. SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

942 F.Supp.2d 630

Patricia VINSON, Plaintiff,

v.SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:12–CV–3670–L.

United States District Court,

N.D. Texas,

Dallas Division.

April 29, 2013.

Jamie Jean McKey, Joe Kendall, Matthew R. Scott, Kendall Law Group LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Michael H. Bell, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SAM A. LINDSAY, District Judge.

Before the court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, filed September 11, 2012. After carefully reviewing the motion and brief, response and brief, reply, record, and applicable law, the court grants Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and remands this action to the County Court at Law No. 1, Dallas County, Texas.

I. Background

On August 14, 2012, Patricia Vinson (“Vinson” or “Plaintiff”) originally filed this action against Schneider National Carriers, Inc. (“SNC” or “Defendant”) in County Court at Law No. 1, Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff asserted claims for disability discrimination, disability harassment, and disability retaliation, pursuant to section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code. Vinson also asserted a claim for disability discharge, contending that “Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff and terminated her employment because Plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits.” Pl.'s Orig. Pet. 5. She asserted this claim pursuant to section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code. Although Vinson filed Plaintiff's First Amended Petition on October 9, 2012, the court is required to consider her pleadings as they existed at the time of removal. Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir.1990). In any event, the nature of the claims asserted in the amended pleading does not change, and, therefore, the court's analysis is not affected.

Defendant removed this action to federal court on September 10, 2012, contending that complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and that the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $75,000. Vinson contends that this action should be remanded to state court because SNC removed an action that includes a claim that is nonremovable and 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) deprives this court of jurisdiction over actions removed to federal court based solely on diversity of citizenship.

Defendant counters that the court has diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under section 21.051 of Texas Labor Code and that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) does not destroy the court's diversity jurisdiction over these state law claims. SNC disagrees that section 1445(c) mandates remand of workers' compensation claims in diversity cases but not federal question cases. Defendant also argues that the court should sever the workers' compensation claim under section 451.001, remand it to state court, and exercise jurisdiction over the section 21 claims for which diversity jurisdiction exists.

Vinson disagrees and contends that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) permits a severance and remand only when an action includes a nonremovable claim that is joined with a federal claim. In other words, according to Vinson, there can be no severance and remand of a claim when the basis for removal of a civil action is diversity jurisdiction and the action includes a nonremovableclaim or cause of action. The court agrees.

II. DiscussionA. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Procedural Defects

A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” or over civil cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and in which diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must have statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a claim. See Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1998). Absent jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, they lack the power to adjudicate claims and must dismiss an action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Id.;Stockman v. Federal Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Veldhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1994)). “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction cannot be created by waiver or consent.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 919 (5th Cir.2001). A federal court has an independent duty, at any level of the proceedings, to determine whether it properly has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.”); McDonal v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177, 182 n. 5 (5th Cir.2005) ( “federal court may raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte ”). Any doubts as to the propriety of the removal should be construed strictly in favor of remand. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.2002). “The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction in federal court rests on the party seeking to invoke it.” St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir.1998) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, if a case is removed to federal court, the defendant has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, that is, the defendant must establish that the action falls within one of the two previously listed types of civil cases.

The court sets out the jurisdictional framework because: (1) the parties seem to view the determinative issue as jurisdictional rather than procedural; and (2) the framework sets forth the type of cases over which a federal court has original jurisdiction. Although the general removal statute allows removal based on diversity, as will be discussed later, it does not apply to those actions arising under the workers' compensation laws of a state. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). A “statutory restriction against removal is not a matter of substantive jurisdiction, but rather a procedural defect.” Williams v. AC Spark Plugs Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 985 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir.1993). A procedural defect “is any defect that does not go to the question of whether the case originally could have been brought in federal district court.” Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1544 (5th Cir.1991) (citation omitted). Vinson's “claim of retaliatory termination under § 451.001 is a claim arising under Texas worker's compensation laws.” Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir.1998) (citation omitted). Nothing prohibits a plaintiff from originally filing a case in federal court that includes a claim arising under the workers' compensation laws of a state as long as diversity or federal question jurisdiction exists. The prohibition is on the removal of such civil action. In this case, had Vinson so elected, she could have brought this action in federal court because diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Williams, 985 F.2d at 788. The question is not whether this action could have been brought originally in federal court but whether it was removed contrary to a statutory restriction.^* For this reason, whether this action is remanded in its entirety or stays in federal court with a severance and remand of the section 451.001 claim is not decided on the existence of subject matter jurisdiction but whether the removal was procedurally defective and whether the court has the authority to sever and remand claims filed pursuant to section 451.001. The issue of diversity is quite beside the point in this instance.

B. Relevant Statutes

Several statutes are relevant to the disposition of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. They include the general removal statute, a limiting statute, and one dealing with the joinder of federal and state law claims. The general removal statute provides:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or defendants to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). This general right of removal, however, is subject to the limitation of another statute that provides, “A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). The third and final statute relevant to the court's analysis provides as follows:

(c) Joinder of Federal law claims and State law claims.—

(1) If a civil action includes—

(A) a claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (within the meaning of section 1331 of this title), and

(B) a claim not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court or a claim that has been made nonremovable by statute, the entire action may be removed if the action would be removable without the inclusion of the claim described in subparagraph (B).

(2) Upon removal of an action described in paragraph (1), the district court shall sever from the action all claims described in paragraph (1)(B) and shall remand the severed claims to the State court from which the action was removed. Only defendants against whom a claim described in paragraph (1)(A) has been asserted are required to join in or consent to the removal under paragraph (1).

28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). This is the current version of section 1441(c), and it was enacted on December 7, 2011, and became effective on January 6, 2012. See Federal Court Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–63, 125 Stat. 758. While the other two statutory provisions are important to the...