Vinson v. Vinson
| Decision Date | 07 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D18-40,1D18-40 |
| Citation | 282 So.3d 122 |
| Parties | Mary Grace VINSON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Tommy Junior VINSON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Mary Grace Vinson, pro se, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Travis R. Johnson of Meador & Johnson, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
We deny the former wife's Pro Se Motion for Rehearing. We withdraw our earlier opinion, however, and substitute the following corrected opinion in its place.
Before us are the former wife's appeal, the former husband's cross-appeal from the Amended Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, and the orders properly subsumed therein. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h). After giving due consideration to all of the arguments raised by each party, we affirm the points raised on appeal, but reverse in part the points raised on cross-appeal. As a result—and for the reasons discussed below—we remand the cause for further proceedings.
There are few dissolution cases that reach this Court having taken the straight and narrow path. Likewise, in the present case, the parties met pitfalls and took detours of their own device prior to reaching the final hearing. We take note of the trial court's commendable efforts to shepherd them toward that end. But in order to fairly and accurately recount the hazards they encountered along the way requires that we include the following, relatively lengthy, recitation of the facts.
The parties were married on February 14, 2007. Their daughter was born in 2012. The parties separated in December 2014, and six months later, on June 1, 2015, the former wife filed her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. On January 15, 2016, following a hearing, the trial court entered a Stipulated Temporary Order adopting the parties' stipulated temporary time-sharing agreement concerning their minor child. The stipulated order established an equal time-sharing arrangement between the parties and obligated the former husband to pay temporary child support.
A final hearing was scheduled on the former wife's petition on October 5, 2016. In the meantime, on September 26, the former wife and her attorney—Wanda Morgan—arrived at the law offices of the former husband's attorney with the intent of taking the former husband's deposition. Instead, the parties entered into a new time-sharing agreement that departed markedly from the equal time-sharing plan approved by the trial court in the Stipulated Temporary Order.
Specifically, Ms. Morgan announced that they had "worked out the time sharing in this case, that the husband [would] have majority time sharing with the parties' minor child," and the former wife "[would] get all of the summer [ ]—which will begin one week after school lets out and it will end when—one week before school reconvenes." In addition, the parties would "alternate the entire Thanksgiving holiday ... [and] [would] split the Christmas Holiday according to [the] Okaloosa Shared Parenting Plan." Furthermore, the former wife would get "every three or four day weekend," which they anticipated would amount to one weekend per month, "whether it be due to a teacher work day or holiday like Labor Day, Memorial Day, [P]resident's Day ...." Lastly, the former wife would pay "$200 a month to the husband as child support." Ms. Morgan represented that they would "reserve" on the remainder of the assets, including the marital home, until the upcoming October hearing.
Next, the court reporter—who had been retained to report the former husband's deposition—placed the former wife under oath. Ms. Morgan asked the former wife if she understood the time-sharing arrangement as it was outlined by Ms. Morgan. The former wife replied, "Yes," and then added, "Yeah, I just want to know about the social security that he can get[.]" After informing the former wife that they would eventually get to that issue, Ms. Morgan asked her if she was in agreement with the time-sharing plan as Ms. Morgan had summarized it. The former wife said she was in agreement and then asked about the "other holidays." Ms. Morgan explained that she would get her daughter one long weekend per month. The former wife expressed her satisfaction with that answer and then testified that no one had promised or threatened her to enter into the agreement—she was entering into it freely and voluntarily because she believed it was in the best interest of her daughter.
The former husband was then questioned by his attorney—Travis Johnson. The former husband confirmed that he had discussed the terms of the agreement with Mr. Johnson, who had answered all of his questions. He agreed that the time-sharing plan was in his daughter's best interest; that he had not been forced into the agreement or promised anything for his agreement; and that he had entered into it freely and voluntarily. Both parties confirmed they understood that the issues of the equitable distribution of assets and liabilities and other financial issues would be decided at a later date.
Nevertheless, three business days before the scheduled dissolution hearing, the former wife waivered and filed a pro se Motion to Set Aside Custody Agreement, in which she alleged that she had been fearful and anxious and had felt pressured and coerced when she entered into the newly-stipulated time-sharing plan. On the heels of the motion, and based upon a Stipulated Motion to Withdraw, the trial court entered an order relieving Wanda Morgan of responsibility as the former wife's attorney of record.
On October 13, 2016, following a hearing, the trial court granted the former wife's Motion to Continue, in order that she could retain new counsel. The court also awarded the former husband fees and costs for the preparation necessary for the previously scheduled final hearing. In the meantime, the former wife—who did retain new counsel—filed Petitioner's Motion for Contempt, asking the trial court to find the former husband in contempt for failing to follow the January 7, 2016 Stipulated Temporary Order, as opposed to the terms of the September stipulated agreement.
On January 20, 2017, a hearing was held before the court on the former wife's two motions. The former husband was present and represented by Mr. Johnson. The former wife was also present and represented by Tonya Holman. The trial court heard testimony from the former wife and Wanda Morgan.
According to the former wife—prior to the day that they met at the Mr. Johnson's law offices—Ms. Morgan had been telling the former wife that her "custody" case was weak because she worked and the former husband did not. She also referenced an email from Ms. Morgan sent on September 21, 2016, in which—in the former wife's words—Ms. Morgan told her that she might "lose [the case] ... because [she] withheld very important information until just a couple of weeks before trial[.]"
Prior to admitting the email into evidence, the trial court informed the former wife that, by doing so, she was waiving her attorney-client privilege. The former wife said she understood. She then testified as to her version of the sequence of events that occurred on September 26, 2016, when she first arrived at the law offices for the deposition of her former husband.
As she described it, Ms. Morgan talked to her "quickly" outside, again advising her that her case was "weak" and that the judge "probably" would not give her custody because she worked. She then said, "So we opened the conversation" about a plan that would give the former husband majority time-sharing during the school year, but claimed that they "rushed into it." The former wife related that Ms. Morgan then spoke to Mr. Johnson and, afterwards, relayed back to her that he was willing to reduce her child support obligation to $200 per month during the months the former husband maintained majority time-sharing. The former wife said that she told the attorneys she could not afford even that amount, but Ms. Morgan allegedly responded that it was "the best deal" she could get "because the Judge may give some more."
At that point, Ms. Holman addressed the former wife's September 26 testimony where the former wife assented to the agreement. Specifically, the former wife argued that despite Ms. Morgan's representation that they had discussed the details of the time-sharing agreement, the former wife still harbored questions, but was too afraid to ask them; it was not what she wanted, but "everything happened so fast," she "wasn't ready," and she "wasn't given enough time to think about it."
The transcript of that meeting was moved into evidence. Ms. Holman went over each question asked by Ms. Morgan and answered by the former wife. She then asked the former wife how she felt when she answered those questions. The former wife testified that she felt "scared" and "confused," and did not know what was going on. In light of the email she received from Ms. Morgan, the former wife claimed she felt she was already losing her case.
The email conversation between the former wife and Ms. Morgan was entered into evidence. Read as a whole and in context, it revealed that on September 21, 2016, just days before the scheduled final hearing, the former wife advised Ms. Morgan of a new witness she had just thought of and asked Morgan if she would subpoena the witness. In response, Ms. Morgan informed the former wife that she had "severely hurt [her] case by not telling" her this "important information sooner." Ms. Morgan made clear that the former wife had been withholding information and refusing to allow Morgan to request continuances. Ms. Morgan told her, "Your not allowing me to attempt to continue your case could cost you custody," and she explained that by the former wife's having withheld important information from her "until just a couple of weeks before trial" left her "no time to get witnesses and much needed information."
On cross-examination by Mr. Johnson, the former wife confirmed that it...
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