Vinzant v. Hillcrest Medical Center
| Decision Date | 01 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 51798,51798 |
| Parties | Bob J. VINZANT, Appellee, v. HILLCREST MEDICAL CENTER, Appellant. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Rogers County; Edwin D. Carden, judge.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of the district court which determined that the attorney's lien was superior to the hospital lien.
AFFIRMED.
David L. Ashbaugh, Claremore, for appellee.
Boone, Ellison & Smith by Reuben Davis, Tulsa, for appellant.
Bob J. Vinzant, appellee, (lawyer) brought a declaratory judgment action for the interpretation of the hospital lien statute, 42 O.S. 1971 § 43. 1 The controversy concerned the priority of liens between the hospital and the attorney who negotiated a settlement for the patient following an automobile accident.
Wanda McDonald (patient) was injured in an automobile accident June 26, 1976. She was treated at Hillcrest Medical Center (hospital) for the resulting injuries and incurred a hospital bill in the amount of $6,555.82. After the accident, she employed Bob J. Vinzant, lawyer, to represent her in an action against the tortfeasor. The patient executed an agreement to pay the lawyer up to 40% of whatever was collected. The hospital properly filed its lien in compliance with the statute. 2 Thereafter, the lawyer negotiated a settlement with the tortfeasor's insurer for the policy limits of the insurance coverage, $10,000.00. Two drafts were issued by the insurance company, one was for $3,404.18, payable to the lawyer and the patient. The lawyer received $1,337.67, or 40% of the draft, and the patient received the balance of $2,066.51. The lawyer retained possession of the second draft in the amount of $6,555.82, which was made payable to the lawyer, the patient, and the hospital. The draft was endorsed in blank without restriction by the patient prior to the filing of suit.
The crux of the issue is that the lawyer asserts that 40% of the second draft is due and payable to him, while the hospital claims that it is entitled to collect its bill in full, which is equal to the total amount of the second draft. The trial court held that the lawyer should receive 40% of the second draft, and that the hospital was entitled to the balance.
The hospital not only appeals from the superior imposition of the attorney's lien, but it also asserts that venue in Rogers County was improper. Venue of this action is controlled by 12 O.S. 1971 § 1653, which provides that if one or more individuals are involved in an action who reside in different counties, venue lies in any county where any of the defendants reside or may be served with summons. The sole basis for venue lying in Rogers was the allegation that the patient resided in Oologah, Rogers County, Oklahoma. This allegation was challenged by the hospital which asserted that she resided in Tulsa County, and that Tulsa County was the only county where the action could properly be brought. The trial court found that the patient resided in Rogers County and that venue was proper. This Court has consistently held that the question of fact of residence is for the determination of the trial court and the determination is conclusive upon appeal unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence. 3 The evidence presented to the trial court was sufficient for it to conclude that the patient's residence was in Rogers County. 4
The hospital also argued that the patient was not a necessary or proper party to the declaratory judgment action. This issue was not presented to the trial court, and was raised for the first time on appeal. The hospital's objection is untimely. An objection to a misjoinder of parties must be promptly interposed in the manner provided by law, and failure to do so will preclude the question being raised on appeal. 5
The hospital contends that the lawyer did not have a lien because he did not follow the statutory procedure prescribed by 5 O.S. 1971 § 6, 6 enforcement of an attorney's lien. The statute provides for imposition of an attorney's lien from the time of the commencement of an action, or from the filing of an answer containing a counter-claim. The lawyer's position is that he was precluded from perfecting his lien because no suit was filed. He asserts that whether a lien was perfected is immaterial to this appeal. We agree. It is provided by 42 O.S. 1971 § 43 that the hospital's lien is inferior to any lien or claim of the attorney who handles a matter on behalf of the patient. The apparent legislative intent is to provide a certain degree of protection to the lawyer while he effectuates a recovery for his client.
There is no basis for a hospital lien in the absence of a statute. In an attempt to lessen the burden imposed on hospitals by non-paying patients involved in accidents, the legislatures of several states have enacted statutes which give a hospital a lien upon any recovery which the patient might receive from a tortfeasor causing the injuries for which treatment is given. 7 The claimant obligated herself to pay a fee from what the lawyer recovered from the tortfeasor. The legislature obviously recognized the fact that a contingent fee is the customary arrangement in negligence cases, and that it is the efforts and skill of the lawyer which result in the recovery of anything for the patient and the hospital.
The statute provides that if the injured party asserts or maintains a claim against the tortfeasor because of injuries incurred, the hospital shall have a lien "upon that part going or belonging to such patient of any recovery or sum had or collected or to be collected," 8 with the proviso that the hospital lien is inferior to any lien or any claim of the attorney handling the matter for the patient. The patient had contracted that the lawyer was to receive 40% of whatever he recovered. The patient, therefore, could only have received $6,000.00. Consequently, the part "going or belonging" to the patient is the part remaining after the fee of the lawyer is deducted.
It is argued by the hospital that even if the lawyer's lien is valid, the amount awarded to him should be reduced by the sum which he disbursed to his client from the first draft. The lawyer is not responsible for payment to the hospital, and whether the patient or the insurer may be liable is not an issue. The trial court was correct in determining that the lawyer was to receive $2,622.32 of the $6,555.82 draft and that the hospital was entitled to $3,933.50.
AFFIRMED.
I concur in the court's decision which holds a lawyer's charging lien superior to the statutory hospital lien. I dissent from that...
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