Virginia Bridge & Iron Co. v. Crafts

• Decision Date: 19 June 1907
• Docket Number: 42.
• Citation: 58 S.E. 322,2 Ga.App. 126
• Parties: VIRGINIA BRIDGE & IRON CO. v. CRAFTS.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

58 S.E. 322

2 Ga.App. 126

VIRGINIA BRIDGE & IRON CO. v. CRAFTS.

No. 42.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

June 19, 1907

Syllabus by the Court.

In no trial should the scope of the court's instructions to the jury be more limited or more extensive than the range of the relevant evidence properly submitted therein. The charge of the court should be pertinent and applicable to the issues presented by the evidence, and it is error to charge the jury upon a theory which is not sustained by evidence.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 46, Trial, § 596.]

Where one of the issues was no contract, or a certain definite contract, charges applicable to the nature of a contract which had not been shown to exist were properly refused.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 46, Trial, § 596.]

A contract will be construed as made for a legal, rather than for an illegal, purpose; and the more especially when such contract is attacked by a party thereto who has been benefited thereby.

"Courts hold themselves bound to the observance of rules of extreme caution, when invoked to declare a transaction void, on grounds of public policy; and prejudice to the public interest must clearly appear before a court will be warranted in pronouncing transaction void on this account. It is not to be lightly inferred from facts and circumstances of doubtful import and meaning, or which may admit of different construction, one consistent with, and the other opposed to unquestioned policy." Smith v. Dubose, 3 S.E 314, 78 Ga. 415, 6 Am.St.Rep. 260.

"Where the government offers contracts for public works to the lowest bidder, the public is deeply interested in free competition in the bidding; and as a general rule any agreements among contractors to suppress the bidding, and thereby to acquire the contract from the government at a higher figure than could otherwise be obtained if the competition was left untrammeled, are held to be illegal." 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 953.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 11, Contracts, §§ 659-661.]

"'A joint proposal, the result of honest cooperation, though it might prevent the rivalry of the parties, and thus lessen competition, is not an act forbidden by public policy. *** The public may obtain at least the benefit of the joint responsibility and of the joint ability to do the service."' "In all contracts secured in such a manner, the courts should never hesitate to protect parties in their agreements with each other and compel them to comply with the terms thereof." Hoffman v. McMullen, 83 F. 377, 28 C.C.A. 183, 45 L.R.A. 410. "The rule rendering illegal contracts suppressing competition in the letting of public constructions does not render illegal bona fide partnership agreements for bidding for such contracts, or other bona fide arrangements between prospective bidders, whereby a bid for the entire contract is put in and the parties to the agreement are each to do a part of the work; the object of the parties not being to suppress competition." 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d. Ed.) 953.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 11, Contracts, §§ 659-661.]

The judgment refusing a new trial is not, for any reason assigned, erroneous.

Error from City Court of Atlanta; H. M. Reid, Judge.

Action by the Virginia Bridge & Iron Company against George H. Crafts. From the judgment, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Arthur Heyman, Dorsey, Brewster, Howell & McDaniel, and Francis L. Eyles, for plaintiff in error.

Westmoreland Bros. and Hamilton Douglas, for defendant in error.

RUSSELL J.

The Virginia Bridge & Iron Company brought their action against George H. Crafts in the city court of Atlanta to recover a balance of $2,850.66 alleged to be due on an account for structural material furnished to the defendant, who was a contractor and builder of bridges. Defendant admitted the correctness of the account, but pleaded a counterclaim, by way of set-off (averring that the plaintiff had no office or place of business, or assets, in Georgia), that the plaintiff "is indebted" to defendant in the sum of $3,836 for failure to comply with certain agreements made between plaintiff and defendant as to sharing in the work of building certain bridges in the Vicksburg National Military Park, in the state of Mississippi, let out under competitive bids by the United States government.

The defendant, in his extended answer, avers that in 1903 and 1904 both plaintiff and defendant were in the business of taking contracts to build both substructure and superstructure of bridges; that plaintiff, in addition to being a contractor, was also a manufacturer of structural steel superstructures; that defendant made a special feature of building substructures, such as excavations, concrete bases, brick piers and walls, etc., commonly called the "substructure"; that this fact was known to plaintiff, who often let out the substructure work of bridges let to it by entire contract; that in January, 1903, when the United States called for bids looking to the construction of certain bridges in the Military Park, negotiations were entered into between plaintiff and defendant that they should so arrange their bids as that defendant should put in the only bid, with the understanding and agreement that plaintiff should have the steel work, or superstructure, and defendant the other work, or substructure, on whatever contracts might be awarded by the United States government to defendant; that the bid so made by defendant was partly for the use and benefit of plaintiff and at prices for the respective portions agreed on by the parties before the bid was submitted; that on February 12, 1903, the contract to build three bridges was awarded to defendant, and he at once placed an order with plaintiff for the steel work, in accordance with their agreement, but subsequently (February 16, 1903) the government, through its officers, decided to reject all the bids and call for new ones, and specified that the estimate of cost for building both superstructure and substructure should be made separately, in each bid, these second bids to be opened April 16, 1903, in Vicksburg.

It is further averred that on March 16, 1903, the president of the plaintiff company addressed a letter to defendant, saying, "If it is your desire to take the matter up along the lines we worked together before, *** we know of no special objection;" and asked what method of procedure defendant would advise; the meaning of said letter (defendant avers) being to arrange some plan by which plaintiff and defendant could co-operate in securing one or more of the dozen bridges to be let by the government, so that one could furnish the substructure and the other the superstructure. Defendant had extended negotiations with Vernon H. Smith, the representative of plaintiff, and submitted to Smith the figures and calculations which were the basis of the bids made by plaintiff at the second letting, and under which plaintiff, in his own name, finally obtained the contracts and erected three of the bridges let by the government. Defendant avers that on the night of April 15, 1903, before submitting bids next day, in Vicksburg, plaintiff and Smith met, had a long interview, examined plans, estimates, figures, and prints; that Smith made an agreement with defendant to take defendant's estimates, submit a bid in plaintiff's name, and that defendant should have the substructure work at the figures submitted, and plaintiff the superstructure of whatever contracts might be awarded to plaintiff. Defendant, being on the ground with all equipments and implements for work (having just finished some similar work), could do the work cheaper than other contractors, and this fact was a mutual inducement for plaintiff and defendant to work in concert; and defendant then and there disclosed and turned over to the plaintiff's said agent his estimates, prices, calculations of quotations, etc., to be used by plaintiff in preparing his bid. He says, further, that immediately on said contract being made with the United States government by plaintiff to construct three bridges, known as Nos. 4, 5, and 8, in said park, defendant offered to perform his part of said contract, and demanded his right to do the substructure work at the price named for same in plaintiff's bid, all of which was denied and refused by plaintiff, who awarded the substructure to another contractor (Rubush) at a cheaper price, all to his injury and damage as aforesaid. To the defendant's answer were attached tabulated statements showing how he would be entitled to damages, and for which he prays set-off, amounting to $3,856, besides interest from October 1, 1903.

The jury found for the plaintiff $837.75, upon which judgment was entered. Plaintiff moved for new trial on the several grounds stated in the record. At the hearing of the motion the trial judge passed the following order: "Defendant having voluntarily written off the sum of $144.23 from the set-off found in his favor, leaving the amount due the plaintiff the sum of $981.98, the motion for new trial is hereby overruled and denied."

In the voluminous record there is evidence for the defendant that the first letting, which was afterwards rejected by the government, took place as alleged; that afterwards, on the night of April 15, 1903, before the second letting next day plaintiff's agent, Vernon H. Smith, and the defendant, met in the latter's room at the hotel in Vicksburg to confer as to methods of submitting bids; that plaintiff's agent said his principal was chiefly a manufacturer of steel structural work and did not care for foundation work, though it did not refuse it; that defendant had figures made out in detail on...