Virginia Sur. Co., Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co.

Decision Date22 December 2005
Docket NumberNo. 3-04-0701.,3-04-0701.
Citation840 N.E.2d 1271
PartiesVIRGINIA SURETY COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK and Capital Construction Group, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Joseph A. Namikas, Gregory G. Vacala (argued), Rusin, Patton Maciorowski & Friedman, Ltd., Chicago, for Virginia Surety Company, Inc.

Francis A. Spina (argued), Heather B. Stewart, Cremer, Kopon, Shaughnessy & Spina, LLC, Chicago, for Northern Insurance Company of New York.

John P. Prusik, Prusik, Selby & Daley, P.C., Chicago, for Capital Constructing Group, Inc.

Justice LYTTON delivered the Opinion of the court:

Both plaintiff, Virginia Surety Company, Inc., and defendant, Northern Insurance Company, insured De Graf Concrete Construction, Inc. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that defendant had a duty to defend and indemnify De Graf with respect to a third-party complaint filed by Capital Construction Group, Inc. against De Graf. Plaintiff and defendant filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendant's motion. We affirm.

I. FACTS

Capital was the general contractor at a construction site. Capital hired De Graf to work as a subcontractor at the site. Section 4.6.1 of the contract between Capital and De Graf contained the following indemnification provision:

"To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Subcontractor WAIVES ANY RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION AGAINST AND shall indemnify and hold harmless, the Owner, Contractor, Architect, Architect's consults, and agents and employees of any of them from and against claims, damages losses and expenses * * * arising out of or resulting from performance of the Subcontractor's Work under this Subcontract, provided that such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than the Work itself) including loss of use therefrom WHICH IS caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the Subcontractor, the Sub-contractor's subcontractors, anyone directly or indirectly employed by them or any for whose acts they may be liable, regardless of whether or not such claim, loss or expenses is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder."

The contract between Capital and De Graf also required De Graf to obtain a commercial general liability (CGL) policy of insurance. De Graf obtained a CGL policy from defendant. The CGL policy contained, in pertinent part, the following employer's liability exclusion:

"This insurance does not apply to:

* * *

`Bodily injury' to:

(1) An `employee' of the insured arising out of and in the course of:

(a) Employment of the insured; or

(b) Performing duties related to the conduct of the insured's business; or

* * *

This exclusion applies:

(1) Whether the insured may be liable as an employer or in any other capacity; and

(2) To any obligation to share damages with or repay someone else who must pay damages because of the injury.

This exclusion does not apply to liability as assumed by the insured under an `insured contract.'"

"[I]nsured contract" is defined as:

"That part of any other contract pertaining to your business * * * under which you assume the tort liability of another party to pay for `bodily injury,' `property damage' or `personal liability' to a third person or organization. Tort liability means a liability that would be imposed by law in the absence of any contract or agreement."

In addition to the CGL policy issued by defendant, De Graf obtained a worker's compensation and employer's liability policy from plaintiff.

James Smith, an employee of De Graf, was injured while working at the construction site. Smith sued Capital to recover for his injuries. Capital filed a third-party complaint against De Graf, seeking contribution. Capital's complaint alleged that DeGraf committed ten negligent acts or omissions that caused James Smith's injuries. The complaint specifically referenced the Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act and requested the following relief:

"in the event judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff, James Smith, and against the defendant/third-party plaintiff, Capital Construction Group, Inc., on plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at Law, then in that event judgment should be entered against the third-party/defendant De Graf Concrete Construction, Inc., in such amount by way of contribution as permitted by law."

De Graf tendered the defense of the complaint to plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff accepted the tender, but defendant refused to defend or indemnify De Graf pursuant to the employer's liability exclusion in its CGL policy. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that defendant had a duty to defend and indemnify De Graf in the contribution action.

Both plaintiff and defendant filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendant's motion.

II. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions and admissions reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(d) (West 2004). Where both parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties agree that no material issue of fact exists and that only a question of law is involved. Board of Education v. Cunningham, 346 Ill.App.3d 1027, 1030, 282 Ill.Dec. 631, 806 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (2004). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill.2d 480, 487, 276 Ill.Dec. 887, 795 N.E.2d 240, 245 (2003). We can affirm the trial court's ruling on any basis in the record. Ashley v. Pierson, 339 Ill.App.3d 733, 737, 274 Ill.Dec. 574, 791 N.E.2d 666, 670 (2003).

Whether an insurer has a duty to defend depends on whether the allegations in the complaint trigger the relevant provisions of the insurance policy. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill.2d 90, 107-08, 180 Ill.Dec. 691, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992).

Here, plaintiff argues that the ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Allianz Ins. Co. v. Guidant Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 29 Diciembre 2008
    ...Ill.Dec. 719, 822 N.E.2d 1 (2004). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo (Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 362 Ill.App.3d 571, 573, 298 Ill.Dec. 836, 840 N.E.2d 1271 (2005)) and may affirm on any basis in the record, irrespective of whether the trial court ......
  • Virginia Sur. Co. v. Northern Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 19 Enero 2007
    ...motion for summary judgment and denied Virginia Surety's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed. 362 Ill. App.3d 571, 298 Ill.Dec. 836, 840 N.E.2d 1271. The appellate court first noted the parties' arguments reflected the split in the appellate districts regarding whether......
  • Sadler v. Lynn J. Serv.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 26 Enero 2011
    ...Code, the plaintiffs' action was time-barred. 810 ILCS 5/3–118(b) (West 1994); see Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 362 Ill.App.3d 571, 574, 298 Ill.Dec. 836, 840 N.E.2d 1271 (2005) (holding that an appellate court can affirm the circuit court's ruling on any basis......
  • Virginia Sur. Co. v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 1 Marzo 2006
    ...VIRGINIA SUR. CO. v. NORTHERN INS. CO. OF NEW YORK. No. 102036. Supreme Court of Illinois. March 1, 2006. Appeal from 362 Ill.App.3d 571, 298 Ill.Dec. 836, 840 N.E.2d 1271. Disposition of petition for leave to appeal * For Cumulative Leave to Appeal Tables see preliminary pages of advance s......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT