Visser v. Auto Alley, LLC

• Decision Date: 24 February 2017
• Docket Number: Docket No. 43432
• Citation: 162 Idaho 1,393 P.3d 1027
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Douglas VISSER, a married man as to his sole and separate property, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AUTO ALLEY, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Calvin Visser and Vicki Visser, as individuals and in their capacity as Members and/or Managers of Auto Alley, LLC, Defendants-Appellants.

162 Idaho 1

393 P.3d 1027

Douglas VISSER, a married man as to his sole and separate property, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.AUTO ALLEY, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Calvin Visser and Vicki Visser, as individuals and in their capacity as Members and/or Managers of Auto Alley, LLC, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 43432

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed: February 24, 2017

Rehearing Denied May 9, 2017

Berg & McLaughlin, Chtd., Sandpoint, for appellants. Toby McLaughlin argued.

Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., Sandpoint, for respondent. Brent Featherston argued.

HORTON, Justice.

Auto Alley, LLC, Calvin Visser, and Vicki Visser appeal from the Bonner County district court's order granting a writ of possession and quieting title to certain real property in Douglas Visser. Douglas was awarded the property in his divorce from Vicki in 2005. A dispute subsequently arose and in February of 2014, the parties entered into a stipulation that resulted in Vicki being permitted to continue to occupy part of the property known as "Lot 2." A stipulated judgment was entered which provided that Douglas would convey Lot 2 to Vicki if she completely performed a number of specific obligations within specified time frames. When Vicki failed to completely perform those obligations, Douglas brought the instant motion to enforce the judgment and the district court granted his motion. Vicki timely appealed. We affirm and award Douglas attorney fees on appeal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Douglas and Vicki were divorced in 2005. As part of that divorce, Douglas was awarded the real property in dispute in this action. The property had been used as a wrecking yard. The property was encumbered by a promissory note and deed of trust from Douglas and Vicki to Joseph Lapham in the amount of $111,500 (the Lapham debt). In 2006, Calvin Visser, Douglas's son, rented a portion of the property from Douglas to run a wrecking yard. Instead of paying rent, Douglas and Calvin agreed that Calvin would pay the monthly payments on the Lapham debt and the property taxes.

In 2007, Vicki moved back to Ponderay and began to operate the wrecking yard with Calvin. Calvin and Vicki operated the wrecking yard as Auto Alley, LLC. In 2013, Douglas learned that the property taxes were several years in arrears and that the county had plans to take the property by tax deed. $52,807.52 was due on taxes for 2009–2012. Douglas paid $14,591.74 to prevent the property from being sold. Douglas also learned that the Lapham debt had increased from $111,500 to nearly $300,000. Douglas filed an action for breach of contract and waste in 2013 for Vicki's failure to make payments on the Lapham debt and pay the taxes. The district court entered a temporary restraining order on July 3, 2013. At an Order to Show Cause hearing held on July 24, 2013, the parties stipulated to continuing the Temporary Restraining Order and enter into mediation.

On February 18, 2014, the parties submitted a Stipulated Judgment to the district court. The Stipulated Judgment was entered by the district court on February 19, 2014. The Stipulated Judgment allowed for the property to be split into two lots and for Vicki to obtain title to Lot 2 upon her fulfillment of certain obligations. The Stipulated Judgment required Vicki to pay half of the Lapham debt, remove all of her property from Lot 1, and commission an environmental study of Lot 1. Douglas was required to convey Lot 2 to Vicki "ONLY upon condition that [Vicki] ... fully and completely perform all of the obligations as set forth hereafter." (emphasis in original). The Stipulated Judgment also provided, "[i]f [Vicki] fail[s] and/or refuse[s] to make payments as set forth in the preceding section, [Vicki] must immediately vacate the premises described in Exhibit ‘A’ immediately and [Douglas] shall have an immediate Writ of Possession from this Court as set forth above."

Almost immediately, Vicki failed to comply with the terms of the Stipulated Judgment and Douglas filed a Motion for Writ of Possession and Judgment for Quiet Title on April 3, 2014. The district court denied the motion, finding that Vicki had substantially complied with the terms of the Stipulated Judgment. On May 7, 2014, Vicki filed a motion claiming that Douglas had interfered with her ability to comply with the Stipulated Judgment. Following a hearing, the district court declined to grant the motion. In March of 2015, Vicki filed a motion for contempt and Douglas filed a second motion seeking a writ of possession and quiet title. Following a hearing on both motions, the district court issued its memorandum opinion and order granting Douglas's motion and denying Vicki's. In its decision, the district court found that Vicki had failed to comply with the terms of the Stipulated Judgment and Douglas was entitled to a Writ of Possession as well as an order quieting title in the property. The district court denied Vicki's contempt motion, finding that Douglas was not in contempt for failing to convey the deed to Lot 2 to Vicki prior to her completion of the terms of the Stipulated Judgment.

Vicki then filed a motion to reconsider. Vicki argued that the forfeiture of the property constituted an illegal penalty and that Douglas had prevented Vicki from fulfilling her obligations under the Stipulated Judgment. After a hearing, the district court denied Vicki's motion to reconsider and entered judgment in favor of Douglas. Vicki timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The general rule is that a stipulated judgment is not subject to appellate review." Fagen, Inc. v. Rogerson Flats Wind Park, LLC , 159 Idaho 624, 627, 364 P.3d 1189, 1192 (2016). "There is an exception to the general rule where the appellant(s) did not actually consent to the judgment, or the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, or the judgment was obtained by fraud, or the judgment adversely affects the public interest." Id.

"A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous." Pinnacle Engineers, Inc. v. Heron Brook, LLC , 139 Idaho 756, 758, 86 P.3d 470, 472 (2004). "On appeal this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Id. "Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven." Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Vicki raises two substantive issues on appeal. First, Vicki argues that the forfeiture provision contained within the Stipulated Judgment constitutes an unenforceable penalty and the district court erred in enforcing it. Vicki next argues that Douglas interfered with her ability to comply with the judgment. These issues will be addressed in turn.

A. Whether the forfeiture provision constituted an unenforceable penalty is not properly before this Court.

Vicki's first argument is that the Stipulated Judgment contains an unenforceable penalty provision and the district court erred in enforcing it. Vicki premises this argument on the belief that a Stipulated Judgment is a contract. In support of this premise, Vicki cites to Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner , 157 Idaho 927, 342 P.3d 639 (2015), where this Court said "[s]ince a stipulation is a contract, its enforceability is determined through contract principles." Skinner , 157 Idaho at 933, 342 P.3d at 646. There, we were considering the proper way to interpret the language of the stipulation. Id. Similarly in Guzman v. Piercy , 155 Idaho 928, 318 P.3d 918 (2014), this Court again applied contract principles to ascertain the meaning of language in a stipulation. Guzman , 155 Idaho at 936, 318 P.3d at 926.

Here, Vicki is asserting that the Stipulated Judgment is unenforceable. While Vicki makes this assertion, she has not sought relief from the Stipulated Judgment nor has she appealed that judgment. Generally, judgments must be appealed within 42 days from the time they were entered. I.R.C.P. 83(b)(1)(A). However this Court recently stated that stipulated judgments are not subject to appellate review. Fagen, Inc. , 159 Idaho at 627, 364 P.3d at 1192.

The general rule is that a stipulated judgment is not subject to appellate review. There is an exception to the general rule where the appellant(s) did not actually consent to the judgment, or the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, or the judgment was obtained by fraud, or the judgment

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