Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., B-351
| Decision Date | 26 January 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. B-351,B-351 |
| Citation | 118 So.2d 664 |
| Parties | James T. VOCELLE, Walter Lightsey, and Stuart L. Moore, as Chairman and members, respectively, constituting the Florida Industrial Commission, a State Agency, and Ray E. Green, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. KNIGHT BROTHERS PAPER COMPANY, Inc., a Florida corporation; Massey Motors, Inc., a Florida corporation; Miller Electric Company of Florida, a Florida corporation, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Robert J. Kelly and Joseph C. Jacobs, Asst. Attys. Gen., for Ray E. Green, State Comptroller.
Burnis T. Coleman and Lawrence Kanzer, Tallahassee, for Florida Industrial Commission, appellants.
Caldwell, Parker, Foster, Madigan, Oven & Moriarty, Tallahassee, for appellees.
Allen, Dell, Frank & Trinkle, Tampa, Holland, Bevis, McRae & Smith, Bartow, Bryant, Martin & Kibler, Lakeland, Arnold & Matheny, Orlando, Counts Johnson, Tampa, and Robert L. Staufer, Winter Haven, as amici curiae.
The members of the Florida Industrial Commission and the State Cimptroller, defendants below, bring this appeal to review a declaratory decree of the Circuit Court of Leon County, Florida, Taylor, Circuit Judge, construing certain provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law of Florida (), thereby determining the rights of the plaintiffs and other like-situated employers.
The pertinent part of the decree provides:
'In the determination of eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits under the provisions of Section 443.05, Florida Statutes, Chapter 59-55, Laws of Florida, 1959, the Defendant Florida Industrial Commission shall determine
The facts were not in dispute and the basis for the above conclusions of law, with which we concur, is set out in a Memorandum Opinion prepared by the learned trial judge at the request of the parties.
Chapter 59-55, Laws of Florida 1959, amends Section 443.04, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., in the following particulars pertinent to this appeal:
'(2)(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a), (b), and (c) of this subsection, the weekly benefit amount, the average weekly wages, and total amount of benefits available with respect to all benefit years beginning on and after July 1, 1959, but prior to July 1, 1960, shall be determined and shall be payable in accordance with the following:
* * *' (Emphasis supplied.)
Chapter 59-55, Laws of Florida 1959, also amends Section 443.05(5), Florida Statutes, in the following particulars pertinent to this appeal:
'An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only as the Commission finds that:
'(5) He has been paid wages for insured work equal to twenty times his average weekly wages during his base period; provided, that no unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits if his average weekly wages is less than twenty dollars ($20.00).' (Emphasis and capitalization supplied.)
The cited amendatory act fixes July 1, 1959, as the effective date thereof, thus leaving in effect until that date the prior provisions of Section 443.05(5), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. 1
Following adoption of the 1959 act making the above-quoted changes in the statutes, the Florida Industrial Commission on May 20, 1959, and June 15, 1959, issued bulletins and directives construing the amendatory act, and particularly the last quoted section, stating in these simple words: '* * * with respect to all benefit years beginning on or after July 1, 1959, but prior to July 1, 1960, the average weekly wages shall be one-thirteenth of the high quarter wages.'
Application of the statute as thus construed resulted in the denial of a substantial number of claims for unemployment benefits filed by persons who felt that they were, or should be, within the protection of the statute providing such benefits. The Commission reconsidered its previous action and on August 25, 1959, issued a bulletin under which the 'average weekly wages' to be used in measuring an applicant's qualification to receive benefits may be determined by applying either of two standards: (1) The formula previously adopted of dividing the wages earned during the highest quarter of the base period by thirteen, or (2) if this formula did not result in the applicant being eligible for benefits, eligibility should then be tested by dividing the total of wages earned during the base period by the number of quarters in which wages were earned multiplied by thirteen.
It is obvious that under the August 25, 1959 bulletin some persons would qualify under the first formula who could not do so under the second, and conversely, that some could qualify under the second who could not do so under the first. It results that the application of the tests provided by the bulletin of August 25, 1959, imposes a greater burden upon the unemployment compensation insurance fund.
The plaintiff employers (appellees) insist that the construction first placed by the Commission upon the amendatory act is correct and furnishes the sole criterion by which eligibility to receive payments from the unemployment insurance fund may be determined. They urge that the definition of 'average weekly wages' as contained in the amendment to Section 443.04 must be used in construing the amended Section 443.05; that the Commission is bound by that definition and has no power to place any other construction on the statute.
The appellant Commission contends that the definition of 'average weekly wages' as contained in amended Section 443.04 is not applicable in determining the phrase 'average weekly wages during his base period', as contained in amended Section 443.05; that the addition of the words 'during his base period' indicates a legislative intent to modify the meaning which would otherwise be placed upon the words 'average weekly wages' and that, consequently, for the purpose of determining eligibility of applicants it may properly take into account earnings of the employee during other quarters of the base period. In this connection the Commission points out that Section 443.04 in which the definition 'average weekly wages' is found deals with the amount and duration of benefits, and Section 443.05 deals with eligibility to receive benefits. The Commission also seeks to justify its position by pointing out that several thousand applicants for benefits must be denied assistance if the original construction is adhered to and...
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