Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 January 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. CV 13–00288 MMM (Ex).
• Citation: 992 F.Supp.2d 998
• Parties: Martin VOGEL, Plaintiff, v. RITE AID CORP. dba Rite Aid # 05585; Thrifty Payless, Inc. dba Rite Aid # 05585; William J. Knight, Trustee of the William J. Knight Living Trust Dated May 11, 2000, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

992 F.Supp.2d 998

Martin VOGEL, Plaintiff,

v.RITE AID CORP. dba Rite Aid # 05585; Thrifty Payless, Inc. dba Rite Aid # 05585; William J. Knight, Trustee of the William J. Knight Living Trust Dated May 11, 2000, Defendants.

Case No. CV 13–00288 MMM (Ex).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Jan. 17, 2014.

Scottlynn J. Hubbard IV, Alexander Nowinski, Law Office of Lynn Hubbard, Chico, CA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

MARGARET M. MORROW, District Judge.

On January 15, 2013, Martin Vogel filed a complaint against Rite Aid Corporation, dba Rite Aid # 05585, Thrifty Payless, Inc., dba Rite Aid # 05585, and William J. Knight, trustee of the William J. Knight Living Trust dated May 11, 2000 (“Knight”), alleging violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (“the Unruh Act”), California Civil Code § 51; the California Disabled Persons Act (“the CDPA”), California Civil Code § 54; and California Health and Safety Code § 19953.¹ On March 13, 2013, the clerk entered Knight's default.² On April 25, 2013, Vogel filed the present motion for the entry of default judgment against Knight. ³ On May 15, 2013, the court dismissed the other two defendants with prejudice, pursuant to the parties' stipulation.⁴ Vogel seeks statutory damages, attorneys' fees and costs, as well as injunctive relief requiring Knight to bring the store into compliance with the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) and California's Building Code requirements.⁵

I. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT

Vogel is a T–3 paraplegic due to a motorcycle accident in 1986.⁶ He is unable to walk or stand, and needs to use a wheelchair when traveling about in public.⁷ Defendants own, operate, and/or lease Rite Aid Store No. 05585 (“Rite Aid”), located in Covina, California.⁸ Rite Aid is a retail sales establishment open to the public, and is intended for nonresidential use.⁹ Its operation affects commerce.¹⁰

Vogel visited Rite Aid and encountered both physical and intangible barriers that interfered with or thwarted his ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, privileges, and accommodations offered at the facility.¹¹ These barriers included: (a) access aisle slopes and cross slopes that exceed 2.0 %, making it difficult for Vogel to unload and/or transfer from his vehicle, as the slope caused his wheelchair to roll; (b) lack of parking spaces designated van accessible, making it difficult for Vogel to determine which space(s) would accommodate a van; (c) lack of van-accessible parking spaces, forcing Vogel to unload partially in a disabled parking space and risk being hit by an incoming vehicle; (d) lack of a sign on the men's restroom door indicating that the facility was accessible to Vogel; (e) a restroom door lock that required twisting, pinching, and/or grasping to operate, making it difficult for Vogel to use; (f) a water closet that obstructed the floor space required to access the disposable seat cover dispenser, making it difficult for Vogel to reach and use the dispenser; (g) a disposable seat cover dispenser that was mounted too high, making it difficult for Vogel to reach and use the dispenser; (h) a toilet tissue dispenser that was mounted too high, too far from the back wall, and too far from the front of the water closet, making it difficult for Vogel to reach and use the dispenser; and (i) pipes beneath the lavatory that were incompletely wrapped, causing Vogel to risk burning his legs when washing his hands.¹²

Vogel alleges that he was deterred from visiting Rite Aid on other occasions because he knew Rite Aid's goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations were unavailable to physically disabled patrons like him.¹³ Vogel asserts that he continues to be deterred from visiting Rite Aid due to future threats of injury created by the barriers. ¹⁴ He contends that defendants knew these elements and areas of Rite Aid were inaccessible, violated state and federal law, and interfered with or denied access to the physically disabled.¹⁵ Despite having the financial resources to remove the barriers without difficulty or expense, defendants purportedly refuse to remove the barriers or seek an unreasonable hardship exemption to excuse their non-compliance.¹⁶ For these reasons, Vogel asserts that defendants discriminated against him and the physically disabled public by denying them full and equal enjoyment of the store.¹⁷

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard Governing Motions for Entry of Default Judgment

A court may enter judgment against parties whose default has been taken pursuant to Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Security Cans., 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D.Cal.2002); Kloepping v. Fireman's Fund, No. C 94–2684 TEH, 1996 WL 75314, *2 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 13, 1996).

Granting or denying a motion for default judgment is a matter within the court's discretion. Elektra Entertainment Group Inc. v. Bryant, No. CV 03–6381 GAF (JTLx), 2004 WL 783123, *1 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 13, 2004); see also Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Elias, No. CV 03–6387 DT (RCX), 2004 WL 141959, *3 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 20, 2004). The Ninth Circuit has directed that courts consider the following factors in deciding whether to enter default judgment: (1) the possibility of prejudice to plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts; (6) whether defendant's default was the product of excusable neglect, and (7) the strong public policy favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir.1986); see also Bryant, 2004 WL 783123 at *1–2.

Once a party's default has been entered, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those concerning damages, are deemed to have been admitted by the non-responding party. See Fed. R.Civ.Proc. 8(b)(6); see also, e.g., Geddes v. United Fin.Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.1977) (stating the general rule that “upon default[,] the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true”). The court, however, must still “consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law.” 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2688, at 63 (1998) (footnote omitted); see also Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir.1992) (“[N]ecessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default”); Doe v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1272 (N.D.Cal.2004) (“[Although] the factual allegations of [the] complaint together with other competent evidence submitted by the moving party are normally taken as true ... this Court must still review the facts to insure that the Plaintiffs have properly stated claims for relief”).

If the court determines that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to establish liability, it must then determine the “amount and character” of the relief that should be awarded. 10A Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra, § 2688, at 63; Elektra Entertainment Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 394 (C.D.Cal.2005) (stating that the district court has “wide latitude” and discretion in determining the amount of damages to award upon default judgment, quoting James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir.1993)).

B. Procedural Requirements

Before a court can enter default judgment against a defendant, the plaintiff must satisfy the procedural requirements for default judgments set forth in Rules 54(c)¹⁸ and 55 ¹⁹ of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as with Local Rule 55–1. Local Rule 55–1 requires that a party moving for default judgment submit a motion (1) indicating when and against what party default has been entered; (2) identifying the pleading as to which default has been entered; (3) indicating whether the defaulting party is an infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether that person is represented by a general guardian, committee, conservator or other representative; (4) stating that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 App. U.S.C. § 521, does not apply; and (5) affirming that notice has been served on the defaulting party if required by Rule 55(b)(2). CA CD L.R. 55–1, 55–2; PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1174.

Vogel has satisfied these requirements. His motion states that the clerk entered Knight's default on the complaint on March 13, 2013.²⁰ It also states that Knight is not a minor or infant, incompetent person, in military service, or otherwise exempted under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, the predecessor to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.²¹ Vogel's motion seeks statutory damages, an injunction, and attorneys' fees—the same forms of relief sought in his prayer for relief.²² Additionally, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that, on April 24, 2013, although not required to do so under Rule 55(b)(2), Vogel served the motion for default judgment on Knight.²³ Vogel has thus complied with the procedural prerequisites for entry of default judgment. See, e.g., PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175 (finding that the procedural requirements of Rule 55 and Local Rule 55–1 had been met where plaintiffs addressed each required factor in their application for default judgment).

C. The Eitel Factors

The court must next determine whether, applying the Eitel factors, granting Vogel's motion for the entry of default judgment is appropriate.

1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first Eitel factor considers whether a plaintiff will suffer prejudice if a default judgment is not entered. PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Vogel contends that he has been, and continues...