Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Services

• Citation: 937 S.W.2d 856
• Parties: Walter P. VOGEL, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. WELLS FARGO GUARD SERVICES, Defendant/Appellant, and Dina Tobin, Director of the Division of Worker's Compensation, Tennessee Department of Labor, Second Injury Fund, State of Tennessee, and Charles Burson, Attorney General for the State of Tennessee.
• Decision Date: 07 October 1996
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

Page 856

937 S.W.2d 856

Walter P. VOGEL, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. WELLS FARGO GUARD SERVICES, Defendant/Appellant, and Dina Tobin, Director of the Division of Worker's

Compensation, Tennessee Department of Labor,

Second Injury Fund, State of Tennessee,

and Charles Burson, Attorney

General for the

State of Tennessee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Knoxville.

Oct. 7, 1996.

Ernest D. Bennett, III, Nashville, for Defendant/Appellants Wells Fargo Guard Services.

Charles W. Burson, Attorney General & Reporter, Dianne Stamey Dycus, Senior Counsel, Civil Division, Nashville, for Defendants/Appellants Dina Tobin and Charles Burson.

David H. Dunaway, David H. Dunaway & Associates, LaFollette, for Plaintiff/Appellee Vogel.

OPINION

WHITE, Justice.

In this workers' compensation case, we are asked to review the trial court's determination that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) is unconstitutional and that plaintiff is entitled to life-time workers' compensation benefits. Having considered the positions of the parties, the plain language and the legislative intent of the statute, and relevant authority in other jurisdictions, we reverse.

Walter Vogel was employed as a security guard with Wells Fargo Guard Services. As part of his obligation, he inspected tractor-trailers. During one such inspection, he slipped on a muddy embankment, fell, and injured his shoulder and back. At the time of his fall, Vogel was seventy-three years of age and had substantial preexisting health problems, including stomach cancer, heart difficulties, lung problems, and arthritic degeneration of the spine.

As a result of his work-related fall, Vogel sought the care of orthopedic doctors. Dr. Donald Ivey performed back surgery on Vogel and assigned a twenty-two percent physical impairment rating based on the back condition. Dr. James McKinney, an orthopedic surgeon, found that Vogel had a seventy-three percent impairment to the body as a whole, twenty percent of which was attributable to Vogel's back injuries. Another orthopedic doctor, Dr. William Kennedy, agreed that Vogel had significant body impairment and attributed twenty-five percent to the back injury. Based on this evidence, the trial court found that the medical evidence in the case supported a finding of twenty-three percent medical impairment to the body as a whole.

In addition to medical witnesses, Vogel presented the testimony of Dr. Norman Hankins, a vocational expert. Hankins testified that Vogel's vocational impairment was one hundred percent. As a result of this testimony, the trial judge found that Vogel was one hundred percent permanently and totally disabled as a result of the on the job injury. The state concedes that the evidence supported this finding. The trial court apportioned the liability sixty-five percent to Wells Fargo, Vogel's present employer, and thirty-five percent to the Second Injury Fund.

In addition to awarding benefits, the trial court found that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional. Specifically, the court held that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i)

would purport to limit [Vogel's] recovery for the compensable disability found by the court to exist, due to his age. The court finds that there is no rational basis for a situation which would, as in this case, if a person was ninety-nine (99%) percent disabled, award him three hundred ninety-six (396) weeks but, if he is one hundred (100%) percent permanently and totally disabled, limit him to two hundred sixty (260) weeks. The court therefore finds after reviewing the entire record that the age related caps contained in the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Reform Act ... should be and the same are declared to be arbitrary, capricious, illegal, and unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because they unfairly discriminate between workers based on age.

As a result of the trial judge's conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional, the judge awarded Vogel life-time benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.

The statute at issue is part of the Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1992. It provides, in relevant part, that

compensation shall be paid during the period of such permanent total disability until the employee reaches the age of sixty-five (65); provided, that with respect to disabilities resulting from injuries which occur after age sixty (60), regardless of the age of the employee, permanent total disability benefits are payable for a period of two hundred sixty (260) weeks. Such compensation payments shall be reduced by the amount of any old age insurance benefit payments attributable to employer contributions which the employee may receive under the Social Security Act, U.S.C., title 42, chapter 7, subchapter II, as amended.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) (1995 Supp.). Vogel contends that the statute is constitutionally infirm because of the distinctions it draws between workers who are injured before and after age sixty-five and between workers who are injured before age sixty and those who are injured between the ages of sixty and sixty-five. He challenges the statute as violating both the equal protection clause and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

I. Constitutional Analysis Generally

We begin with the presumption which the law attaches and which we cannot ignore that the acts of the General Assembly are constitutional. See e.g., Petition of Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768 (Tenn.1995); Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn.1993); Bozeman v. Barker, 571 S.W.2d 279 (Tenn.1978). In evaluating the constitutionality of a statute, we must indulge every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of constitutionality. Petition of Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768 (Tenn.1995). A statute comes to a court "clothed in a presumption of constitutionality [since] the Legislature does not intentionally pass an unconstitutional act." Cruz v. Chevrolet Grey Iron Div. of General Motors, 398 Mich. 117, 247 N.W.2d 764, 769 (1976). Therefore, notwithstanding the trial judge's findings in this case, we must begin our inquiry with the presumption that the statute in question passes constitutional muster.

II. Equal Protection Challenge

From the beginning, we turn to analyze the statute in question recognizing the very real concern that it violates equal protection by classifying individuals differently based on age. In analyzing equal protection challenges, we must first determine the appropriate measure of scrutiny. In Brown v. Campbell County Board of Education, 915 S.W.2d 407 (Tenn.1995), we discussed the three levels of scrutiny applicable to discrimination claims and concluded that claims such as these, in which the class allegedly discriminated against is not a suspect class, should be scrutinized under the rational basis test. Brown v. Campbell County Board of Education, 915 S.W.2d at 413-14. We join other jurisdictions in applying the rational basis test to constitutional challenges based on age. In a recent decision the Colorado Supreme Court held that "[c]lassifications based on age are not suspect or special warranting strict scrutiny or intermediate review." Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo.1996) (citing Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566-67, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976)). See also Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 431 So.2d 204, 221 (Fla.App.1983). Additionally, workers' compensation benefits are not deemed to be fundamental rights thereby triggering a higher standard of review. Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d at 66.

Under the rational basis test, our inquiry is whether the classification system has a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest. "Unless the individual challenging the statute can establish that the differences are unreasonable, the statute must be upheld." Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 154 (Tenn.1993). If the classification is naturally and reasonably related to that which it seeks to accomplish it has passed the rational basis test and has met constitutional standards. Our chore, then, is to determine whether the statute naturally and reasonably relates to legitimate state purposes.

Our Workers' Compensation Act, like most, draws classifications. The fact that a statute classifies people differently, and results in inequality, does not invalidate the statute. In fact, all classification systems involve discrimination, but "only invidious discrimination with no rational basis for the statutory classification ... offends the equal protection guarantee." Brown v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 3 Kan.App.2d 648, 599 P.2d 1031, 1035 (1979), aff'd, 227 Kan. 645, 608 P.2d 1356 (Kan.1980).

As is also true of most workers' compensation statutes, our statute uses age as a basis for various classifications. Benefits are terminated for permanently, totally disabled persons based on age and the length of benefits for others who are permanently and totally disabled depends upon their age.

The use of age as a basis for drawing distinctions is not necessarily problematic. In certain contexts, age-based discrimination has been deemed rational and essential to legitimate governmental purposes. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (mandatory judicial retirement at age seventy is constitutional); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (mandatory foreign service officer retirement at age sixty is constitutional); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (Massachusetts ban on employment of police officer over age fifty is constitutional). In the context of disability benefits, no presumption of rationality attaches; consequently, we must determine whether the discrimination is rationally related to any...