Vogt v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, No. 19-0676
| Decision Date | 25 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-0676 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Christina M. Vogt, Plaintiff Below, Petitioner v. American Arbitration Association, Defendant Below, Respondent |
Petitioner Christina M. Vogt, self-represented litigant, appeals the June 22, 2019, order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County dismissing her civil action and the circuit court's August 6, 2019, order awarding Respondent American Arbitration Association ("AAA") its attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $15,516.36, plus post-judgment interest at 5.5% per year. The AAA, by counsel Charles F. Printz, Jr. and William L. Burner, filed a response in support of the circuit court's orders. Petitioner filed a reply.
The Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court's orders is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
As a condition of her employment,1 petitioner agreed to the arbitration provisions set forth in her former employer's, Macy's, June 1, 2014, Early Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures ("arbitration agreement").2 The arbitration agreement provided that arbitration proceedingsbetween Macy's and its employees would be "decided by [an arbitrator] from the [AAA]" and pursuant to AAA rules.
On January 12, 2017, petitioner made a demand for arbitration, alleging that hostile behavior by other Macy's employees "resulted in [her] constructive discharge in July of 2016." Throughout the arbitration proceedings, petitioner was unhappy with both the AAA and the arbitrator. For example, petitioner questioned whether the first arbitrator assigned to her case was biased against her.3 Following the first arbitrator's recusal, a second arbitrator was selected to hear the case.
During discovery in the arbitration proceedings, petitioner felt that Macy's improperly withheld pertinent information and that the second arbitrator unfairly denied her motions to compel discovery. Petitioner further felt that the AAA's case management team was "unprofessional," which caused petitioner to contact the assistant to the AAA's president, a contact that violated the AAA's rules. Shortly before the final arbitration hearing, petitioner filed a complaint against the second arbitrator with the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and the arbitrator recused himself. Following the second arbitrator's recusal, in August of 2018, the AAA closed petitioner's arbitration case without reaching a decision due to petitioner's conduct toward the arbitrator.
On March 1, 2019, petitioner filed a civil action against the AAA in the Circuit Court of Berkeley County. By order entered on March 4, 2019, the circuit court directed petitioner to file an amended complaint in compliance with Rule 10(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Petitioner filed an amended complaint on March 20, 2019.
On April 15, 2019, the AAA filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint given the immunity provided to the AAA by the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ("the Act"), West VirginiaCode §§ 55-10-1 through 55-10-33, and further argued the Act required that the AAA be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred in the underlying action. On May 21, 2019, petitioner filed a response and a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. In the second amended complaint, petitioner alleged the following causes of action: Petitioner further alleged that during the arbitration case, "illegal and unfair practices [were] committed by . . . the [AAA] [and] its [a]rbitrator[.]"5 On June 3, 2019, the AAA filed a reply to petitioner's response to its motion to dismiss and a response to petitioner's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. On June 18, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on the AAA's motion to dismiss and petitioner's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.
By order entered on June 22, 2019, the circuit court granted the AAA's motion to dismiss petitioner's civil action and denied petitioner's motion for leave to file the second amended complaint. The circuit court found that allowing petitioner the opportunity to file the second amended complaint would be futile because, despite the labels petitioner gave to her purported causes of action, all of her alleged claims stemmed from her belief that she had been unfairly treated in the arbitration proceedings. The circuit court further found that the Act provided the AAA with absolute immunity regarding the administration of the arbitration proceedings and required that the AAA be awarded its attorney's fees and costs associated with the underlying action. Accordingly, the circuit court directed the AAA to file a motion within thirty days of the entry of its order requesting a specific amount of attorney's fees and costs along with documentation to support that amount and directed petitioner to file any response to the AAA's motion within fifteen days of the service of the motion.
On July 19, 2019, the AAA filed a motion requesting $15,516.36 in attorney's fees and costs. In support of its motion, the AAA submitted a spreadsheet itemizing its attorney's fees and costs and a sworn affidavit from its lead attorney verifying the amounts. Petitioner filed no response to this motion. By order entered on August 6, 2019, the circuit court awarded the AAA its attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $15,516.36, plus post-judgment interest at 5.5% per year.
It is from both the June 22, 2019, order dismissing the civil action and the August 6, 2019, order awarding attorney's fees and costs that petitioner now appeals. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her amended complaint, that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, and lastly, that the circuit court erred in granting the AAA's motion for attorney's fees and costs.
"Appellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo." Syl. Pt. 1, Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 226 W. Va. 214, 700 S.E.2d 183 (2010) ). The standard for reviewing a denial of a motion for leave to amend is deferential:
Syllabus point 6, Perdue v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 152 W. Va. 222, 161 S.E.2d 250 (1968).
Syl. Pt. 4, Bowyer v. Wyckoff, 238 W. Va. 446, 796 S.E.2d 233 (2017).
West Virginia Code § 55-10-16(a) provides that "[a]n arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in that capacity is immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial capacity." In West Virginia, judicial immunity is "absolute . . . [and] applies (1) to all judicial act[s]; unless (2) those acts fall clearly outside the judge's subject matter jurisdiction." Syl. Pt. 4, Roush v. Hey, 197 W. Va. 207, 475 S.E.2d 299 (1996).
Petitioner contends that contrary to the Legislature's public policy declaration set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-10-2(1), the AAA's actions in the underlying arbitration proceedings conclusively establish that arbitration is not "a more efficient and cost-effective alternative to court litigation." Accordingly, petitioner argues that to the extent that the AAA holds itself out as providing such an alternative, it has engaged in false advertising. Petitioner further argues that given the gap between the AAA's alleged promises and the outcomes in actual arbitration cases, this Court should "reconcile" the public policy declaration set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-10-2(1) and the grant of immunity afforded to arbitration organizations by West Virginia Code § 55-10-16(a). The AAA counters that the circuit court properly granted its motion to dismiss the civil action and denied petitioner's motion for leave to file her second amended complaint. We agree with the AAA.
"[W]here an amended pleading would be subject to a motion to dismiss on other grounds, such as immunity, it should be denied as futile." Pyles v. Mason County Fair, Inc., 239 W. Va. 882, 888 n.14, 806 S.E.2d 806, 812 (2017). As we explained in Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 147-48, 479 S.E.2d 649, 657-58 (1996), "claims of immunities, where ripe for disposition, should be summarily decided before trial," and "[t]he very heart of the immunity defense is that it spares the defendant from having to go forward with an inquiry into the merits of the case." Id. at 148, 479 S.E.2d at 658. (Footnote omitted).
Here, the circuit court found that allowing petitioner to file her proposed second amended complaint would be futile because, regardless of the labels petitioner gave to her causes of action, all of her claims (in the complaint, the amended complaint, and the second amended complaint) stemmed from her belief that she had been unfairly treated in the arbitration proceedings. As petitioner alleged in the second amended complaint, "illegal and unfair...
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