Volkswagen Ins. Co. v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 01 August 1967
• Docket Number: Nos. I-380,I-404,s. I-380
• Citation: 201 So.2d 624
• Parties: VOLKSWAGEN INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant. v. James R. TAYLOR, Appellee. VOLKSWAGEN INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 624

201 So.2d 624

VOLKSWAGEN INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant. v. James R. TAYLOR, Appellee.

VOLKSWAGEN INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.

Nos. I-380, I-404.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 1, 1967.

John I. Todd, Jr., of Howell, Kirby, Montgomery, Sands & D'Aiuto, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Marion R. Shepard, of Mathews, Osborne & Ehrlich, Alan C. Winter, Jr., and Evans, Stewart & Proctor, Jacksonville, for appellees.

WIGGINTON, Chief Judge.

Appellant, who was defendant in the trial court, seeks review of a summary judgment rendered in this case in favor of appellee James R. Taylor who was original plaintiff, and of a final judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company who was thirdparty defendant.

The factual setting out of which these causes of action arose is without dispute. Taylor was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned by Jessie Williams which was involved in a three-car collision on Phillips Highway in Duval County. The Williams car collided with the rear-end of a motor vehicle operated by an uninsured motorist, one James Stephens. As a result of this collision Taylor allegedly suffered personal injuries. When the vehicles came to a stop, the driver of Williams' car got out to examine the damage caused by the collision, while Taylor remained seated in the car. Before such examination was concluded, a second collision occurred in which an automobile operated by one John Forrest McEnulty, Jr., struck the Williams vehicle, thereby inflicting upon Taylor additional personal injuries from which he suffered damages.

Taylor brought suit against John Forrest McEnulty, Jr., owner of the third car, whose collision with the Williams vehicle allegedly inflicted additional personal injuries upon Taylor. The McEnulty suit was defendant by his insurance carrier who had issued a policy of liability insurance on his vehicle. Taylor's claim against McEnulty was amicable settled for the sum of $1,500.00 upon payment of which Taylor delivered to McEnulty a complete release from further liability, and terminated the litigation then pending between them.

Williams, the owner of the vehicle in which Taylor was riding, held a policy of liability insurance on his vehicle issued by appellant, Volkswagen Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as VICO. This policy contains an uninsured motorist clause which provides coverage for damages suffered by a passenger riding in the Williams automobile if cause by the negligence of an uninsured motorist.

Taylor, as a beneficiary under the VICO policy, made demand for the damages suffered by him as a result of the collision with the vehicle operated by the uninsured motorist, James Stephens. VICO questioned Taylor's entitlement to damages against the uninsured motorist, and furthermore questioned the amount of damages claimed as a result of his injuries. Because of this dispute the matter was referred to arbitration under the standard form of arbitration clause contained in the policy, in which VICO also denied coverage under its policy on the ground that Taylor had released McEnulty from further liability without the written consent of VICO. The arbitration proceeding resulted in an award in favor of Taylor in the amount of $6,571.00, together with administrative fees and costs.

Following the arbitration proceedings between Taylor and VICO, the latter refused to be bound by the award of the arbitrators, as a result of which this action was commenced. VICO resisted Taylor's claim for judgment on the primary ground that Taylor had violated the terms of the insurance policy issued by VICO to Williams in that he had instituted suit against McEnulty and given to the latter a complete release without VICO's written consent. VICO alleged that such violation relieved it of liability under its insurance policy issued to Williams, and immunized it against the claim asserted by Taylor as a beneficiary under that policy. Secondarily, VICO asserted as a further defense that it had paid Taylor the sum of $1,000.00 under the medical payments coverage of its policy with Williams, and that the amount of such payment should be credited as a set-off against any amounts which may be found due Taylor in the case.

After preliminary skirmishing on the pleadings, Taylor filed a motion for summary judgment. At the hearing on this motion the trial court announced that the motion would be granted and a summary judgment entered in favor of Taylor against VICO for the amount awarded by the arbitrators. At the request of Taylor the court deducted from the arbitration award the amount of medical payments paid to him by VICO and also the amount of settlement received by Taylor from the operator of the third vehicle, John Forrest McEnulty, Jr. At this hearing VICO moved for and was granted permission to file a third-party complaint against appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as State Farm. Pursuant to permission granted by the court, VICO filed its third-party complaint against State Farm alleging that it had issued to Taylor an automobile liability insurance policy containing an uninsured motorist clause similar to the one contained in the policy issued to Williams by VICO. The prayer of the complaint was for contribution from State Farm for its pro rata share of the judgment rendered against VICO in favor of Taylor in the main proceedings. Before State Farm was required under the rules to answer or otherwise plead to the third-party complaint, formal summary judgment was rendered in Taylor's favor against VICO. Thereafter, State Farm filed its motion to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground, among others, that summary judgment had already been rendered in favor of the principal plaintiff, Taylor, thereby foreclosing the right of State Farm to assert any defenses it might have against Taylor with reference to the issues in the case. From final judgment granting the motion and dismissing VICO's third-party complaint...