Volkswagen of America v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 18 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. A095728.,A095728.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent; Wilbur Adams et al., Real Parties in Interest.

114 Cal.Rptr.2d 541

94 Cal.App.4th 695

VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent; Wilbur Adams et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. A095728.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5.

December 18, 2001.

Review Denied March 13, 2002.

Justs N. Karlsons, James G. Scadden, Kathryn A. Amnott, Terrie L. Robinson,

David M. Rice, Laurie J. Falik, San Francisco, Carroll, Burdiek & McDonough, Counsel for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Alan R. Brayton, Gilbert L. Purcell, Novate, Lloyd F. LeRoy, Brayton, Purcell, Curtis & Geagan, Counsel for real parties in interest.

JONES, P.J.

In this case, we will hold that General Order No. 55, adopted by the San Francisco Superior Court to help manage its complex asbestos litigation, does not violate California Rules of Court, rule 981.1, which preempts generally applicable local rules.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By the early 1980's, the complexity and volume of asbestos-related litigation in state and federal courts had become the focus of substantial judicial resources and public attention. In response, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) established a working group to develop and publicize methods to resolve asbestos cases expeditiously. The working group produced a report which noted "[t]he complexity of the asbestos legal environment has resulted in almost total dependence upon the courts to resolve thousands of pending claims." (National Center for State Courts, Judicial Administration Working Group on Asbestos Litigation, Final Report with Recommendations (1984) part II, p. 3 (hereafter NCSC Asbestos Recommendations).) The report observed that the absence of prefiling claims processes and the practice of one claimant suing a large number of defendants resulted in excessive cross-claims and prolonged and duplicative pleading and discovery proceedings. (Ibid.) The report predicted that the "burden [on the courts] will grow as thousands of additional claims mature over the next twenty to thirty years, unless other means are developed to resolve such cases." (Ibid.)

Responding to this shared concern, the San Francisco Superior Court acted quickly to prevent the asbestos cases in its inventory from overburdening and monopolizing the judicial resources of the court. Acting pursuant to Section 19, California Standards of Judicial Administration¹ (hereafter Standards of Judicial Administration), the court, in August 1984, declared that all litigation then pending or thereafter filed which sought damages for death or injury caused by exposure to asbestos was "complex litigation" that would be assigned to a single judge. In the following years, the court then adopted a series of "general orders" to manage the complex asbestos litigation. (See, e.g., Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1154, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, [discussing General Order No. 21, which declared that the theory of market share liability, articulated in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, was not applicable to the asbestos cases]; Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry &amp Berry (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 9, 15, 267 Cal.Rptr. 896 [discussing General Order No. 41, which designated a particular counsel to schedule and supervise discovery on behalf of all other defendants] (disapproved on other grounds in Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 896-897, 899, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 838 P.2d 250).)

The order at issue in the present case, General Order No. 55,² was developed as part of this on-going process. Adopted by the court in January 1996, after more than 11 years of experience, the order states that an attorney who represents a party in asbestos litigation may file a master complaint or master answer which must be kept in a special file of the court. Thereafter, any party who is represented by counsel who has filed a master complaint or master answer, may file a summary pleading. The summary pleading must include (1) the names of the parties on whose behalf it is filed and against whom it is asserted, (2) notice that a master pleading is on file and that portions of it are being incorporated into the summary pleading, (3) those claims or defenses which are being asserted against the party being served, and (4) such case-specific information as is necessary to satisfy the pleading requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure.³

Real parties in interest are six individuals who separately filed summary complaints⁴ under the authority of General Order No. 55, seeking damages for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos. The complaints vary in their specifics, but in each instance, real party described the causes of action being alleged, and incorporated by reference portions of a master complaint that previously had been filed with the court.

Petitioners are three car manufacturers who were named as defendants in at least one of the complaints discussed above. Each petitioner was served with a copy of the relevant summary complaint, but not the master complaint on file with the court.

Petitioners believed the summary complaint procedure was invalid and they challenged it by filing demurrers and motions to strike. All the demurrers and motions to strike were essentially identical. Petitioners' primary argument was that the summary complaint procedure authorized by General Order No. 55 was invalid under California Rules of Court, rule 981.1,⁵ which preempts generally applicable local rules.

The court considered three of the demurrers and motions to strike at a hearing on May 11, 2001. The court orally overruled the demurrers and denied the motions to strike, and entered orders to that effect on May 21, 2001. Notices of entry were served on May 22, 2001.

The court considered the remaining demurrers and motions to strike at a hearing on June 8, 2001. Again the court overruled the demurrers and denied the motions to strike orally and entered orders to that effect that same day. Notices of entry were served on June 19, 2001.

On July 31, 2001, petitioners challenged the court's ruling on their demurrers and motions to strike by filing the present petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Writ Review is Appropriate

Real parties in interest urge us to deny writ relief without reaching the merits because writ review is not appropriate. They present three arguments on this issue.

First, real parties contend the petition is not timely. As a general rule, a writ petition should be filed within the 60-day period that is applicable to appeals. (Reynolds v. Superior Court (1883) 64 Cal. 372, 373, 28 P. 121; Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 496, 499, 165 Cal. Rptr. 748.) "An appellate court may consider a petition for an extraordinary writ at any time [citation], but has discretion to deny a petition filed after the 60-day period applicable to appeals, and should do so absent `extraordinary circumstances' justifying the delay." (Popelka, Allard McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 499, 165 Cal. Rptr. 748, italics in original.)

Here, the trial court entered orders rejecting three of petitioners' demurrers and motions to strike on May 21, 2001. Real parties served notices of entry the following day, May 22, 2001. Accordingly, the present petition, filed 70 days later on July 31, 2001, is not timely as to these three demurrers and motions to strike.

However, the petition is timely as to the remaining demurrers and motions to strike decided by the court on June 8, 2001. Since all the demurrers and motions to strike are essentially identical, it would serve little purpose to review the court's ruling as to some of them but not others. We will exercise our discretion to decide all of the orders in question even though the petition is not timely as to some of them.⁶

Second, real parties contend writ review is not appropriate because petitioners have an adequate remedy at law. According to real parties, petitioners could have sought relief in the trial court by way of a motion to "modify, revoke, or amend General Order [No.] 55 through the procedures available under the San Francisco Superior Court's General Orders Governing Complex Asbestos Litigation." We reject this argument because none of the general orders real parties cite provides a method for challenging or modifying a general order. General Order No. 1 establishes the general order system. General Order No. 3 establishes a special file for general orders. General Order No. 7 establishes a central file for "motions which seek a general order." General Order No. 8 states that parties seeking a general order must first obtain leave of the court. We conclude petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to pursue a remedy that has not been shown to exist.

Finally, real parties contend we should decline to reach the merits because any decision we might make "would not result in [a] final disposition as to the Petitioners." It is true that even if this court were to find the summary complaints insufficient, all petitioners stand to gain is an order sustaining their demurrers with leave to amend, not a final disposition of the cases against them. While the fact that a ruling would result in a final disposition does support the decision to grant writ relief (see, e.g., Curry v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 180, 183, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 495), real parties have not cited, and we are not aware of, any authority that holds writ review is only available in that instance. The petition raises significant issues of first impression that are likely to arise repeatedly in cases currently pending in the San Francisco Superior Court. Under these circumstances, we will exercise our discretion and grant writ review in order to provide guidance to the trial court in resolving similar claims in pending...