Voorhees v. City of Miami

• Decision Date: 20 December 1940
• Citation: 145 Fla. 402,199 So. 313
• Parties: VOORHEES v. CITY OF MIAMI et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

199 So. 313

145 Fla. 402

VOORHEES v. CITY OF MIAMI et al.

Florida Supreme Court

December 20, 1940

En Banc.

Suit by S.W. Voorhees, a taxpayer of the City of Miami, and an employee of the Department of Public Safety, Division of Fire, of City of Miami, against the City of Miami and others to restrain defendant city from receiving moneys to be placed in fund of retirement allowance and death benefit system under provisions of statute, and to restrain defendant city from invoking provisions of ordinance requiring an election of policemen and firemen prior to January 1, 1941, on order to be included in Group 5 of the retirement allowance and death benefit system, and for an accounting by defendant city for pension levies for the tax years 1937, 1938 and 1939. From a decree dismissing the bill of complaint for want of equity, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Ross Williams, Judge.

COUNSEL

Jack Moore, of Miami, for appellant.

Lewis Twyman, J. W. Watson, Jr., and William W. Charles, all of Miami, for appellees.

OPINION

CHAPMAN Justice.

On December 6, 1939, the City of Miami enacted Ordinance No 2230, which provided for retirement allowances and death benefits on account of employees of the City of Miami. The ordinance classifies all the employees of the City of Miami into five separate and distinct groups, viz (1) General men employees, exclusive of uniformed members of police and fire departments; (2) general women employees; (3) general police and firemen; (4) special women employees; (5) special policemen and firemen. When membership to either of the five groups has been declared, an assignment cannot be made to another group. The administration of the ordinance provision is lodged in a Board consisting of seven members, viz.: (a) City manager; (b) city director of finance; (c) two members to be elected by the city commission; and (d) two members of the civil service board of the city of Miami. The board, by the ordinance, is granted power to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations necessary to the administration of the provisions of the ordinance.

Any employee of the city of Miami can or may obtain membership in the retirement allowance and death benefits provided for by the ordinance. The retirement board is required to issue a service certificate to each employee which sets forth the length of service rendered to the city, and the certificate shall be conclusive for retirement purposes as to such service. The retirement board is required to issue to members a certificate of service when eligible to retire. The City Attorney is made legal advisor of the board, and power is granted to set up a medical board and employ an actuary.

The retirement allowance and death benefit system provided for by the ordinance is financed by contributions deducted from the salaries or wages of the members assigned to groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, and moneys raised by taxation on real and personal property within the city of Miami not to exceed 2 mills on the dollar, and from gifts, devises and bequests of money or property for the benefit of the respective funds enumerated in the ordinance.

The record shows that a levy was made for the benefit of all the employees of the city of Miami under Chapter 18689, Special Acts of 1937, Laws of Florida, against the real and personal property of the City of Miami. It is not necessary to recite other important features of the ordinance for the purpose of disposing of the case at bar. The charter power of the ordinance here challenged is Chapter 18689, Special Acts of 1937, Laws of Florida.

This case originated in the circuit court of Dade County, Florida, and was brought by a taxpayer of the city of Miami, who is an employee in the department of public safety, division of fire, of said city, and had been an employee for more than fourteen years. It is a class suit in behalf of those person similarly affected, and it was contended that Chapter 15338, Special Acts of 1931, Laws of Florida, creates a pension system for members of the Police and Fire Departments of the City of Miami, which contains a provision mandatorily requiring the members of the police and fire departments to be members of the retirement system and which provided for a deduction of 2% of the salaries or wages of the policemen and firemen, coupled with a smal assessment on the valuation of real and personal property of the city of Miami, and from those sources a fund was created and established under Chapter 15338, supra, and the fund was in existence and a membership of some four or five hundred policemen and firemen was entitled to participate in said fund so created.

The bill of complaint sought to restrain the city of Miami from receiving moneys to be placed in the fund of the retirement allowance and death benefit system under the provisions of Chapter 19112, Acts of 1939, Laws of Florida, and restraining the defendant from invoking the provisions of Subsection 4 of Section 3 of the ordinance requiring an election of the policemen and firemen prior to January 1, 1941, in order to be included in Group 5 of the retirement allowance and death benefit system, and for an accounting by the city for pension levies for the tax years 1937, 1938 and 1939, and that the proceeds of these levies be paid into the police and firemen's pension fund created under the provisions of Chapter 15338, Acts of 1931, and not placed to the credit of the funds enumerated in the retirement allowance and death benefit system.

The lower court denied the injunction or temporary restraining order and sustained a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint for want of equity, and an appeal has been perfected therefrom to this court.

It is here contended that Ordinance No. 2230, enacted as an emergency ordinance by the city of Miami on December 6, 1939 creating or establishing the retirement allowance and death benefit system, was illegal and void for the reasons, viz.: (a) the city commission was without authority to require compulsory contributions from the employees to the pension fund; (b) the ordinance was invalid in that it provided for pensions and annuities instead of pensions; (c) the authority to promulgate rules and regulations by the retirement board is a delegated power and void; (d) Chapter 18689, Special Acts of 1937, Laws of Florida, did not repeal Chapter 15338, Special Acts of 1931, Laws of Florida; (e) the police and fireman's pension fund established by Chapter 15338, supra, as a matter of law, should have been augmented by funds arising from tax levies made for the years 1937, 1938, and 1939, and moneys received from insurance assessments under the provisions of Chapter 19112, Acts of 1939.

We hardly think it necessary for a decision of this case to decide the several questions posed in the briefs. The Legislature of Florida, under Section 8 of Article 8 of the Constitution of Florida, is granted the power to establish and to abolish municipalities, to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time. It is under this provision of our fundamental law that the Legislature enacted Chapter 18689, Special Acts of 1937. In the case of State ex rel. Holton v. City of Tampa, 119 Fla. 556, 159 So. 292, 98 A.L.R. 501, the court had before it an act creating a pension fund for firemen of the city of Tampa, and, in sustaining the act, in part said: 'It is undoubtedly true that the establishment of a pension system for municipal officers and employees whereby after serving a certain number of years, or upon disability from injuries received in the course of their duties, they are to be retired from active service and paid a certain proportion of their salaries for the remainder of their lives, is a valid disposition of public funds when duly authorized by statute, and that the rights of a person in such a pension fund, even though he contributes to its maintenance, are not such as will prevent the Legislature from repealing or amending the statute, merely because the officer or employee has contributed to the fund so long as the fund existed and the law stood unrepealed. The foregoing rule is amply supported by authorities of which we approve. Anders v. Nicholson, 111 Fla. 849, 150 So. 639; Pennie v. Reis, 80 Cal. 266, 22 P. 176; Id., 132 U.S. 464, 10 S.Ct. 149, 33 L.Ed. 426; People ex rel. Donovan v. Retirement Board, 326 Ill. 579, 158 N.E. 220, 54 A.L.R. 940, and extended note giving cases; 21 R.C.L. 243; 48 C.J. 786; People v. Hanson, 330 Ill. 79, 161 N.E. 145; Turner v. Passaic Pension Com'rs, 112 N.J.L. 476, 163 A. 282, 10 N.J.Misc. 1270; Kavanagh v. Board of Police Pension Fund Com'rs, 134 Cal. 50, 66 P. 36; Aitken v. Roche, 48 Cal.App. 753, 192 P. 464; Macfarland v. Bieber, 32 App.D.C. 513.' See Annotations 98 A.L.R. 505-508; Annotations 112 A.L.R. 1009-1012.

The rule promulgated by this court in the case of State ex rel. Holton v. City of Tampa, supra, is in line with the weight of authority in McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., Revised Vol. 2, par. 529, pp. 271-275, viz.:

'529 (511). Retirement and Pensions.---- Laws exist providing that under named conditions certain classes of officers and employees may be retired and obtain designated sums from time to time from the public treasury in the form of a pension. Such laws contemplate meritorious service for a considerable time which is often specified, and also, a named age limit. Such benefits are being gradually extended. Laws so providing are sustained as valid and constitutional, on the ground that pensions are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered and for which pay was withheld to induce long continued and faithful service....