Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co.

Decision Date20 March 1991
Citation246 N.J.Super. 564,588 A.2d 417
PartiesEileen VOORHEES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PREFERRED MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Respondent.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Francis X. Garrity, for plaintiff-appellant (Garrity, Fitzpatrick, Graham, Hawkins & Favetta, attorneys, Francis X. Garrity of counsel, Rudolph G. Morabito on the brief, Montclair).

Anthony P. Pasquarelli, for defendant-respondent (Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys; Anthony P. Pasquarelli, Rahway, on the brief).

Before Judges PRESSLER, DEIGHAN and BAIME.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BAIME, J.A.D.

This appeal presents novel questions concerning an insurer's duty to defend its insured. The principal issue is whether a complaint alleging that the insured committed the torts of outrage and negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting in mental anguish to the claimant creates a duty to defend under the comprehensive general liability coverage of a homeowner's insurance policy. An ancillary question is how the insurer's duty to defend can best be enforced where an action against the insured includes covered and non-covered claims. We hold that the term "bodily injury," as used in the policy, encompasses the mental and psychological sequelae resulting from the torts of outrage and negligent infliction of emotional distress and therefore the insurer had the duty to defend. We also conclude that because the expenses incurred by the insured cannot fairly be apportioned between covered and non-covered claims, the insurer alone should bear the reasonable costs of the defense.

I.

In December 1985, Linda Sisto, a teacher in the Kenilworth public schools, filed a complaint in the Law Division, naming as defendants the superintendent, the principal, the board of education, two local newspapers, plaintiff Eileen Voorhees and another parent of a student. The complaint alleged that Sisto had been suspended from her teaching duties and directed to undergo psychiatric examinations as a result of the claims of several parents concerning her alleged lack of fitness. Sisto claimed that the school officials had acted unfairly and that she had been defamed by reports of the episode in the newspapers.

The fourth count of the complaint was directed against Voorhees and the other parent. Because the complaint was inartfully drafted, it is difficult to characterize accurately the specific claims made against the two defendants. The issue is an important one and we therefore quote liberally from the fourth count:

At various times and on various dates relevant to this complaint, defendants Constance Scuderi and Eileen Voorhees made false and erroneous statements about the competency and fitness of the plaintiff, such statements serving to place plaintiff before the public in a false light, further serving to interfere with her rights of privacy and to inflict upon her severe humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress and mental anguish. The statements as well as conduct of these defendants respecting the plaintiff herein were made and carried out wilfully, deliberately, recklessly and negligently. Moreover, these defendants knew or should have known that their statements about plaintiff were false and would probably, as occurred, place plaintiff before the public in a false light, interfere with her rights of privacy, cause her severe humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress and mental anguish.

As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, plaintiff was damaged in her reputation as a professional teacher and has been unable and remains unable to function in her customary teaching assignment. Moreover, she has been placed before the public in a false light, has had her rights of privacy interfered with and has suffered and continues to suffer embarrassment, humiliation, emotional distress and mental anguish. [Emphasis added].

Upon receipt of the complaint, Voorhees notified defendant Preferred Mutual Insurance Co. (Preferred) of the pendency of the suit and requested it to defend the action in accordance with its obligation under her homeowner's policy. In an exchange of correspondence, defendant declined Voorhees' demand. Initially, defendant asserted that Sisto's complaint sounded in defamation and that the damage to her reputation claimed did not constitute "bodily injury" under the policy. In a subsequent letter, defendant added that Sisto's claim fell within the policy's exclusion for intentional acts. Voorhees retained an attorney and ultimately settled the Sisto claim for the sum of $750. However, extensive discovery proceedings had occurred prior to the settlement. In the course of these proceedings, Voorhees' attorney had received a report from Sisto's psychiatrist, indicating that Sisto had experienced various physical symptoms as the result of the emotional distress allegedly caused by Voorhees' conduct, including headaches, nausea and stomach and body pains. According to the psychiatrist, these physical effects were consistent with Sisto's subjective complaints and were not idiosyncratic.

Following the settlement of Sisto's suit, Voorhees instituted this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Preferred was responsible for reimbursement of all defense costs, approximately $14,000. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The Law Division judge rendered an oral opinion, finding that although Sisto's claim did not fall within the policy exclusion for intentional acts, the complaint alleged defamation, a cause of action not covered under the insuring agreement. The judge granted summary judgment in Preferred's favor and this appeal followed.

II.

We commence our analysis with the well-settled principle that an insurer's duty to defend an action against the insured is measured by the allegations contained in the complainant's pleadings. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 44 N.J. 504, 512, 210 A.2d 221 (1965); Danek v. Hommer, 28 N.J.Super. 68, 77, 100 A.2d 198 (App.Div.1953), certif. granted 14 N.J. 465, 102 A.2d 693 (1954), aff'd 15 N.J. 573, 105 A.2d 677 (1954); 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (Berdal ed. 1979), § 4683 at 42. The duty to defend arises when the complaint states a claim constituting a risk falling within the purview of the policy language. Danek v. Hommer, 28 N.J.Super. at 77, 100 A.2d 198. If the pleadings state facts bringing the injury within the coverage of the policy, the insurer must defend regardless of the insured's ultimate liability to the complainant. 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, supra, § 4683 at 42. The nature of the damage claim, rather than the actual details of the accident or the ultimate liability of the insured, determines whether the insurer is obliged to defend. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 44 N.J. at 512, 210 A.2d 221; see also Hackensack Water Co. v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 84 N.J.Super. 479, 482-483, 202 A.2d 706 (App.Div.1964); Van Der Veen v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co., 30 N.J.Super. 211, 217, 103 A.2d 900 (App.Div.1954).

Applying these principles, we first look to the policy language. The standard form policy provides that Preferred will pay all sums recovered against the insured "because of bodily injury ... caused by an occurrence." The word "occurrence" is defined in pertinent part as "an accident." "Bodily injury" means "bodily harm, sickness or disease...." The duty to defend clause is broader than the indemnification provision in that it does not require the "bodily injury" be caused by an "occurrence." However, both clauses are subject to a policy exclusion which excepts from coverage "liability ... caused intentionally by or at the direction of any insured."

We next consider the allegations contained in Sisto's complaint. As we pointed out previously, the complaint was inartfully drafted and ambiguously phrased. The Law Division judge concluded that the fourth count alleged a cause of action for defamation. In the case of a complaint charging defamation, the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to identify the defamatory words, their utterer and the fact of their publication. Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., 212 N.J.Super. 83, 101, 514 A.2d 53 (App.Div.1986), certif. den. 107 N.J. 32, 526 A.2d 126 (1986). A vague conclusory allegation is not enough. Ibid.; see also Kotok Building v. Charvine Co., 183 N.J.Super. 101, 105, 443 A.2d 260 (Law Div.1981). Sisto's complaint does not satisfy that requirement. Of course, we have no occasion to consider the merits of Sisto's claim. Rather, our purpose is to determine whether Preferred had a duty to defend by comparing the allegations of Sisto's complaint with the coverage provisions of Voorhees' policy. We point to the defects in Sisto's pleadings to emphasize the uncertainty respecting whether it was her intention to allege defamation or some other cause of action or multiple claims. Construing the fourth count liberally, we conclude that the Law Division judge erred by finding only defamation alleged. In our view, the allegations set forth in the fourth count can just as well be interpreted as pleading the torts of invasion of privacy, negligent infliction of emotional distress and outrage. We must thus consider whether any or all of these causes of actions fall within the coverage of Voorhees' policy.

In a trilogy of decisions, we have addressed the question whether emotional distress qualifies as "bodily injury" under an insuring agreement. We first considered the issue in NPS Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 N.J.Super. 547, 517 A.2d 1211 (App.Div.1986). There, the complaint in the underlying action alleged acts of sexual harassment consisting of non-consensual touching resulting in the complainant's emotional distress and mental anguish. Noting the lengthening line of cases which has recognized that emotional distress is just as real as physical pain and its valuation no more difficult, see Strachan v....

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • Morton Intern., Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co. of America
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • July 21, 1993
    ...an "occurrence," construing the complaint as alleging causes of action that would be covered under the term "bodily injury." 246 N.J.Super. 564, 570-73, 588 A.2d 417. On appeal, we noted that the duty-to-defend clause was not triggered "absent a potentially-coverable occurrence," 128 N.J. a......
  • SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 17, 1992
    ...248 N.J.Super. 458, 466, 591 A.2d 677 (1991). Furthermore, citing the line of cases including Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 246 N.J.Super. 564, 588 A.2d 417 (App.Div.1991), Wolfe v. State Farm Ins. Co., 224 N.J.Super. 348, 540 A.2d 871 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 654, 546 A.......
  • Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • May 16, 1997
    ...1226, 1227 (1982); SL Indus. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188, 607 A.2d 1266 (1992); Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 246 N.J.Super. 564, 588 A.2d 417, 420-23 (App.Div.1991), cert. denied, 126 N.J. 340, 598 A.2d 897 (1991), aff'd 128 N.J. 165, 607 A.2d 1255 (1992); Gonzales ......
  • Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 17, 1992
    ...which held that a defamation claim is not covered under a bodily-injury policy. The Appellate Division reversed. 246 N.J.Super. 564, 569, 588 A.2d 417 (1991). A majority of the court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the complaint alleged only defamation and not alternative c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • CHAPTER 8
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Zalma on Property and Casualty Insurance
    • Invalid date
    ...based on an “occurrence,” construing the complaint as alleging causes of action that would be covered under the term “bodily injury.” 246 N.J. Super. 564, 570–73, 588 A.2d 417. On appeal, we noted that the duty-to-defend clause was not triggered “absent a potentially-coverable occurrence,” ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT