Voorhees v. Shull
Citation | 686 F. Supp. 389 |
Decision Date | 13 October 1987 |
Docket Number | No. CV 84-4648.,CV 84-4648. |
Parties | Donald VOORHEES, Plaintiff, v. Alfred SHULL, Commissioner of Police of Village of Rockville Centre, and Alfred Shull, Individually, and the Village of Rockville Centre Police Department and the Village of Rockville Centre, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Leeds & Morelli, Carle Place, N.Y., for plaintiff; Steven A. Morelli, of counsel.
Rivkin, Radler, Dunne & Bayh, Uniondale, N.Y., for defendants; Edward J. Hart, of counsel.
Plaintiff Donald Voorhees, a former Village of Rockville Centre police officer, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1988, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as punitive damages and attorney's fees, for the alleged deprivation of his federal constitutional rights. Voorhees attacks both the facial constitutionality and application of Police Department and Collective Bargaining Rules which require an officer on sick or injured leave to obtain permission from the Police Surgeon, Police Commissioner, supervisory officer, or duty officer before leaving his residence.
Voorhees moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Defendants Alfred Shull, Village of Rockville Centre Police Department and Village of Rockville Centre cross-move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for dismissal of the punitive damages claim against Shull.
The following facts are not in dispute. Voorhees commenced employment as a police officer for the Village of Rockville Centre in January 1969. In February 1982, he injured his back in the course of employment and was placed on injured leave with full pay. As an officer on injured leave, Voorhees was subject to Section 13.8 et seq. of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between the Policemen's Benevolent Association of Rockville Centre ("PBA") and the Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre, and to Police Department Memorandum No. 16-83.1
Section 13.8 et seq. of the Agreement provides:
To implement the provisions of the CBA, the Police Department of Rockville Centre issued Memorandum No. 16-83, dated October 13, 1983. The pertinent provisions are:
No guidelines exist for the application of these procedures.
Following Voorhees' placement on injured leave in February, 1982, he and Police Commissioner Shull reached an oral agreement whereby, pursuant to CBA Section 13.8.2, the Commissioner waived the provisions of Section 13.8 which required approval by a Police Department official for an injured police officer to leave home. Under this waiver, Voorhees was free to come and go as he pleased, subject to the limitation that he not engage in activities inappropriate for an officer on injured leave.
On October 11, 1984, Voorhees made an arrest in a nightclub at 3:00 a.m. Voorhees conducted what was later determined to be an improper search of the suspect and the suspect was released. Subsequent to this arrest, on or about November 1, 1984, the waiver of Section 13.8 was revoked and Voorhees was thereafter required to adhere to Memorandum 16-83. The parties disagree about the reasons for the revocation. Commissioner Shull states that he revoked the waiver because Voorhees' presence in a nightclub at 3:00 a.m. showed poor judgment. In Shull's opinion, "by placing himself in the position where a struggle might have ensued causing further injury or aggravation of his present injury Voorhees had conducted himself inappropriately," thereby violating the conditions of the oral waiver. (Shull Affidavit, ¶ 11). Voorhees suggests that the revocation was a "disciplinary action" stemming from the impropriety of Voorhees' search of the suspect. (Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition to Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶ 14). Voorhees' complaint pertains only to the period following revocation of the waiver.
Voorhees alleges that because of the enforcement of Memorandum 16-83, he was, from on or about November 1, 1983 until his retirement on March 1, 1985, "confined to his home for every hour of every day, absent the permission of his department to leave his home." (Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 1). He further alleges that he was "subjected to frequent harassing and threatening telephone calls, surveillance by police department personnel ... and unannounced visits, so that he virtually could not leave his home without permission of the representatives of the Police Commissioner." (Verified Complaint, ¶ Seventh). The Police Department Rules, Voorhees alleges in his first cause of action, deprive officers on sick or injured leave from the "right to travel, right to religious worship, right of free access, right of free association, right of privacy, right of liberty, freedom to care for their health and person, freedom from bodily restraint to compulsion and freedom to walk, stroll or loaf, as well as equal protection under the laws of both the United States and the State of New York." (Verified Complaint, ¶ Sixth). His second cause of action alleges an intentional deprivation of Voorhees' rights by Alfred Shull, individually.
In his complaint, Voorhees demands declaratory judgment as to the rules' constitutional validity, injunctive relief from disciplinary proceedings, one million dollars in punitive damages from Alfred Shull individually, and costs, including counsel fees, under § 1988. The injunctive relief is now moot, in light of Voorhees' retirement.2 Defendants assert that the rules, as written and as applied to Officer Voorhees, do not infringe any constitutionally protected rights, and that Shull in no way violated Voorhees' rights.
We set out the general principles governing summary judgment motions. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, affidavits and other evidence on record indicate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Katz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 737 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603, 606 (2d Cir. 1982). That burden includes the presentation by the moving party of such "`evidence on which, taken by itself, it would be entitled to a directed verdict.'" Donnelly v. Guion, 467 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir.1972) (quoting Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1943)).
Cross motions for summary judgment, such as the ones before the court, "will not, in themselves, warrant the Court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not in dispute." United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 553 F.Supp. 1220, 1224 (D.R.I.1982).
Generally, cases involving constitutional and civil rights questions do not lend themselves to summary disposition. Transport Limousine v. Port Authority of New York, 571 F.Supp. 576, 580 (E.D.N.Y.1983); see also C. Wright, A. Miller & M.K. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2732.2 (1983). In this case, however, the claim of facial unconstitutionality does not present issues that would preclude summary disposition. That claim presents the court with a question of law, and the residual factual dispute is irrelevant to the resolution of the facial validity of the rules. See Venuti v. Riordan, 521 F.Supp. 1027, 1030 (D.C.Mass.1981).
As to the issues of punitive damages and unconstitutionality of the rules as applied, however, material facts are unresolved, and those issues are unsuitable for summary adjudication. See, e.g., Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg,...
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