Voris v. Molinaro—Dissent

• Decision Date: 22 November 2011
• Docket Number: SC18435
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: VORIS v. MOLINARO—DISSENT

VORIS

v.MOLINARO—DISSENT

SC18435

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Date: November 22, 2011

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PALMER, J., with whom VERTEFEUILLE, J., joins, dissenting. The majority concludes that the loss of consortium claim of the named plaintiff, John G. Voris, against the defendant, Peter M. Molinaro, is barred because the plaintiff's wife, Joan Voris (Voris), settled her underlying negligence claim against the defendant. I would conclude that, under the circumstances of the present case, the plaintiff's lack of consortium claim should not be barred. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Although the majority opinion sets forth most of the pertinent facts and procedural history, certain of them bear emphasis and elaboration. The plaintiff brought his claim for loss of consortium, as well as a bodily injury claim, in the same complaint in which Voris asserted her claims for bodily injury and loss of consortium resulting from the defendant's negligence. The defendant subsequently agreed to pay Voris the sum of $50,000 in exchange for the release of her claims. The settlement agreement, which had been prepared by the defendant, specified that the defendant's ''payment is not to be construed as an admission of liability'' on the underlying negligence claims. The agreement contained no language, however, that could be construed as an admission by Voris that the defendant was not legally responsible for her injuries or that would prevent her from testifying with regard to the plaintiff's loss of consortium claim. The plaintiff did not sign the settlement agreement and the agreement made no reference to the plaintiff's bodily injury and loss of consortium claims.

Following the defendant's settlement of Voris' claims, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium on the ground that it was barred by this court's decision in Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 494, 408 A.2d 260 (1979), in which we stated that a ''consortium claim would be barred when the suit brought by the injured spouse has been terminated by settlement or by an adverse judgment on the merits.'' The trial court granted the motion to strike. Thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew his bodily injury claim and filed this appeal.

The majority concludes that the trial court properly granted the motion to strike because, under Hopson, a spouse's loss of consortium claim cannot survive the settlement of the other spouse's underlying personal injury claim. In Hopson, this court overturned its longstanding precedent and concluded that claims for loss of consortium are cognizable in this state. Id., 494-96. We concluded that the ''potential for improper verdicts'' did not militate against adopting this cause of action because, for among other reasons, ''a consortium action is derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action[and therefore] would be barred when the suit brought by the injured spouse has been terminated by settlement or by an adverse judgment on the merits.'' Id., 494. Although I agree with the majority that it is difficult to characterize this statement as mere dictum,¹ I would conclude that the statement was overly broad and should be overruled to the extent that it applies to cases, like the present case, in which the defendant was on notice of the loss of consortium claim when the underlying claim was settled.

First, it is significant that our statement in Hopson followed a thorough examination of the reasons why recognizing a cause of action for loss of consortium was appropriate, including a discussion indicating that joinder of the two spouses' claims should be required so as to avoid the possibility of inconsistent or duplicative verdicts and awards, and explaining that joinder of claims and proper jury instructions are sufficient to minimize potential for improper verdicts. Id. As I discuss further hereinafter, the risk of overlapping and inconsistent recoveries arises when the cases are not joined because in such circumstances, the parties may be unaware of the litigation and settlement status of the spouses' claims. Joinder ensures that the parties know about the status of the claims, and that knowledge, along with proper jury instructions in cases that proceed to trial, eliminates the risk of duplicative or otherwise inappropriate awards. Thus, as we suggested in Hopson, joinder is the key to avoiding such potentially problematic results.

Furthermore, this court's statement in Hopson that all loss of consortium claims are barred if the underlying claim by the injured spouse has been settled is not supported by the cases on which this court relied to support it. See id., citing Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d498,239 N.E.2d 897,293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968), and Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973). In Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., supra, 507, the court noted that ''there are practical difficulties in allowing a consortium action, especially with respect to retrospective application.'' (Emphasis added.) It was with respect to these difficulties with retroactive application that the court in Millington commented that, ''[w]here . . . the [injured spouse's] cause of action has been terminated either by judgment, settlement or otherwise, that should operate to bar the wife's cause of action for consortium.'' Id., 508. Similarly, the court in Diaz held that ''where the claim for the physical injuries has been concluded by judgment or settlement or the running of limitations prior to the coming down of this opinion, no action for loss of consortium thereafter instituted arising from the same incident will be allowed (Emphasis added.) Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 167.² Thus, Millington and Diaz were concerned with difficulties arising out of the retroactive application of the new causeof action for loss of consortium, and do not stand for the broad proposition that the settlement of the injured spouse's underlying claim extinguishes a loss of consortium claim in all cases.

Indeed, almost all courts that have considered the issue have held that, as a general rule, the settlement or contractual waiver of the injured spouse's underlying claim does not bar a subsequent loss of consortium claim. See Jenkins v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 30 So. 3d 414, 418-19 (Ala. App. 2008) (when injured spouse has settled claim, loss of consortium claim may be pursued independently); Letasky v. United States, 783 F. Sup. 451, 452 (D. Alaska 1992) (under Alaska law, settlement of injured spouse's claim excuses requirement that loss of consortium claim be joined with claim); Crouch v. West, 29 Colo. App. 72, 75, 477 P.2d 805 (1970) (settlement of injured spouse's claim did not bar loss of consortium claim); Jones v. Elliott, 551 A.2d 62, 65 (Del. 1988) (injured spouse cannot extinguish loss of consortium claim of other spouse by settling claim); Ryter v. Brennan, 291 So. 2d 55, 57 (Fla. App.) (husband's execution of release of all claims arising out of accident did not bar wife's subsequent loss of consortium claim), cert. denied, 297 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1974); Deese v. Parks, 157 Ga. App. 116, 118-19, 276 S.E.2d 269 (1981) (injured wife's contractual waiver of right to bring action did not bar husband's loss of consortium claim);³ Brown v. Metzger, 104 1ll. 2d 30, 39, 470 N.E.2d 302 (1984) (settlement of injured spouse's claim did not bar loss of consortium claim); Rosanderv. Copco Steel & Engineering Co., 429 N.E.2d 990, 992 (Ind. App. 1982) (injured spouse's settlement and release of workers' compensation claim did not bar plaintiff's loss of consortium claim); Huber v. Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53, 57 (Iowa 1993) (husband's contractual release of liability did not bar wife's loss of consortium claim); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Ky. 1970) (settlement of injured spouse's claim did not bar subsequent loss of consortium claim); Leray v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 950 So. 2d 707, 711 (La. App. 2006) (settlement of injured daughter's claims did not bar subsequent loss of consortium claim by parents); Gillespie v. Papale, 541 F. Sup. 1042, 1046-47 (D. Mass. 1982) (under Massachusetts law, release of injured spouse's claim did not bar subsequent claim for loss of consortium); Steele v. Botticello, 21 A.3d 1023, 1028 (Me. 2011) (release of underlying claim for physical injuries does not preclude loss of consortium claim when plaintiff was not party to settlement agreement and agreement did not cover plaintiff's claims); Oldani v. Lieberman, 144 Mich. App. 642, 650, 375 N.W.2d 778 (1985) (settlement of injured spouse's claim did...